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Abstract
The peculiar properties of quantum mechanics enable possibilities not allowed by
classical physics. In particular, two parties can generate a random, secret key at
a distance, even though an eavesdropper can do anything permitted by the laws
of physics. Measuring the quantum properties of the signals generating the key,
would ultimately change them, and thus reveal the eavesdropper’s presence. This
exchange of a random, secret key is known as quantum cryptography.
Quantum cryptography can be, and has been proven unconditionally secure
using perfect devices. However, when quantum cryptography is implemented, one
must use components available with current technology. These are usually imper-
fect. Although the security of quantum cryptography has been proven for compo-
nents with certain imperfections, the question remains: can quantum cryptogra-
phy be implemented in a provable, unconditionally secure way, using components
available with current technology? This thesis contains both a theoretical, and
an experimental contribution to the answer of this question. On the experimen-
tal side, components used in, and complete quantum cryptography systems have
been carefully examined for security loopholes. In particular, it turned out that
two commercial quantum cryptography systems contained loopholes, which would
allow an eavesdropper to capture the full secret key, without exposing her pres-
ence. Furthermore, this detector control attack could be implemented with current
technology. The attack is applicable against a variety of quantum cryptography
implementations and protocols.
The theoretical contribution consists of security proofs for quantum cryptog-
raphy in a very general setting. Precisely, the security is proven with arbitrary
individual imperfections in the source and detectors. These proofs should make it
possible to use a wide array of imperfect devices in implementations of quantum
cryptography.
Finally, a secure detection scheme is proposed, immune to the detector control
attack and compatible with those security proofs. Therefore, if this scheme is
implemented correctly, it oﬀers provable security.
i
Publications contained in this thesis are referenced in bold (i.e. [57]) throughout
the text.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The word cryptography originates from Greek and is composed by the words kryp-
tos which means hidden, and graphein which means writing. Placed together:
cryptography is the art of writing messages such that their content is hidden for
anyone but the intended receiver. The importance of cryptography cannot be suf-
ﬁciently emphasized. Without the cracking of the Enigma during the second world
war, the world history could have taken a very diﬀerent turn. Without the inven-
tion of public key cryptography in the seventies, it would be unreasonably diﬃcult
to communicate privately on the internet. Just imagine if all your non-face-to-
face communication such as phone calls, text-messages and internet activity were
openly available!
From the ancient Greece through the wars of the medieval times, the second
world war, and to today’s online banking, cryptography is the tool that more or
less permitted the public transport of important information. However, within
the ﬁeld of cryptography, there has always been a constant battle between the
code makers who invent the cryptographic schemes, and those who break them.
Every time a new scheme has been proposed, there has been an extensive eﬀort to
break it. Some try to break the schemes to identify security loopholes, in order to
improve security. Others try to break the schemes to eavesdrop the communication
with evil intentions.
Adding a new chapter to the constant battle between the makers and the break-
ers1, a new ﬂavor emerged 20 years ago, sprouting from quantum physics. Previ-
ously, the security of cryptographic schemes has been based on trusted couriers or
mathematical complexity, while in quantum cryptography the security is rooted
in the laws of quantum mechanics. Even the very best code breakers cannot break
the laws of physics, so it seems that the code makers got the ﬁnal word?
1For an entertaining introduction into the dramatic history of cryptography, I highly recom-
mend “The Code Book” by Simon Singh [1].
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1.1 The playing ﬁeld of cryptography
Before entering the ﬁeld of cryptography, and quantum cryptography in particular,
let us establish some terminology and game rules. The task of ﬁnding weaknesses
or breaking a cryptographic scheme is called cryptanalysis. The information which
is to be encrypted is usually called the plaintext, or just the message. The en-
crypted message is usually called the ciphertext. The goal of all cryptographic
schemes is that one party, commonly named Alice wants to send information to
the receiving party, commonly called Bob through some public channel. The goal
of the eavesdropper Eve, is to obtain the information through her access to the
public channel, in many cases preferably without alerting Alice and Bob.
Encryption and decryption involves the use of secret2 keys, which in a com-
puter context is just a string of ones and zeroes. In fact, an encryption device or
algorithm should only have the secret key and the message as inputs, and only
output the ciphertext. Likewise, the decryption device or algorithm should only
have the ciphertext and the secret key as inputs, and only output the message.
The security of the scheme should not rely on keeping details of the devices or al-
gorithms private. In fact, this is stated in Kerckhoﬀs’ principle for cryptographic
devices: a cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system,
except the key, is public knowledge. Security based on the secrecy of the devices is
often dubbed “security through obscurity,” and does not really oﬀer any security3.
The eavesdropper could simply buy a copy of the system and examine it. Even
when the systems are not sold, the history has shown that the details of a scheme
eventually become known to the eavesdropper. As Claude Shannon phrased it:
“The enemy knows the system”.
1.2 Symmetric cryptography
One of the ﬁrst known ciphers is Caesar’s cipher, used by Julius Caesar to com-
municate with his generals during his military campains. Caesar’s cipher is an
example of a mono-alphabetic substitution cipher: to encrypt the plaintext, each
letter is replaced with a letter a predetermined number of characters higher in
the alphabet. For instance, if the secret key is “f”, the letters of the plaintext is
replaced according to a→f, b→g, c→h and so forth. The ciphertext is decrypted
by replacing each letter with the letter the same number of characters lower in the
alphabet. The encryption is easily broken: the plaintext can be found by trying all
25 shifts in the alphabet, where only one shift will produce a meaningful message.
2Secret means unknown to any but Alice and Bob, and therefore Eve in particular.
3A simple example of security through obscurity is hiding the key to your front door under
the doormat. If the burglar knows the location of the key, the scheme is not secure any more.
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Still, Caesar’s cipher is a prime example of a symmetric ciphers.
In symmetric key cryptography, also called private key cryptography, Alice and
Bob agree on a secret, private, and preferably random keystring4. This key can
then be used to encrypt and decrypt messages in some cryptographic scheme (for
instance the secret key “f” using Caesar’s cipher in the above example).
The most important symmetric cipher is the one-time pad, invented by Gilbert
Vernam in 1917 [2]. On a character by character basis, the encryption and decryp-
tion works just as in Caesar’s cipher: each letter is shifted a number of characters
up and down the alphabet. However, in the one-time pad, the shift is changed
for each letter. For instance the code “fpt” would result in the word “the” being
encrypted as “zwx”. Now a brute-force attack would consist of trying each let-
ter in the alphabet on each of the three places. This would produce all possible
three letter words, hence Eve could just as well try to guess the plaintext. In fact,
the unconditional security (see Section 3.1) of the one-time pad was proved from
information-theoretic principles by Shannon in 1949 [3]. The result is simple to
derive, and is repeated in Section 3.1.
In the binary alphabet, the encryption and decryption algorithm of the one-
time pad is a bitwise exclusive or (XOR) operation5 on the message/cipher bits,
and equally many bits of secret key. Note that the key can not be reused, so the
one-time pad encryption consumes a number of secret bits equal to the number of
bits in the message. In fact, history has shown that reusing a key for the one-time
pad can be fatal: due to reuse of keys, Soviet spies were exposed, captured and
executed in the United States during the cold war6. As a matter of fact, not only
did Shannon prove the unconditional security of the one-time pad, but he also
proved that any unconditionally secure encryption scheme consumes at least as
many bits of secret key as the message. Therefore the symmetric ciphers suﬀer
from the key distribution problem: how much key is needed? And once Alice and
Bob cannot meet to “reﬁll” their key, how do you distribute the secret key?
The key distribution problem has led to the development of less key-consuming
ciphers such as DES [4], RC4, and AES [5,6] which are widely used in computers
today. However, from Shannon’s proof we know that these ciphers do not oﬀer
unconditional security: their security is merely based on the fact that they have
not been broken yet, and that it is believed that they are very diﬃcult to break.
4If the keystring is not random, it reduces the time it takes to ﬁnd the keystring by a brute-
force attack, since Eve can start with the most probable keystrings. An everyday example of
this is the dictionary attack, where the attacker assumes that the password/key is a word.
5The XOR operation is equal to adding modulo 2 bitwise. Another way of thinking about
the XOR operation when used to encrypt in the one-time pad, is that it inverts the message bit
if the secret key bit is 1 or leaves it untouched if the secret key bit is 0.
6Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were exposed by the VENONA eavesdropping project, and later
executed.
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1.3 Asymmetric cryptography
The other main class of non-quantum cryptographic schemes is called asymmetric
key, or public key cryptography, and does not suﬀer from the key-distribution
problem7. In asymmetric cryptography, Alice and Bob use diﬀerent keys: one
for encryption and a diﬀerent key for decryption. The ﬁrst publication on public
key cryptography came in 1976 by Whitﬁeld Diﬃe and Martin Hellman [7]. Two
years later came the now so widely used Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithm
[8]. The principle is that Bob generates a key pair, consisting of an encryption
key, also called the public key, and a decryption key, also called the private key.
The encryption key is made available to Alice, for instance by making it publicly
available. Alice uses the public key to encrypt the message. Once the ciphertext
is received by Bob he uses his private key to decrypt the message.
Public key cryptography solves the key distribution problem, because the en-
cryption key can be made publicly available. In this scheme, the eavesdropper
obtains the encryption key and the ciphertext. Finding the decryption key based
on the the encryption key is a factorization problem which takes an exponential
amount of time8 using currently known algorithms on a classical (i.e. non-quantum)
computer. By selecting the key size, the average time required to ﬁnd the private
key can be made arbitrarily large. However, there is a hitch: it is unknown whether
more eﬃcient factorization algorithms exist. Therefore, the security of public key
cryptography is based on computational complexity and assumptions about the
non-existence of more eﬃcient algorithms.
Unfortunately an algorithm which is polynomial in time exists for quantum
computers [9,10]. This makes public key cryptography insecure in the presence of
a scalable quantum computer9. Even without quantum computers, public cryp-
tography oﬀers no forward secrecy: Eve could capture and store the public key
and the ciphertext until suﬃcient computational power to decrypt the message is
available.
So it seems that solving the key distribution problem comes at the cost of the
provable security?
7Of course Alice and Bob need to authenticate in any cryptographic scheme: This requires
Alice and Bob to know some (not necessarily secret) information about each other, like the hash
of each others public key.
8Exponential amount of time means that the factorization time consumed by a classical
computer scales exponentially with the size of argument.
9Currently, the number 15 has been factorized on a magnetic resonance quantum computer
[11]. Also recently, a Canadian company started oﬀering quantum computers based on quantum
annealing [12]. Even though there have been discussions whether quantum annealing can be
used to implement general quantum algorithms [13], the company recently announced selling a
quantum computer to Lookheed Martin [14].
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1.4 Quantum cryptography
This is where quantum cryptography comes to a rescue! The strange laws of
quantum mechanics allow Alice and Bob to generate a secret, random key at a
distance, therefore solving the key distribution problem! Afterwards, the key can
be used in an unconditionally secure symmetric encryption scheme, like the one-
time pad. I will here give a brief overview of the history of quantum cryptography;
for a more complete story, see for instance the reviews by Gisin [15] and Scarani
[16].
In 1984 Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard suggested the use of elementary
particles to generate a secret random key at a distance [17]. The intuition comes
from the laws of quantum mechanics: in general, a measurement of a property
of a particle, can change the same property. This makes it impossible to copy a
quantum particle [18]. To exploit this for key distribution, Alice sends random bits
encoded in the properties of such elementary particles to Bob. These random bits
can later be used as a secret key. Any attempt at eavesdropping will we caught:
measuring the particles will change them, and reveal Eve’s presence to Alice and
Bob. If the particles were received undisturbed, the laws of quantum mechanics
guarantee that no one has knowledge of the bits in the key. Therefore, the security
of the key is not based on computational complexity, but rather on the laws of
physics.
The term quantum cryptography is somewhat inaccurate, since there is no
encryption involved. A more correct term is quantum key distribution (QKD),
which is the term I will use throughout this thesis10.
The protocol proposed in 1984 is now known as the BB84 protocol from the
names of its inventors. Alice sends a random bit in a random basis corresponding
to sending one out of four non-orthogonal quantum states to Bob. Bob performs
a measurement in a random basis. Afterwards they compare their bases, and if
they used the same bases Bob’s measurement result should correspond to Alice’s
random bit. If they used diﬀerent bases the bits are discarded. Their remaining
random bits is a private secret key. To check for eavesdropping, they publicly
compare a fraction of their keys to check for errors. A full review of BB84 is given
in Section 2.1.
Independently, and without knowledge of Bennett and Brassard’s ﬁndings,
Arthur Ekert proposed to use entangled states to perform key distribution [19].
His intuition came from the fact that measuring each of the two particles in an
entangled state gives correlated measurement results, even if the two particles
are measured at a distance. These strong quantum correlations will necessarily
10Although some prefer to call it quantum key growing, since the authentication of Alice and
Bob requires a small initial key.
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violate the Bell inequalities [20]. Any measurement on an entangled state brings
“local reality” [21] to the properties of the particle such that further measurements
will not violate the Bell inequalities. Therefore, the violation of Bell inequalities
means that no eavesdropping has taken place. This makes it is possible to re-
veal any eavesdropper. In fact, one could even let the eavesdropper produce the
entangled states.
The protocol proposed by Ekert is named E91 or simply the Ekert protocol.
Here Alice and Bob each have one particle from an entangled state. Both Alice and
Bob measure their respective particles in one out of three diﬀerent bases. Again,
the same basis choice gives perfectly correlated results, and these bits are the key.
The other bits where their bases diﬀer, are used to check for the eavesdropper
by verifying the violation of a Bell inequality. Later Bennett, Brassaird and Mer-
main claimed that prepare-and-measure protocols such as BB84, and entanglement
based protocols such as the Ekert protocol are equivalent [16,22].
In 1992 Bennett showed that it is possible to perform QKD using only two
non-orthogonal states [23] in the so-called B92 protocol.
The ﬁrst experimental demonstration of a QKD system was conducted by Ben-
nett et al. in 1992 [24]. This lab-bench experiment had a 32 cm free-space quantum
channel, with the quantum states encoded in the polarization of photons. After
this demonstration, the interest for QKD rapidly increased, as did the experimen-
tal activity. Soon QKD was demonstrated in an optical commercial telecomcable
over 23 km [25]. Currently, the distances has been increased to 250 km for an opti-
cal ﬁbre [26], and 144 km in free space [27]. Today there exist several commercial
companies which supply QKD systems.
Theory also came a long way since 1984. An important discovery was privacy
ampliﬁcation [28], which makes it possible to remove Eve’s partial knowledge about
the secret key by discarding some of the key during public discussion. Afterwards
the ﬁrst security proofs were established [29–32], proving the unconditional security
of BB84 using perfect devices. In turn, people started considering the security
of QKD with models of real devices [33–35]. Unfortunately, the early security
analysis used an insuﬃcient security deﬁnition (see Section 3.2). In 2005, a new
composable security deﬁnition was found [36, 37], and subsequently most of the
existing security proofs were updated or patched.
Even though QKD has been proven secure, it is a considerable challenge to
implement it. The presence of side channels was realized already during the ﬁrst
experimental demonstration [24], when noise from the Pockels cells power supplies
revealed the secret key, making the system “secure against any eavesdropper who
happened to be deaf!” [38].
One imperfection which received considerable attention was the use of a coher-
ent source at Alice, which frequently sends more than one photon in each pulse.
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This allows the photon-number-splitting attack [39, 40], where Eve blocks single
photons from Alice, and takes a photon for herself from the pulses containing
multiple photons. Although covered by security proofs [33,34][41], the impact on
the key rate and communication distance is devastating. Therefore, new protocols
emerged [42–45] to allow implementations with only a modest reduction in key
rate from an imperfect source.
A host of other security loopholes have also been identiﬁed [46–56][57][58,59] in
the implementations. From Eve’s point of view, the most successful class of attacks
is the detector control attacks [57,60]. Exploiting the detector response to bright
illumination, they allow Eve to capture the full secret key, without causing errors in
the key. Furthermore, the eavesdropping device is implementable with oﬀ-the-shelf
components. Detector control has been demonstrated in two commercial quantum
key distribution systems [57], and a full eavesdropper has been used to capture
the full secret key of an experimental QKD system at the National University of
Singapore [58]. The search for implementation loopholes is often referred to as
quantum hacking.
Even with very general security proofs [33][41], it seems to be challenging
to make implementations within the assumptions of the proofs. In parallel with
the success of quantum hacking, the idea of device independency was established.
In device-independent QKD (DI-QKD) [19, 61, 62] the number of assumptions on
the devices is reduced to a minimum. However, the remaining assumptions are
challenging to implement. In particular, the proofs depend on a loophole-free
Bell test, which requires a high detection probability at Bob. Otherwise, the
correlations seen at Alice and Bob can originate from a pre-programmed computer.
Although there are proposals to circumvent the detection loophole [63–65] at a
distance [66], it seems experimentally challenging and promises at best moderate
key rates. Therefore, it remains an open question if we will ever see DI-QKD
outside the laboratory [67].
1.5 Motivation for this work
When I entered this ﬁeld in 2006, I got the impression that QKD was quite mature.
There were several startup companies producing QKD systems, and quite general
security proofs incorporated a wide array of imperfections. However, a loophole
not covered by the existing security proofs was found by our group. Therefore my
motivation was that, by weeding out some remaining loopholes, practical QKD
could deliver its provable, unconditional security. During my PhD, I have been
given the opportunity to test commercial QKD systems to see if they actually
comply with the assumptions in the security proofs. This is a very important task:
all mature security technologies, for instance RSA public-key cryptography [68],
7
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did not become practically secure before the implementation had received massive
scrutiny from independent researchers, and loopholes were closed. Therefore, if
QKD is to mature, it is crucial that the security of the practical devices is tested
by independent researchers, in order to obtain a reasonable level of security.
8
Chapter 2
The principles of quantum key
distribution
There are numerous techniques in various quantum key distribution protocols,
but they all rely on the same fundamental principle from quantum mechanics:
in general, a measurement of a quantum state necessarily perturbs the quantum
state. In particular, the no-cloning theorem [18] shows that it is impossible to
copy a quantum bit (qubit). Therefore, by generating and measuring qubits in a
suitable way, any eavesdropper must necessarily change the states of the qubits by
measuring them, and therefore reveal her presence.
In this chapter, the ﬁrst and most important protocol, the BB84 protocol is
presented. Several other protocols have been proposed and implemented, mainly
to increase practical performance, or to simplify the implementation. Some of
those protocols will be presented in subsequent chapters.
2.1 The BB84 protocol
The BB84 protocol is the QKD protocol which was ﬁrst proposed [17], implemented
[24], and proved unconditionally secure [29, 31]. It has the advantage of being
intuitive and easy to understand, but it might not be the optimal protocol to
implement in practice.
QKD protocols require Alice and Bob to share a quantum channel, capable
of transporting qubits, and a classical channel, for instance the internet. Eve is
allowed to do anything allowed by physics with the qubits in the quantum channel.
The classical channel is authenticated1 by Alice and Bob. Therefore, while Eve
1Unconditionally secure authentication schemes exists. However, breaking the authentica-
tion after the secret key is generated does not compromise the security of the key. Therefore,
authentication schemes that guarantee the security for a limited amount of time are suﬃcient.
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can read all the information in the classical channel, she can not change this in-
formation. To authenticate the classical channel, previously generated secret key
is used2. Therefore QKD is often referred to as secret growing.
BB84 protocol:
1. Alice generates N random classical bits, and for each bit she randomly
chooses the Z = {|0〉, |1〉} or the X = {|−〉, |+〉} basis, where |+〉 =
1√
2(|0〉 + |1〉) and |−〉 = 1√2(|0〉 − |1〉). For each bit, she generates a qubit
and sends it to Bob. If the bit value is 0, she sends |0〉 or |−〉, and if the bit
value is 1, she sends |1〉 or |+〉.
2. Bob measures the N qubits in a random basis; either the Z or the X basis.
Bob’s measurement result will be equal to Alice’s bit value if they used the
same basis. If they used opposite bases, Bob’s measurement result will be
random. This initial key is often called the raw key.
3. Alice and Bob publicly announce their basis choices over the classical chan-
nel, and discard the bits where they used diﬀerent bases. With a high prob-
ability, they have about N/2 bits left, commonly called the sifted key.
4. Alice randomly selects a fraction of the remaining bits, and publicly an-
nounces the bit values. Bob compares Alice’s bit values with his measure-
ment results to check for Eve’s presence. From this set, they can estimate
the quantum bit error rate (QBER). If it is suﬃciently low they continue the
protocol with the remaining m-bit key (how low is suﬃciently low will be
discussed in Chapters 3 and 5). Otherwise, they discard the key and start
over again.
5. The last step is called reconciliation. Using the QBER estimate Alice sends
Bob error correcting data to obtain equal keys. The QBER enables Alice
and Bob to upper bound Eve’s information about the key. Then, Eve’s
information about the key is removed by discarding parts of the key. This
is called privacy ampliﬁcation (see Section 2.3). In this step, the m-bit
erroneous, partly secure key is reduced to an n-bit ﬂawless, unconditionally
secure key.
2For the ﬁrst run, a pre-established (small) secret key is used for authentication. At ﬁrst this
might appear as a drawback for QKD, but absolutely all (including all classical) cryptographic
schemes require authentication to avoid the man-in-the-middle attack. In this attack, Eve poses
as Alice to Bob, and as Bob to Alice, but in fact both Alice and Bob communicate only with
Eve. To avoid this attack, all protocols require some preshared information about the parties.
In QKD this is a random, secret key. In classical cryptography there exists schemes where the
preshared information is publicly available (i.e. the MD5 or SHA1 hash of a public key), but
these schemes are not unconditionally secure.
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50%
50%
source
100%
0%Photon-
a) b) c)
Figure 2.1: The components used for a simple polarization encoded BB84 scheme.
a) A photon source is followed by a linear polarizer to generate a qubit with the
desired polarization, in this case a horizontally polarized photon. b) When a hor-
izontally polarized photon propagates through a horizontally oriented polarizing
beam splitter (PBS), it is deterministically found in the exit of the beam splitter
corresponding to the horizontal polarization. c) When a horizontally polarized
photon propagates through a +45◦ oriented PBS, the photon has 50% probability
to be found in each exit (but the photon will only be detected in one of them!).
Furthermore, if the photon is found in the ±45◦ exit of the PBS, the photon will
have a ±45◦ polarization afterwards. Therefore, the measurement has changed the
state of the photon.
During the reconciliation step Alice’s key was selected as the reference key,
and Alice sent information to Bob such that he could correct his key. The proce-
dure could have been done in the opposite direction, often referred to as reversed
reconciliation.
The protocol can be illustrated in a simple way by using the polarization of
photons as qubits. As we will see in Chapter 4, photons are used as qubits in
implementations. Figure 2.1 shows how to generate, encode and measure photons
as qubits. Figure 2.2 illustrates the BB84 protocol for a polarization encoded QKD
scheme.
2.2 Example of an attack
Let us brieﬂy examine why a simple attack strategy fails. The most intuitive would
be for Eve to collect the qubit, copy it, and send one copy to Bob. After the basis
is revealed she could measure her copy in the same basis, and obtain the bit correct
value. But the no-cloning theorem [18] makes it impossible to copy the qubit, so
this strategy is physically impossible.
Let us see what happens if Eve tries to measure the qubits sent by Alice. Since
she does not know the basis used by Alice and Bob3, she randomly uses the Z or X
basis. For half the bits she will guess the correct basis, and then she measures the
3For BB84, Alice and Bob discard the bits where they used diﬀerent bases, so it is only
necessary to consider the case where Alice and Bob used the same basis.
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H/V basis
H/V basis
source
0
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0 0 1 1 0011 1 0 0 10
0 0 1 0 1 0
1
”1”
”0”
±45◦ basis
±45◦ basis
0
Alice
Bob
Alice’ bit
Alice’ basis
Photon-
Secret key
Same basis?
Bob’s basis
Bob’s measurement
Same basis?
Secret key
No Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes
Figure 2.2: The BB84 protocol illustrated with photons. Here, the horizontal/ver-
tical (H/V) basis corresponds to the Z basis and the ±45◦ basis corresponds to
the X basis.
correct bit value. These qubits are unaﬀected by Eve’s measurement, and Bob’s
measurement results will correspond to Alice bit values. No QBER is introduced.
For the other half of the bits, Eve will use the opposite from Alice’s and Bob’s
basis. For these bits, the probability to measure the same bit value as Alice is
50%. The qubit is passed on to Bob in the wrong basis, so regardless of Eve’s
measurement result, Bob will have a 50% probability of measuring the opposite
of Alice’s bit value. In other words, Eve’s attack will introduce 50% QBER for
half of the bits, a total of 25% QBER. Figure 2.3 illustrates this attack for the
polarization encoded scheme presented in Figure 2.2.
This type of attack is called an intercept-resend attack because Eve fully mea-
sures the qubits from Alice. For such attacks, Eve always has more information
about Alice’s bits than Bob has. Therefore, obviously the QBER accepted by Alice
and Bob must be lower than 25%. The acceptable QBER depends on the assump-
tions about Alice’s and Bob’s devices, and will be discussed in detail in Chapters 3
and 5. Note that Eve could achieve an arbitrarily low QBER by attacking just a
fraction of the qubits. Therefore, a non-zero QBER means that Eve might have
some information about the key.
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Bob
Alice’ bit
Alice’ basis
001
Same basis?
Same bit value? Same bit value?
Same basis?
Bob’s measurement
Bob’s basis
Photon-
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Yes
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Figure 2.3: Eve’s attempt at a simple intercept-resend attack. She always uses
the same H/V basis (Z basis) to measure the photons, since this is equally likely
to be the correct basis choice as any other choice. For the bits where Eve’s basis
choice is diﬀerent from the one of Alice and Bob, she will introduce errors in the
key. Therefore, when Alice and Bob estimate the QBER (using a fraction of the
key, in this case 3 bits) her presence is revealed.
2.3 Privacy ampliﬁcation
Let’s assume that after error correction, Alice and Bob have a ﬂawless, private key
where parts of the key is known to Eve. It turns out that it is possible for Alice
and Bob to sacriﬁce parts of the key to obtain a smaller key on which Eve has no
information. The procedure is called privacy ampliﬁcation [28].
An intuitive algorithm goes as follows: Alice announces that two of the bits are
to be replaced with a single bit. The bit value of this bit is the XOR of the two
bit values. If Eve knew each bit value independently with 75% probability, she
knows the correct XOR value with probability 0.752 + 0.252 = 0.625. Thus Eve’s
information about this bit is less than her information about each of the previous
bits.
In practice, a diﬀerent algorithm is used. The only privacy ampliﬁcation
algorithm that preserves composability (see Section 3.2) is two-universal hash-
ing. A hash function maps all 2n n-bit inputs to all 2m m-bit outputs. Since
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m < n there exists a probability that two diﬀerent inputs produce the same out-
put. The family of two-universal hash functions F has the property that for all
f ∈ F , and all x, x′ ∈ (Z2)n, the probability of a collision is upper-bounded as
p(f(x) = f(x′)) ≤ 1/2m. Therefore, Alice and Bob randomly choose a function
f ∈ F , and obtain the secret key s = f(x), where x is the key after error correc-
tion. If Eve has a slightly diﬀerent key x′, the probability that she obtains the
same key f(x′) is equal or less than 1/2m, so any guess is equally probable to be
the key as f(x′).
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Theoretical security
So far the security of QKD has been based on the fact that Eve cannot measure
the qubits without introducing errors in the key. However, quantum physics allows
more powerful interactions than a projective measurement! Normally, Eve’s attack
is classiﬁed as follows [69]:
• In individual attacks (also called incoherent attacks) Eve treats every quan-
tum system from Alice equally. One example of an individual attack is the
intercept-resend attack considered in Section 2.2. A more general attack is
to let each quantum system from Alice interact with an individual probe1,
and measure the probe later. In diﬀerent deﬁnitions of individual attacks,
it varies whether the measurement of the probe must happen before or after
sifting [16]. Note that for the BB84 protocol, the best individual attack has
been found [70].
• A stronger class of attacks is collective attacks. As for the individual attacks,
Eve may let the each system from Alice interact with a probe. After the
interactions, Eve has a number of probes. In this class of attacks Eve can
wait arbitrarily long, for instance until the key is used in some application
like the one-time pad. Then she can do a collective measurement on all the
probes simultaneously.
• The most powerful class of attacks is called coherent attacks, or general at-
tacks. Here Eve can have any interaction with the system from Alice and
perform any measurement at any time. She could for instance entangle mul-
tiple bits, and/or use the same probe for many bits.
1A probe is a quantum system in a well-deﬁned state, typically a number of quantum bits
each prepared in the state |0〉.
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The exponential de Finetti theorem [71,72] proves that in the asymptotic limit
of inﬁnite keys, and if Bob’s signals have a suﬃciently low dimension, any coher-
ent attack is not better than the best collective attack. Therefore, under such
circumstances, it suﬃces to prove the security against collective attacks. However,
the prerequisites are not always fulﬁlled for devices with imperfections. To apply
the de Finetti theorem, the (entanglement based) protocol must be invariant to a
permutation of Alice’s and Bob’s N particle pairs after they have been distributed.
This is clearly not the case for collective errors, for instance in the case of after-
pulses (see Section 4.1.3). In general, the dimension of Bob’s signals will be of
inﬁnite dimension, and therefore the de Finetti theorem does not apply. In some
cases, this can be solved by proving the existence of a squash operator [73–76],
such that one can assume that Eve only sends single qubits to Bob. However,
in the presence of certain imperfections, for instance detector eﬃciency mismatch
(see Section 5.5), no squash operator has been found2.
3.1 Provable security
Provable secure means that the security is proven without restricting the eaves-
dropper in computational power, time or physical access to the communication
channel. The only requirement is that the attacker obeys the laws of physics, and
that the protocol is correctly implemented3.
Since it is straightforward, let us prove that the one-time pad (see Section 1.2)
is unconditionally secure. Assume a n-bit message M ∈ (Z2)n where P (M = m)
follows some probability distribution. Furthermore, assume a random, secret key
K ∈ (Z2)n where all keys are equally probable: P (K = k) = 1/2n. Let the
ciphertext be denoted by c ∈ (Z2)n. Since all possible keys k map m into all
possible ciphers c in (Z2)n, the conditional probability on the cipher c given the
message m is equal to P (C = c|M = m) = 1/2n. In turn the probability of a
speciﬁc ciphertext c for any message m is found as
P (C = c) =
∑
m
P (C = c|M = m)P (M = m) =∑
m
P (M = m) 12n =
1
2n . (3.1)
2Squash operators have been found for BB84 for speciﬁc measurement setups for Bob: when
Bob’s detectors are identical and his basis selector is simply a Hadamard transform on each
photon of the received pulse [74,77], or if Bob’s measurement operators are symmetric under the
cyclic group C4 [76].
3As a trivial example: Alice or Bob should not reveal the secret key, nor the secret message to
Eve. Although trivial, in practice this kind of information leakage is a highly relevant problem.
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Then, Bayes’ theorem gives
P (M = m|C = c) = P (C = c|M = m)P (M = m)
P (C = c) =
1/2nP (M = m)
1/2n
= P (M = m),
(3.2)
which means that the probability of a given message m is the same if the ciphertext
is known. In other words: the ciphertext reveals nothing about the plaintext.
3.2 Security deﬁnition for QKD
One would like to prove that a QKD protocol gives a random, secret key to Alice
and Bob, while zero information about the key is given to Eve. This means that
the best attempt Eve could do to ﬁnd the key is to try to guess. Unfortunately, Eve
could always attack a few bits, and the privacy ampliﬁcation could fail, leaving Eve
with a tiny information about the key. In practice, the security is deﬁned such that
the information left to the eavesdropper is quantiﬁed, and can be made arbitrarily
small. The ﬁrst security deﬁnition was the following: “A QKD protocol is -secure
if, for any security parameters  > 0 and s > 0 chosen by Alice and Bob, and for any
eavesdropping strategy, either the scheme aborts, or it succeeds with probability at
least 1− O(2−s), and guarantees that Eve’s mutual information with the ﬁnal key
is less than . The key must also be exponentially close to uniformly distributed
[78, 79].” The security deﬁnition is very intuitive: the protocol should normally
succeed, and Eve’s mutual information with the key can be made arbitrarily small.
Under this security deﬁnition the achievable secret key rate R is given by [80]
R ≥ I(A,B) − min {I(A,E), I(B,E)} , (3.3)
where I( · , · ) denotes the mutual information [81] two parties (A stands for Alice,
B for Bob, and E for Eve).
This deﬁnition is insuﬃcient because it considers the information after the par-
ties (including Eve) have measured their quantum systems. Quantum mechanics
is often counterintuitive, and it turns out that if Eve is given one extra bit of
information before she measures her probe, this could unlock more than one bit
of information [82]. This extra information could easily come from some known-
plaintext attack4. This security criterion also lacks composability. If an -secure
task5 uses an ′-secure key, what is the security parameter of the composite pro-
cess?
4In a known-plaintext attack, the eavesdropper knows a part of the encrypted plaintext. For
instance, the header of an e-mail is very similar for all e-mails. Then, the one-time pad encrypted
header reveals parts of the secret key.
5The one-time pad is a 0-secure task.
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A suitable security deﬁnition was found in 2005 [37]. The success criterion
corresponds to the original one, but Eve’s knowledge about the key is not based
on measurement data any more. Let ρABE be the general quantum state of Alice,
Bob and Eve. Further let ρS = 1/|S|∑S |s〉〈s| ⊗ |s〉〈s| be a classical quantum
extension of the ﬁnal secret key bits s. Then, the key is -secure if
1
2‖ρABE − ρS ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ , (3.4)
where 12‖ρ − σ‖1 = 12tr|ρ − σ| is the trace distance between the quantum states ρ
and σ, with |A| =
√
A†A. The trace distance has the property that no physical
process can increase the trace distance between two quantum states [83]. There-
fore, there is no operation that will increase Eve’s entanglement with the key, and
thus knowledge about the key after a measurement of her quantum system.
For this security deﬁnition,  is the distinguishability advantage: the probability
that Eve can use her information to distinguish the QKD system from a perfect
QKD system is less than .
This security deﬁnition is composable [84], so if an -secure key is used for an
′-secure task, the composed task is ( + ′)-secure. Due to the late arrival of this
suitable security deﬁnition, many of the security proofs and security frameworks
are formulated for the obsolete security deﬁnition. Luckily, patches have been
found for most security proofs and frameworks, making them valid also with the
new deﬁnition. Note that the expression for the secret key rate, Equation (3.3)
remains valid for security proofs restricted to individual attacks.
3.3 Koashi’s framework for proving security
It is often complicated to prove the security of QKD-protocols directly. Therefore,
the security proofs are usually constructed as follows: ﬁrst the security is proved
for an abstract, virtual protocol. Then, the actual protocol is shown to be a special
case of the virtual protocol.
The security of QKD has been proven using several diﬀerent frameworks [29–
32,85,86]. For QKD with imperfections, most proofs use a virtual protocol based
on entanglement. The contributions in this thesis use the framework from Koashi
[85, 87]. The idea and principle behind this framework is sketched below. Note
that this sketch is not complaint with the new security deﬁnition. Luckily, it has
been proved that the results are also valid with the new security deﬁnition [88]
(see Section 3.2). Nevertheless, the information-theoretic approach is sketched
here because it is more intuitive and easier to understand than the trace-distance
based approach.
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Koashi’s security proof is based on the uncertainty principle. Assume that N
qubits are measured in either the X or the Z basis, and let XN and ZN be the
stochastic variables corresponding to the measurement result in each basis. The
entropic uncertainty relation [89] can then be formulated as:
H (XN) + H (ZN) = N, (3.5)
where H( · ) denotes the entropy of the measurement result in a basis. The idea
is to use the entropic uncertainty relation (3.5) to upper bound Eve’s information
about the key6.
In this protocol, Alice and Bob share N bipartite states (for instance EPR-
pairs). The protocol is symmetric with respect to the basis choices, so without
lack of generality, assume that Alice and Bob use the Z basis7 to generate the key,
and in particular, let Alice’s measurement result be the raw key.
The amount of privacy ampliﬁcation required can be found from the following
virtual experiment: assume that Alice measures the raw key in the X basis instead
of the Z basis. Bob’s task is to predict the result of Alice’s virtual X basis
measurement. Since Bob does not actually do this prediction, Bob can do anything
permitted by the laws of nature, including a virtual measurement on his parts of
the bipartite states. If the uncertainty about Alice’s virtual X basis measurement
H(A) can be bounded from Bob’s virtual measurement result B = b, H(A|B =
b) ≤ K, then the entropic uncertainty relation (3.5) predicts that no one, including
Eve can predict the outcome of Alice’s Z basis measurement with uncertainty less
than H(ZN) ≥ N − K. Since these N − K bits are unknown to Eve, they can be
used to generate a secret key. However, Bob must ensure that he has an identical
raw key as Alice. Let δbit be the error rate in the Z basis, and let h( · ) denote the
binary entropy function. Then Alice can use Nh(δbit)-bits of pre-established secret
key to securely send Bob error correcting data such that they obtain identical raw
keys. The net secret key rate is therefore
R ≥ N (1 − h (δbit)) − K. (3.6)
For perfect devices, Bob can for instance try to predict Alice’s virtual X basis
measurement by measuring his parts of the bipartite states in the X basis. Then,
if δphase is the error rate in the X basis, the number of bits where his and Alice’s
measurement results diﬀer should be Nδphase, and his uncertainty about Alice’s
6Recently a quantum version of the uncertainty relations has been found [90, 91], relating
the uncertainty not only to the measurement outcome of Eve, but also to the quantum states
possessed by Eve.
7Since protocol is symmetric with respect to the basis choice, one can simply label Alice’s
and Bob’s basis choice as the Z basis, and the opposite basis as the X basis.
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virtual X basis measurement is given by K ≥ Nh(δphase). Therefore, the net key
rate for perfect devices is given by
R ≥ 1 − h(δbit) − h(δphase). (3.7)
If the QBER in the bases are equal (δ = δphase = δbit), the rate becomes
R ≥ 1 − 2h(δ). (3.8)
R > 0 requires δ < 0.11 = 11%. This is a bound for the QBER in the absence of
imperfections.
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Implementations of QKD
The most important ingredient when implementing QKD is suitable quantum bits.
They should be easy to generate, easy to transport while preserving their quantum
state, and easy to measure. In practice the photon is the particle that best suits
these requirements. In this chapter, we discuss the main components in a QKD
setup, and discuss some architectures for QKD systems. Finally, QKD networks
are discussed. Note that continuous-variable QKD [92, 93] is not presented here,
since it is unrelated to the work presented in this thesis.
4.1 Components for QKD
4.1.1 Qubit source
In most setups, lasers are used as a qubit source because they are practical, small
and low-cost. However, a laser is not a single photon source: it emits approximately
coherent states. Without a phase reference, the output state from a laser can be
expressed as a Poissonian mixture of the diﬀerent number states:
ρ =
∞∑
n=0
e−μμn
n! |n〉〈n|, (4.1)
where μ is the mean number of photons in the pulse.
Since Alice frequently sends more than one photon, this imperfection has led
to the development of more sophisticated protocols to battle the photon-number
splitting attack (see Section 5.2).
There are sources which send out multiphoton pulses less frequently than a
laser, so-called sub-Poissonian sources. The development of these sources for
quantum cryptography has slowed down, due to the development of the decoy
state protocol [43–45], which negates the loss of key due to multiphoton pulses.
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However, the sub-Poissonian sources might ﬁnd a new application in quantum
repeaters [94].
A third class of sources is entangled photon sources, for instance used in the
Ekert and the BBM QKD protocols [19,22], and an essential ingredient in photon-
based quantum computing [10]. Entangled photon sources have developed rapidly
in the recent years. Traditionally, entangled photons have been generated through
parametric down-conversion, requiring a powerful pump laser. However, now it
seems that entangled light emitting diodes are within reach [95,96].
In prepare and measure schemes, Alice’s basis and bit choice is usually encoded
in the polarization or phase of the photon. In a polarization encoded scheme, the
encoder is simply a polarizer, while in a phase encoded scheme, the encoder is
usually an interferometer (see Sections 4.2.1–4.2.2).
4.1.2 Quantum channel
The requirements for the quantum channel are that it should preserve the quantum
state (avoid decoherence from the environment), and have low loss. In practice,
two channels have the desirable properties: optical ﬁber and free-space.
Optical ﬁber technology is mature: optical ﬁbers have been developed and
used in telecommunication for four decades. The loss α of an optical ﬁber is
usually measured in dB/km. The probability for a single photon to be transmitted
through an optical ﬁber of length l, is given by 10−(αl)/10. The loss depends heavily
on the wavelength of the photons, and is minimal in the two “telecom windows”:
α  0.34 dB/km for 1330 nm, and α  0.2 dB/km for 1550 nm. Since loss is critical
for the transmission range and key rate, the 1550 nm wavelength is usually used
for QKD.
Due to birefringent eﬀects, optical ﬁbers have signiﬁcant depolarization. There-
fore, phase-encoding is usually used for ﬁber-based QKD systems.
Free-space links have negligible decoherence. However, atmospheric ﬂuctua-
tions make it challenging to predict the arrival point of a photon over large dis-
tances. Another disadvantage of the free-space link is that it requires a line-of-sight
between Alice and Bob.
There are “atmospheric transmission windows” that have small loss, for in-
stance 780–850 nm and 1520–1600 nm typically have loss α < 0.1 dB/km in clear
weather [97].
4.1.3 Detector
There are excellent reviews of single photon detectors [98,99], so this section only
contains a brief review of the detector technologies relevant to this thesis: avalanche
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photodiodes (APDs) [100], and superconducting nanowire single photon detectors
(SNSPDs) [101,102].
The detector performance has four important ﬁgures: detection eﬃciency, dark
count rate (false detection events), detector dead time (or maximum detection rate)
and timing jitter.
With a few notable exceptions [103–105], both APD based and SNSPD based
single photon detectors are threshold detectors. Then, the detector output is
binary and distinguishes between “zero” or “one or more photons”.
Avalanche photodiodes
In an APD, an absorbed photon creates an electron-hole pair. If an electric ﬁeld
is present, the electron and the hole will propagate in opposite directions, and
in the case of a suﬃciently large electric ﬁeld, the particles can generate energies
larger than the ionization energy of semiconductor. Then, a collision with the
lattice causes more electron-hole pairs, and in total an avalanche of charge carriers.
Therefore, by applying a suﬃciently large bias voltage VAPD across the APD, the
absorption of a single photon is ampliﬁed to a large macroscopic current.
When the APD is (reversely) biased above the breakdown voltage Vbr in the
Geiger mode, the current caused by an avalanche is self-sustained. To reset the
APD, the voltage of the APD is reduced below the breakdown voltage, such that
the avalanche stops. This is called quenching [106]. It can be done passively, where
the current trough the APD lowers the voltage, or actively, where an external
circuit forces the voltage down after an avalanche. Gating the APDs can be seen
as a special case of active quenching, where the voltage is reduced periodically
regardless of the presence of an avalanche. Figure 4.1 shows the bias operation of
the APD.
For light in the 400–1000 nm range, silicon APDs can be used [100]. They
typically have a detection eﬃciency of around 50%, and a dark count rate of about
100Hz. Furthermore, their dead time allows count rates up to at least 10MHz.
Typical jitter is 350 ps FWHM for thick APDs optimized for longer wavelengths,
50 ps FWHM for thinner ones with peak sensitivity around 500 nm [100].
With ﬁber-based QKD, the 1550 nm wavelength is the most interesting due to
the low loss at this wavelength. While it is possible to use silicon APDs combined
with up-conversion [107], InGaAs/InP heterostructure APDs are usually used at
this wavelength. The drawback of these composite semiconductor devices is that
they have more impurities, resulting in higher dark count rates. Therefore, they
are only biased to the Geiger mode when a photon is expected, in so-called gates
(see Figure 4.2).
The temperature is an important parameter for the APD. At a lower tempera-
ture, the dark count probability is reduced. However, during an avalanche carriers
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Figure 4.1: The operating principles of an APD. First the APD is biased at a point
(A) above the breakdown voltage Vbr. When a single photon arrives, it causes an
electron-hole pair which ampliﬁes to a macroscopic current (B). A photon arrival
is signaled when the current exceeds the comparator threshold Ith. Afterwards,
the current is stopped through quenching (C), before the voltage is brought back
above the breakdown voltage again. For a bias below the breakdown voltage, the
current through the APD depends linearly on the optical power incident on the
APD.
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Figure 4.2: Gating an APD to reduce dark counts. When the APD is gated, the
voltage at the APD is only above the breakdown voltage at times when a photon
is expected.
are trapped in impurities in the semiconductor. If a gate is applied a short time
after an avalanche, there is a high dark count probability due to decay of trapped
carries. This is called an afterpulse. At a lower temperature, it takes a longer time
for the trapped carries to decay, and therefore low temperature eﬀectively reduces
the gate repetition rate. There is an intermediate solution: the gates are applied
at a high repetition rate, but a number of gates is removed after a detection event,
so-called afterpulse blocking [108]. For example, Clavis2 QKD system by manufac-
turer ID Quantique uses a pair of InGaAs/InP APDs. They are cooled to −50 ◦C,
and about 3 ns long gates are applied at a frequency of 5MHz. Their quantum
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Figure 4.3: Single photon detection using a superconducting nanowire. (a) A
photon is absorbed in the superconducting nanowire, and causes a normally con-
ducting hot-spot. (b) The bias current circumvents the hot-spot, increasing the
current density outside the hot-spot. (c) The current density on each side of the
hot-spot exceeds the critical current density, and a larger piece of the cross-section
is now normally conductive. (d) The normally resistive region covers a whole
cross-section of the nanowire, which now has a non-zero resistance. Reprinted
from Reference [113], c©2003 IEEE.
eﬃciency is about 10%. After a detection event, 50 gates are removed from both
APDs, corresponding to a deadtime of 10μs, eﬀectively limiting the count rate to
less than 100 kHz. The timing jitter for these detectors is about 500 ps FWHM,
although the system only registers timing as the gate number.
Faster APD based detectors have been developed using rapid gating techniques
[109–112]. These detectors use very short gates, and bias the APD only slightly
above the breakdown voltage in the gate. Therefore, the current in the avalanche,
and thus afterpulses are signiﬁcantly reduced. They also use more sophisticated
comparator techniques, some of which give photon-number resolving capabilities
[103].
Superconducting nanowire single photon detectors
A SNSPD [101, 102] consists of a superconducting nanowire, typically shaped to
ﬁll a square in order to achieve good coupling between the optical ﬁber and the
nanowire. During operation, the nanowire must be cooled to the superconducting
state, typically at a temperature of about 4K. Then, it is biased with a current Ib
slightly lower than the critical current Ic where nanowire goes normally conductive.
Note that since the nanowire is superconducting, there is no voltage drop across
it. When a photon is absorbed by the nanowire, it causes a normally conductive
hot-spot (see Figure 4.3). This reduces the superconducting cross-section of the
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nanowire, such that the current density in the rest of the cross-section increases,
and exceeds the critical current density. Then, the whole cross-section goes nor-
mally resistive, which makes the voltage over the nanowire increase. Afterwards,
the current drops, the nanowire cools back to the superconducting state, and the
current rises to the original value making the detector ready for the next photon.
The longest-distance experiments [26, 114–116] use SNSPDs, due to their low
dark count rates (< 1Hz) and low timing jitter (< 60 ps FWHM). The deadtime is
typically 10 ns, and the quantum eﬃciency is typically in the order of 1%. However,
using an integrated optical cavity, a quantum eﬃciency of 57% has been reported
[117].
4.2 System architectures
4.2.1 Polarization encoding
Polarization encoding was used in the ﬁrst experimental QKD system [24]. Alice
used a laser and two Pockels cells to generate the four diﬀerent states in the BB84
protocol. The quantum channel was 32 cm free space. Bob’s receiver consisted of
a Pockels cell to select the basis, followed by a polarizing beam splitter and two
photomultiplier tubes. There is one important remark about this implementation:
Alice’s and Bob’s bit and basis choice must be applied to the Pockels cells. This is
called active basis choice: true random numbers must be input to the apparatuses.
Generating a suﬃcient amount of random numbers is challenging. True quan-
tum random number generators1 still have a bit rate less than 100Mbit/s [120,
121]2. Therefore, passive basis choice implementations were invented [124], with
one example in Figure 4.4. In a passive basis choice BB84 implementation, a beam
splitter is used to randomly choose the basis: the single photon can only take one
of the exits of the beam splitter. Since one of the exits contains the X basis
measurement, and the other contains the Z basis measurement, this results in a
random basis choice. In passive basis choice implementations, Bob cannot verify
that the basis choice was random. Therefore, passive basis choice oﬀers a lower
level of security than active basis choice. I will use the term passive not only for
BB84, but for all implementations where Bob does not input any randomness into
his measurement device.
1There are quantum random number schemes, which are faster, but contain a mixture of
quantum and chaotic randomness [118,119].
2An natural question is: how can one verify that a sequence of numbers is truly random? The
answer is that this is impossible for a ﬁnite sequence of numbers, because this sequence could
always repeat itself [122]. Interestingly, quantum physics oﬀers not only a technique to generate
random numbers (single photon source followed by a 50/50 beam splitter and two detectors),
but also, a way to verify that the numbers are truly random [122,123].
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Figure 4.4: A polarization encoded implementation with passive basis choice. Al-
ice randomly ﬁres one of the four laser diodes before reducing the energy of the
pulse to the single photon level. Bob must use waveplates in order to revert the
transformation by the quantum channel. A beam splitter (BS) is used to ran-
domly select the basis at Bob’s side. LD: laser diode; ND: neutral density ﬁlter
(attenuator); PBS: polarizing beam splitter; λ/2: half-wave plate; APD: avalanche
photodiode.
After the initial demonstration [24], distances increased to 1 km [125], and later
to 23 km in an existing ﬁber under lake Geneva [25]. The experiments revealed
that the depolarization in the ﬁber is a challenge. In contrast, free-space has
negligible impact on the polarization. Therefore, polarization encoding has been
used in several free-space experiments [27,126–128].
4.2.2 Phase encoding
It was quickly realized [23, 129] that in optical ﬁbers, the phase of the photon is
stable, and therefore suitable for encoding the qubit state. Figure 4.5 shows an
example of a phase encoded implementation, consisting of a large Mach-Zehnder
interferometer where Alice and Bob controls the phase shift in each arm. Alice
selects the bit and basis by applying one out of four random phase shifts ϕA ∈
{0,π/2,π,3π/2} to her phase modulator. The quantum channel consists of two
optical ﬁbers between Alice and Bob. Bob randomly selects one out of two phase
shifts ϕB ∈ {0, π/2} to select between the two bases. If the phase diﬀerence
ϕA − ϕB is equal to 0 or π, the photon will be detected deterministically at a
single output from Bob’s ﬁber coupler. If ϕA − ϕB is equal to π/2 or 3π/2, the
photon will be detected at a random output. This is summarized in Table 4.1.
From the table, it is easy to realize that a phase encoded system is topologically
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Figure 4.5: A phase encoded implementation using active basis choice. Alice ran-
domly chooses a phase shift ϕA ∈ {0,π/2,π,3π/2} to encode one of the four states.
Bob randomly chooses a phase shift ϕB ∈ {0,π/2} to select his measurement basis.
This setup is topologically equal to the polarization encoded system in Figure 4.4.
LD: laser diode; C: ﬁber-optic coupler; PMA: Alice’s phase modulator; PMB:
Bob’s phase modulator; APD: avalanche photodiode.
Alice bit Alice basis ϕA Bob basis ϕB ϕA − ϕB Bob measurement
0 Z 0 Z 0 0 0
0 Z 0 X π/2 −π/2 ?
0 X π/2 Z 0 π/2 ?
0 X π/2 X π/2 0 0
1 Z π Z 0 π 1
1 Z π X π/2 π/2 ?
1 X 3π/2 Z 0 3π/2 ?
1 X 3π/2 X π/2 π 1
Table 4.1: The relation between Alice’s and Bob’s bit and basis choices, Bob’s
measurement result and the settings of the phase modulators in an interferometric
implementation.
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Figure 4.6: An active basis choice phase encoded implementation, using two
asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometers. Alice randomly chooses a phase shift
ϕA ∈ {0,π/2,π,3π/2} to encode one of four states. Bob randomly chooses a phase
shift ϕB ∈ {0,π/2} to select measurement basis. LD: laser diode; C: ﬁber-optic
coupler; PMA: Alice’s phase modulator; PMB: Bob’s phase modulator; APD:
avalanche photodiode.
equal to a polarization encoded system.
The implementation as shown in Figure 4.5 is impractical. Optical ﬁbers are
expensive, so two ﬁbers would double the bill. More importantly, it would be a
tremendous challenge to keep such a long interferometer stable. There is however
a way to transport the modes of both ﬁbers through a single ﬁber by using an
asymmetric interferometer to time-multiplex them into two pulses. Then the two
pulses are split in another asymmetric interferometer at Bob. Figure 4.6 shows an
implementation using two Mach-Zehnder interferometers, but note that there are
also implementations based on Faraday-Michelson interferometers [130].
Despite this conﬁguration being tremendously more stable than the one in
Figure 4.5, still the main challenge of the double interferometer architecture is to
keep the interferometers balanced: after alignment they usually only stay balanced
for minutes [131]. Therefore, tracking methods have been developed [108, 132].
This double interferometer architecture has been used in numerous experiments,
including an experimental QKD system producing over 1Mbit/s secret key rate
over 50 km [133].
4.2.3 Plug-and-play architecture
As mentioned, the main challenge in an interferometric implementation is phase
drift in the interferometers. However, there is a beautiful solution to the problem.
In plug-and-play systems (see Figure 4.7), the pulses are ﬁrst passing through
Bob’s interferometer as bright pulses, and are sent from Bob to Alice. Alice uses
her phase modulator to encode the bit and basis choice, and uses a Faraday mirror
[134] to send the pulses back to Bob. The pulses are attenuated to single photon
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Figure 4.7: A plug-and-play QKD system. The laser in Bob sends a train of pulses
through his interferometer without activating his phase modulator (PMB). The
pulses travel to Alice, where a classical detector (D) is used to synchronize Alice’s
phase modulator (PMA) to one of the two pulses from Bob’s interferometer. An
optical delay line (DL) is used to store the whole train of pulses to avoid Raileigh
backscattering hitting Bob’s detectors. Upon return, the pulses travel through
the opposite arms of the interferometer thereby automatically compensating drift
in the interferometer. FM: Faraday mirror; C: ﬁber-optic coupler; ND: neutral
density ﬁlter (attenuator); PBS: polarizing beam splitter; APD: avalanche photo-
diode.
level at the exit of Alice’s system. Using this design, the birefringence (i.e. po-
larization transformation) of the ﬁber is reverted when the photon travels back to
Bob. Furthermore, the polarization is exploited to make the photon travel the op-
posite arm in Bob’s interferometer when it returns. Given that the interferometer
is stable for the round trip time of the photon, phase drift in the interferometer is
automatically compensated. Therefore, this is called the plug-and-play architec-
ture: it works on any uncharacterized3, previously deployed ﬁber. Since the pulses
are sent from Bob to Alice and back to Bob again, this is also often referred to as
a send-return system. Although this allows Eve to tamper with the signals before
they enter Alice’s system, including this in the model of Alice shows that it barely
reduces the key rate [135].
There have been many QKD experiments using the plug-and-play systems [136–
138]. In fact it is the architecture used in several commercial systems, such as the
QKD systems from ID Quantique (see Figure 4.8) and the QPN 5505 by MagiQ
Technologies. In the SwissQuantum QKD network (see Figure 4.9), three links
from ID Quantique ran autonomously from April 2009 to January 2011, thus the
plug-and-play architecture seems to be very stable.
3The loss of the ﬁber must be upper bounded to calculate the secure key rate, but this should
be possible with the knowledge of the length and type of ﬁber.
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Figure 4.8: Clavis2, a research QKD system by commercial vendor ID Quantique.
This system is an implementation of the plug-and-play architecture presented in
Figure 4.7. Alice is at the left while Bob is at the right. Printed with permission
from ID Quantique. Photo c©2008 Vadim Makarov.
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Figure 4.9: The node located at the University of Geneva (UNIGE) in the Swis-
sQuantum network. The bottom of the rack contains two commercial Vectis QKD
systems by ID Quantique, each connected to diﬀerent nodes through pairs of ﬁbers
(one dark ﬁber for faint pulses and synchronization data, classical post-processing
and encrypted data on another). The node also contains a key management server,
and several diﬀerent classical encryptors which use the secret key generated by the
QKD systems. Photo by c©2010 Vadim Makarov.
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Figure 4.10: An implementation of the DPS protocol. Alice consists of a laser
source (LD), followed by a phase modulator (PMϕ). The bit values of the key
are encoded into the phase diﬀerence between two consecutive pulses: 0 (π) phase
diﬀerence corresponds to the bit value 0 (1). Bob consists of an asymmetric inter-
ferometer, with the length diﬀerence of the two arms corresponding to the length
diﬀerence between two pulses sent by Alice. The ﬁgure shows an example of bit
values coded into the pulse train. Note that the phase shifts must be read from
right to left according to the pulse’s arrival to Bob. ND: neutral density ﬁlter
(attenuator); D0/1: single photon detector for the bit value 0/1.
4.2.4 Distributed-phase-reference protocols
While some protocols have been motivated by increased security in practical im-
plementations, others have been motivated by a simpler implementation. This
is the case for the distributed-phase-reference protocols such as the diﬀerential
phase shift (DPS) protocol [139, 140] and the coherent one way protocol (COW)
[141, 142]. Note that although numerous restricted attacks have been studied on
these protocols [143–146], there are no security proofs providing lower bounds on
the secret key rate for these protocols. Therefore, it is diﬃcult to compare their
performance against discrete variable protocols4.
Diﬀerential phase shift protocol
Figure 4.10 shows the implementation of the DPS protocol [140]. In this protocol,
Alice emits a train of weak coherent pulses, each with a mean photon number less
than one. The secret key is encoded in the phase diﬀerence between two pulses: 0
(π) phase diﬀerence corresponds to the bit value 0 (1). Bob detects the pulse train
using an asymmetric interferometer, with the length diﬀerence in the two arms
corresponding to the length diﬀerence between two pulses sent by Alice. After
detecting a train of pulses, Bob will publicly announce his detection times. Then
Alice knows which of Bob’s detectors have clicked, and thus which bit value Bob
4Reference [16] contains a comparison using diﬀerent security levels for diﬀerent protocols.
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must have detected for each pulse.
The DPS protocol has a passive Bob, so Eve may use a copy of Bob to obtain
valid detection results. However, it is impossible for Eve to generate the same
detections in Bob without causing errors. Since the mean photon number in each
pulse is less than 1, there will be bit slots without a detection event. Imagine
that Eve wants to cause a click in detector 0 at Bob. She can do this by sending
two pulses with 0 phase diﬀerence. For these two pulses to interfere and cause a
detection event in detector 0, the ﬁrst pulse must enter the long arm and the second
pulse must enter the short arm of Bob’s interferometer. However, the pulses don’t
necessarily interfere: the ﬁrst pulse may take the short arm, and/or the second
pulse may take the long arm. This causes random detections at Bob, and thus
errors in the key.
The DPS protocol is tailored for an easy implementation and a high key rate.
For instance, compared to BB84, one does not have to discard half the key owing
to diﬀerent basis choices. The DPS protocol has been used in several long-distance
experiments with various types of detectors [114,147,148].
Coherent one way protocol
Figure 4.11 shows the implementation of the COW protocol [141,142]. Alice sends
a train of pulses which will be grouped in pairs to encode the key. The position of
the pulse within a pair encodes the bit value of the key. Bob simply measures the
position of the pulse within a pair to determine the bit value. However, this alone
does not provide any security against an eavesdropper. Therefore, an asymmetric
interferometer followed by two monitoring detectors is coupled into the data line
with coupling ratio 1 − tB. A typical value of tB is 0.9. This interferometer
is tailored to reveal eavesdropping attempts. Alice will occasionally send two
adjacent pulses (for instance sending the bit value 1 followed by the bit value 0, or
she might simply insert a decoy state, leaving a pulse in both slots of the pair), and
then this monitoring measurement setup is equal to Bob’s measurement setup in
the DPS protocol. As described for the DPS protocol, Eve cannot fully control the
detections in the monitoring detectors, and therefore any eavesdropping attempt
will be revealed by additional clicks in monitoring detector 1 (DM1).
Compared to the DPS protocol, the COW protocol uses two pulses per bit
instead of one, so double the pulse repetition rate is needed for the same raw key
rate. Still, the COW protocol has been used in a very long distance experiment,
with a transmission distance over 250 km [26]. A COW implementation was also
part of the SECOQC quantum key distribution network in Vienna [149].
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Figure 4.11: An implementation of the COW protocol. Alice consists of a laser
source (LD), followed by an intensity modulator (IM). Similarly to the DPS pro-
tocol, Alice sends a train of pulses. In the COW protocol, the pulses are paired to
encode the bits of the key. The position of the pulse within the pair determines
the bit value. Additionally, Alice can send pulses in both slots of a pair as de-
coys (denoted as “D” in the ﬁgure) to measure the coherence of the channel. Bob
consists of a ﬁber-optic coupler or beam splitter with splitting ratio tB : (1 − tB),
followed by a data detector (DB), used to measure the key. The other exit of the
coupler is followed by an asymmetric interferometer to monitor the coherence of
the channel, with a length diﬀerence equal to the length diﬀerence between two
pulses sent by Alice. The ﬁgure shows an example of bit values coded into the
pulse train. ND: neutral density ﬁlter (attenuator); DM1/2: monitoring detectors.
4.3 QKD networks
There are diﬀerent approaches to create quantum networks, some of which have
been implemented. In one approach, optical switches are used to connect the
quantum channels of the diﬀerent parties [150]. This does not increase the trans-
mission distance, but rather decreases it since the optical switches introduce loss.
A quantum router has also been proposed [151], based on wavelength division mul-
tiplexing. Then, each node is assigned to a wavelength. This makes it possible to
connect all nodes with each other.
In a diﬀerent approach, networks use trusted nodes [149, 152–154]. This does
increase the transmission distance, since a trusted node can be used as a trusted
repeater. There is already a proposal to use a satellite orbiting the earth as a
trusted node [155]. Note however, that two nodes in this type of network must
trust the nodes between them in order to communicate securely. Still, this type of
network might be suitable for instance for companies which own buildings spaced
suitably apart.
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There is also an example of a combination, with parts of the network using
optical switches, and parts of the network using trusted nodes [156].
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Practical security
In this chapter, the practical security of QKD systems is reviewed. In particular,
a number of known attacks are reviewed as well as assumptions about the devices
in the security proofs. There are some implicit assumptions in QKD [16,67]:
a) The information that leaves Alice’s and Bob’s system is restricted to what
the protocol allows.
b) Random numbers originate from true random number sources.
c) Alice and Bob use unconditionally secure authentication on the classical chan-
nel (such schemes exist, for instance Wegman-Carter authentication [157,
158]).
d) Eve must obey the laws of quantum physics.
5.1 Finite key length
Most security proofs consider the secret key rate in the asymptotic limit of an
inﬁnitely long key. Then, neither the error correcting code nor the privacy ampli-
ﬁcation has overhead. Practical systems however, can only perform post-processing
(sifting, error correction and privacy ampliﬁcation) on ﬁnite blocks of bits. There
have been several investigations of ﬁnite key length QKD [159–161] with perfect
devices. The latest results show that in order to obtain 50% of the asymptotic
key rate, a block size of 106 bits is required [161], using a reasonable security pa-
rameter  = 10−14. This is an interesting result. Very few QKD implementations
have the key rate necessary to generate 106 bits in reasonable time at a useful
distance. Therefore, only the highest key rate QKD systems have been reported
incorporating ﬁnite key eﬀects [133,162,163].
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5.2 Photon-number splitting attack
As discussed in Section 4.1.1, most sources are not really single photon sources:
some pulses contain multiple photons. This enables Eve to perform the photon-
number splitting (PNS) attack [39]: Eve measures the number of photons in the
pulse from Alice. This is a non-demolition measurement in the sense that it does
not disturb the polarization or the phase of the photon(s). If the pulse contains
more than one photon, she keeps one photon for herself, passing on at least one
photon to Bob. If it contains a single photon, she does not send anything to
Bob. When Bob announces his measurement bases, Eve measures her photons in
the same bases to obtain identical measurement results. This gives Eve a perfect
copy of the key. Note that it is not known how to implement the non-demolition
photon-number measurement with current technology.
In this attack, Eve introduces loss. However, as discussed in Section 4.1.2 the
channel is always lossy, so Eve can replace the channel by a lossless channel, and
remove a fraction of pulses corresponding to the original loss. Let us do some
napkin-math to see how the PNS attack upper bounds the key rate according
to the transmission of the channel, when the source emits coherent states with
mean photon number μ per pulse (a full derivation can be found for instance in
References [33, 34, 40]). For a coherent state, the number of photons per pulse n
is Poisson distributed:
pn =
μne−μ
n! . (5.1)
The probability that the pulse contains a photon at all is given by
pn>0 = 1 − p0 = 1 − e−μ ≈ μ, (5.2)
for small μ. The probability that the pulse contains more than one photon is given
by
pn>1 = 1 − p1 − p0 = 1 − μe−μ − e−μ ≈ μ
2
2 . (5.3)
Let us assume that Bob has perfect detectors, and that the channel transmission
is given by t. Since the probability that the pulse contains at least one photon is
given by μ, the detection probability at Bob is approximately given by tμ. But we
must assume that Eve knows the value of all the μ2/2 pulses containing multiple
photons. Therefore, a simpliﬁed expression for the rate is given by
R = tμ − μ
2
2 . (5.4)
Optimizing μ to maximize R gives μ = t, thus the rate scales as R ∝ t2 (as
opposed to R ∝ t for a perfect single photon source). In practice, due to the errors
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caused by dark counts, R cannot be arbitrarily small. Therefore, the maximum
transmission distance is substantially reduced by the threat of the PNS attack.
Therefore, the frequent use of coherent sources in QKD caused a search for new
protocols which were resistant to the PNS attack.
5.2.1 Scarani-Acín-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 protocol
The Scarani-Acín-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) protocol [42] is tailored to be
robust against the PNS attack. For the raw key exchange, the protocol is identical
to the BB84 protocol presented in Section 2.1. The diﬀerence is in the post-
processing. In the SARG04 protocol, the key bit is encoded in the basis choice of
Alice. Instead of announcing the basis, Alice announces a set of two states: the
state she sent and a random state from the opposite basis. When Bob selects the
opposite basis from Alice, he can have an unambiguous detection event such that
he deterministically knows which of the two states Alice sent, and thus which basis
she used.
Let the Z basis (= {0〉, |1〉}) represent bit value 0, and the X basis (= {−〉, |+〉})
represent bit value 1. Assume that Alice sent |0〉 (bit value 0) and announced
{|0〉, |−〉}. If Bob measured in the Z basis he must have obtained the measure-
ment result |0〉. However, the bit must be discarded since this result could have
been caused by any of the states announced by Alice. Again, if Bob measured in
the X basis and obtained the measurement result |−〉, the bit must be discarded.
If Bob measured in the X basis and obtained the measurement result |+〉, this
could only result from Alice sending |0〉. Therefore, Bob adds the bit value 0 to
the key. Note that Bob does not announce his basis choice. In fact, Bob’s basis
choice contains the value of the key (Bob’s basis is always the opposite from Alice’s
for unambiguous detection results).
To see why the SARG04 protocol is more resistant to the PNS attack than the
BB84 protocol, assume that Eve has a copy of Bob’s photon and the announcement
from Alice. Eve’s task is to use the photon to distinguish between the two non-
orthogonal states. But it is impossible to perfectly distinguish between two non-
orthogonal states. Therefore, the two photon states emitted by Alice do not always
reveal the bit value.
In the SARG04 protocol, the probability that Bob has an unambiguous mea-
surement result is 1/4, compared to 1/2 for the BB84 protocol. Still, the SARG04
protocol gives a higher bit rate at low channel transmittances, because the mean
photon number in the coherent pulse can be much higher than for BB84. For
an optimal mean photon number, one can show that the key rate scales with the
transmittance as R ∝ t3/2 [16, 164].
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5.2.2 Decoy states protocol
Another discovery countering the PNS attack is the decoy states protocol [43–45].
The diﬀerence between the original BB84 protocol and the decoy states protocol,
is that in the decoy states protocol the photon number mixture of the source is
varied1 in order to estimate the fraction of detections at Bob, where Alice emitted
single photons. In practice, an intensity modulator is added to Alice’s setup, and
Alice emits coherent states of various mean photon number. If an inﬁnite number
of intensities is used, Alice and Bob can obtain a perfect estimate of the single
photon transmittance and error rate [45]. In practice, Alice usually emits signal
states with mean photon number μs ≈ 1, and two diﬀerent decoy states, one with
a very low photon number μd1 = μd < 1 and one which is vacuum μd2 = μv = 0
[165].
The decoy states protocol fully negates the PNS attack, since Alice and Bob
lower-bound the single photon transmittance, and upper-bound the error rate for
single photons emitted by Alice. Since the probability that a single photon will
pass the channel is given by the transmittance t, the rate scales as R ∝ t. When
the decoy states protocl was implemented for the 144 km free-space link between
La Palma and Tenerife, the key rate increased one order of magnitude [27,128]!
The decoy states protocol can be considered an as auxiliary protocol on top
of the BB84 protocol, providing the transmittance and the error rate for single
photons emitted by Alice. Therefore, other security proofs for the BB84 protocol
simply assume that these parameters are available [87][166].
5.3 Trojan-horse attack
In the Trojan-horse attack [47, 48], Eve uses a powerful laser to interrogate the
system of Alice and/or Bob. In particular, it turns out that the back-reﬂections
passing the phase modulator in a phase encoded implementation reveal the setting
of the phase modulator. In Alice’s system, the phase modulator setting contains
the bit and basis value. Therefore, this setting must be kept secret. Most imple-
mentations of Alice contain an attenuator at the exit of Alice’s system, to attenuate
brighter pulses to the single photon level. The same attenuation would apply twice
to Eve’s pulse in the Trojan-horse attack (one time when the pulse enters Alice’s
system, and one time on the reﬂected pulse). Therefore, the Trojan-horse attack
can be countered by having suﬃcient attenuation at Alice’s exit: then the required
power in Eve’s laser would destroy the optical ﬁber [47].
In a BB84 implementation, Bob’s phase modulator setting contains the basis.
1In particular, the probability distributions of the photon number must be linearly indepen-
dent. This is the case for coherent states of various mean photon number.
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This is publicly announced, so protecting it is not crucial2. However, if the four-
state Bob patch is used to counter the detector eﬃciency mismatch loophole (see
Section 5.5), Bob’s phase modulator setting must remain secret. Also, in the
SARG04 protocol (see Section 5.2.1), the basis value is the key bit, and therefore
Bob’s phase modulator setting contains the secret key.
It is more diﬃcult to avoid the Trojan-horse attack on Bob’s apparatus [47].
An attenuator would consume most of the precious single photons from Alice. One
solution could be a narrow bandpass ﬁlter and a circulator followed by a detector to
measure the optical power exiting Bob’s apparatus. In a plug-and-play system (see
Section 4.2.3) this is diﬃcult because Bob’s entrance must remain bi-directional.
Another solution could be a beam splitter and a power meter at Bob’s entrance.
However, if the security of a scheme is based partly on the output of a power
meter in Bob’s system, the output of this power meter must be included in the
assumptions of the security proofs for the system.
5.4 Phase-remapping attack
In the plug-and-play system (see Section 4.2.3), Bob emits pulses which are sent to
Alice, where Alice encodes her bit and basis choice by phase modulating one of the
two pulses from Bob. However, there are two hatches in this scheme: 1) Eve could
mess with the pulses before they enter Alice’s system; 2) Alice’s phase modulator
does not switch inﬁnitely fast between the diﬀerent values. Eve could change the
intensity and/or the photon number statistics of the pulse entering Alice, but this
has been considered in security proofs [135]. However, the ﬁnite switching speed
of Alice’s phase modulator makes the encoding process dependent on the timing of
the pulses. Therefore, in the phase-remapping attack [52], Eve adjusts the timing
of the pulses from Bob such that they are phase shifted less than the value selected
by Alice. Speciﬁcally, instead of a {0, π/2, π, 3π/2} phase shift, the pulses get a
{0, δ, 2δ, 3δ} phase shift. Then, Eve can intercept the pulse from Alice and better
distinguish between the four phase settings. Therefore, she introduces less QBER
when resending to Bob. In the limit where δ → 0, the phase-remapping attack
introduces 14.6% QBER.
The phase-remapping attack has been implemented on a commercial QKD
system [56]. Since it is an intercept-resend attack, Eve has full information about
the secret key. The attack introduced a QBER of 19.7%, which is above the
theoretical 11% limit for perfect devices. Still, there are protocols which allow a
QBER up to 20% [79, 167] (with perfect devices), although they have not been
implemented.
2Note however that it is crucial that Eve does not know the basis value before Alice’s pulse
enters Bob’s apparatus. This can be ensured by a suﬃciently long delay line at Bob’s entrance.
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Figure 5.1: The detector eﬃciency curves for a commercial QKD system from ID
Quantique. The points ’A’ and ’B’ shows the two timings referred to as t0 and
t1, where the subscript refers to the detector that is much more eﬃcient than the
other. Reprinted from Reference [53], c©2008 The American Physical Society.
5.5 Detector eﬃciency mismatch
As discussed in Section 4.1.3, APD-based single photon detectors are usually gated
in order to reduce dark counts. Since QKD systems require the detection of two
diﬀerent bit values, they require at least two detectors3. Then it is unavoidable
that ﬁnite manufacturing precision in the detector and the electronics, and dif-
ference in optical path length will slightly misalign the two detector gates, and
cause detector eﬃciency mismatch [49]. This is the case for the QKD systems
from the commercial producer ID Quantique [53][168]. Figure 5.1 shows the mea-
sured detector eﬃciency curves for a well-designed commercial QKD system [53].
Furthermore, the calibration routine of a commercial QKD system can be tricked
into setting a large detector eﬃciency mismatch [168].
When a QKD system has detector eﬃciency mismatch, the system can be
attacked with the following faked-state attack [49, 169]: Eve measures the state
from Alice in a random basis to obtain a measurement result. Then, she resends
the opposite bit value from her measurement result in the opposite basis, timed
to arrive at Bob’s detectors when the detector corresponding to her measurement
result has much higher detection eﬃciency than the other detector. As an example,
if Eve measured the bit value 0 in the X basis, she would resend the bit value 1 in
the Z basis, timed to arrive at t0 (corresponding to timing A in Figure 5.1). Since
the attack is an intercept-resend attack, Eve has full information about the key.
3It is possible to time-multiplex using a single detector, but that will not avoid detector
eﬃciency mismatch due to the ﬁnite precision of the time-multiplexing.
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Eve will however introduce a non-zero QBER. Let η0(t) (η1(t)) be the eﬃciency
curve of detector 0 (1). Let
η = min
t
{
η0(t)
η1(t)
,
η1(t)
η0(t)
}
, (5.5)
where t labels the various modes, for instance the diﬀerent temporal modes. Then
Eve introduces less than 11% QBER if η ≤ 0.066 [49]. However, Eve can launch
the time-shift attack and the optimal individual attack simultaneously. Then,
the information obtained from the time-shift attack can be used to improve the
measurements of her probes. If η ≤ 0.25, this combined attack gives Eve full
information about the key while the QBER is kept below 11% [166]. The faked-
state attack also applies to the SARG04, DPS and Ekert protocols [170].
The time-shift attack [50] is based on detector eﬃciency mismatch. In this
attack, Eve randomly times the pulse from Alice to arrive at t0 or t1 in Bob. This
partly reveals the bit value: if the pulse arrived at t0 (t1), and Bob announces
receipt, the bit value is more likely to be 0 (1). In contrast to the faked-state attack
[49], Eve does not get the full secret key. However, the time-shift attack has a very
simple implementation, and does not introduce any extra QBER. The vulnerability
was conﬁrmed in a commercial QKD system [53]. In the experiment, Eve got
an information-theoretical advantage in about 4% of her attempts. When Eve
has an information-theoretical advantage, she may outperform a straight brute-
force search for the secret key. In the time-shift experiment [53], the entropy of
the 1297-bit key was reduced to 21131. If this key is used for the one-time pad,
the decrease in entropy tremendously decreases the required computational power
required to decrypt the message. On one hand, such a computational task is
unfeasible now and for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, if we could trust
computationally-bounded security, why use QKD? Also, by the security deﬁnition
in Section 3.2, the security is clearly broken.
A frequently mentioned countermeasure against detector eﬃciency mismatch
is four-state Bob [49, 50, 78]. In a phase-encoded implementation using four-
state Bob, Bob randomly selects from four diﬀerent phase modulator settings
{0, π/2, π, 3π/2} instead of only the usual two {0, π/2}. The extra π phase shift
randomly maps the bit values 0 and 1 to the two detectors. QKD using four-
state Bob has been proven secure if Bob only receives single photons [171]. The
assumption that Bob only receives single photons is clearly unrealistic, but a decoy-
detector scheme similar to decoy-states (see Section 5.2.2) can be used to estimate
the fraction of single photons received by Bob [172].
There are however some drawbacks with the four-state Bob scheme. First of
all, the phase-modulator value must now remain secret, and therefore Bob’s system
must be secured against the Trojan-horse attack. As discussed in Section 5.3, this
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is a diﬃcult task. Also, the four-state Bob scheme does not secure against tailored
bright illumination attacks [55][57,60], and in particular not against the after-gate
attack [173,174].
In another approach, the amount of privacy ampliﬁcation necessary to remove
Eve’s knowledge about the key is quantiﬁed. There has so far not been found
a squash model [74–77] working in the presence of detector eﬃciency mismatch,
therefore existing security proofs using single qubits do not apply to systems having
detector eﬃciency mismatch. However, there are several security proofs for QKD
systems with detector eﬃciency mismatch [41, 166][171]. In the most general
proof, with symmetry between the bases and with a perfect source, the secret key
rate is given by [41]
R ≥ −h(QBER) + η(1 − h(QBER), (5.6)
where h( · ) is the binary entropy function. Here η is the smallest detection prob-
ability for a non-vacuum state received by Bob’s system. For gated systems, η is
very close to zero at the beginning and end of the gate. Therefore, the secret key
rate given by the security proofs will be zero. However, bit-mapped gating allows
the user to calculate η from Equation (5.5) using only detector eﬃciencies in the
central part of the gate [175]. Furthermore, it makes it possible to estimate η
from system parameters measured in the laboratory.
5.6 Detector control attacks
From Eve’s perspective, the detector control attack seems to be the most successful.
The core of the attack is the following [57, 60]: Eve measures the quantum state
from Alice in a random basis. Then a bright trigger pulse is resent to Bob when
his detectors are in a state where they are only sensitive to bright illumination4.
The power level of the pulse is adjusted such that Bob’s detector always reports
a detection event from the bright pulse, but never reports a detection event from
a pulse with 3 dB less power. Therefore, in the detector control attack, when Eve
used the same basis as Bob to measure the quantum state from Alice, Bob gets a
detection event as if there were no eavesdropper. And if Eve used the opposite basis
from Bob to measure the quantum state from Alice, her bright pulse will strike both
of Bob’s detectors with 3 dB less power, and neither detector will report a detection
event: the bit is simply lost. Against an active-basis choice implementation, this
introduces 50% total loss. In practice, this is no limitation for the attack: Eve
4Here, bright means containing a suﬃcient number of photons such that if the bright pulse is
sent through a 50/50 beam splitter, each exit of the beam splitter will contain close to half the
number of photons from the input pulse.
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Figure 5.2: Photo of myself during an experiment at the Group of applied physics
at the University of Geneva. In this experiment, we showed that the commer-
cial QKD system QPN 5505 from MagiQ Technologies was vulnerable to bright
illumination [57]. Photo c©2010 Vadim Makarov.
can place her intercept-unit close to Alice while compensating the loss in the
remaining ﬁber by resending brighter states. This perfect detector control attack
introduces zero QBER, captures the full secret key, and is implementable with
current technology.
If a non-zero QBER, or higher loss than 50% can be tolerated, it suﬃces that
the detectors click with a high probability when Eve used the correct basis, and
with a low probability when Eve used the incorrect basis. For a full discussion of
the constraints on the detector click probability, see Reference [174]. The detector
control attack is applicable to the BB84, SARG04 and decoy-protocols, as well as
distributed-phase-reference protocols like DPS and COW [176].
The question is if Bob’s detectors can be caught in a state where they have
such abrupt change in detection probability. For APD-based detectors, they ac-
tually have such response to bright illumination when they are biased below the
breakdown voltage (see Section 4.1.3). Gated detectors are already biased below
the breakdown voltage outside the gate. Therefore, by timing the bright trigger
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pulse after the gate, eavesdropping is possible, although introduces considerable
QBER [173, 174]. It turns out that by shining bright illumination on the detec-
tors, the bias voltage is lowered to a value below the breakdown voltage. This
is called blinding the detectors, because they remain insensitive to single photons
and have no dark counts. Both passively quenched [55], actively quenched [60],
and gated detectors [57,177] could be blinded and controlled through a variety of
techniques. The detectors in two commercial QKD systems from two diﬀerent ven-
dors were blindable and controllable by bright illumination [57] (see Figure 5.2).
Furthermore, a full eavesdropper5 has been implemented and used to capture the
full key of a 290m quantum channel in an experimental QKD system [58]. Note
that the QKD systems from some manufacturers might be immune to the simplest
blinding schemes [178][179].
SNSPDs have been reported to exhibit multiphotonic processes [102]. There-
fore, in some cases it might be possible to eavesdrop on QKD systems using
SNSPDs simply by choosing an appropriate power level for the trigger pulses [174].
We have also shown that a SNSPD can be blinded permanently6 by forcing it into
the latched state [180]. In the latched state, the SNSPD had a suitable response to
bright trigger pulses, allowing a detector control attack. Furthermore, the SNSPD
can be controlled without forcing it into the latched state [180].
Since the detector control attack can be performed with less than 100 photons
in the trigger pulse, an optical power meter seems to be unreliable to reveal the
eavesdropper [174]. Furthermore, as discussed previously, any threshold in Bob’s
system must be included in a security proof7. It seems that one solution could be a
calibrated light source inside Bob’s system to test the single photon sensitivity at
random times [58][176]. The details and implementation of such a scheme remain
a potential study for the future.
5.7 Device-independent QKD
Many security proofs use a bottom-up approach, incorporating an increasing num-
ber of imperfections. There is also a top-down approach where the number of
assumptions on the devices is reduced to a minimum. In device-independent QKD
(DI-QKD) [19, 61, 62, 91], there are barely any assumptions on the devices: the
5Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, the same implementation has been used to violate
Bell inequalities even though one half of the EPR pairs were measured by the eavesdropper [65].
6Until the operator resets the bias current. Of course, a commercial QKD system using
SNSPDs must have an automatic reset feature or avoid latching by other means.
7For instance, as a countermeasure against the detector control attack it has been suggested
to monitor the photocurrent in the APDs and look for anomalously high values [181][182]. What
is an anomalously high photocurrent? For this particular example, the countermeasure is also
insuﬃcient since a 100 photons in a trigger pulse does not cause any anomalously high value.
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security is proven solely from the non-classical correlations in Alice’s and Bob’s
data. However, three assumptions remain:
• No information can exit Alice’s and Bob’s measurement devices (only the
particles whose properties are to be measured can enter the devices).
• Alice and Bob input true randomness into their devices.
• Alice’s and Bob’s measurement devices always output 0 or 1 whenever they
both apply a basis choice, even if no photon has been detected.
Let us discuss these assumptions in detail. The ﬁrst assumption is not only
necessary for DI-QKD, but also QKD in general and any implementation of a
security scheme. However, it is also equally diﬃcult to test this assumption for a
DI-QKD scheme as for a QKD scheme. For instance, one could imagine that the
detectors emit an exotic particle, for instance the Higgs-boson, which reveals the
key and thereby violates this assumption. Therefore, it is impossible to verify that
this is the case for a real device, with 100% certainty.
As for the true randomness, this is equally important, and the assumption is
equally strict for DI-QKD and for QKD. Without true randomness, Eve might be
able to predict parts of the key.
The last of the assumptions, makes it a major challenge to implement DI-
QKD. As discussed, all channels have substantial loss, and Bob’s detectors have
a ﬁnite detection eﬃciency. Therefore, using current and foreseeable technology,
Bob will most of the time not get a click. Therefore, for DI-QKD, whenever Bob’s
detectors did not produce a click, Bob must simply select the bit value 0 or 1.
Since Bob’s selections will often be erroneous, in practice, the detection probability
must be at least about 90%. This is the obstacle preventing DI-QKD from being
implemented with current technology. Recently there has been a proposal to use
a heralded photon ampliﬁer, such that Bob only applies a basis choice if a photon
entered his apparatus [66]. This eliminates the channel from the loss budget. Still,
an implementation seems to be extremely challenging, and it is unlikely that an
implementation would allow useful key rates at useful distances [66].
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Thoughts on the future
History has shown that one should be careful about predicting the future, espe-
cially when it comes to technology1. There have been predictions and discussions
regarding the future for QKD [67, 183–189]. Here, I will present my perspective
on the future of QKD.
QKD is often advertised as an alternative to public key cryptography, and
the solution to the key distribution problem. I agree that QKD is superior to
public key cryptography in terms of security, but I disagree that QKD should
be compared with public key cryptography. I rather think that QKD should be
compared with a trusted courier distributing a large symmetric key. In fact, a
trusted courier must be used to distribute the QKD system. This courier (as well
as the producer of the QKD system) must be trusted because otherwise, they may
install a tap, leaking the secret key to Eve. Therefore, in terms of distribution,
I see no diﬀerence between a courier transporting a several terabyte hard drive
containing a secret key, and a courier transporting a QKD system. Either case
requires the same level of trust.
A frequently used argument against a huge symmetric key, is that any adversary
seeing the secret key makes all future communication insecure. However, I argue
that the same is the case for QKD: if Eve sees the secret key which is used for
authentication in future rounds of QKD, she may immediately call her helper
Steve, who immediately inserts an eavesdropping station performing a man-in-
the-middle attack2. Just as for the hard drive, an adversary seeing the secret key
makes all future communication insecure.
Note that a courier must also bring the ﬁrst initial secret key, used to authen-
ticate the ﬁrst round of QKD. While it has been claimed that this is a drawback
1Although there is a discussion whether the statement was made, the most famous example
is Thomas J. Watson, a former president of International Business Machines (IBM), whom
predicted a world market for about ﬁve computers in 1943.
2While this operation is very complicated, there is no inherent security in this complexity.
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of QKD [187], this is the case with any encryption protocol: encryption without
authentication is insecure. Alice must be sure that she is talking to Bob and not
Eve, and the only way to do so is pre-shared information3.
Therefore, it seems that the alternative to QKD is a trusted courier transport-
ing a large symmetric key. Table 6.1 compares a 3 terabyte symmetric key with
the best commercially available QKD system and the best experimental QKD sys-
tems. As far as I can see, this comparison favors sending a 3 terabyte symmetric
key with the courier instead of a QKD system. Speciﬁcally, repeating this proce-
dure every 290 days will make a bandwidth equal to the best experimental QKD
system available, without the distance limitation, and with a small fraction of the
cost.
However, one performance parameter omitted so far should be discussed in
detail: lifetime. In some cases, it is very diﬃcult to replace the hard drive, for
instance if one of the parties is placed in a satellite [155]. Then it simply boils
down to the lifetime of the device. Consumer hard drives are known to fail after
3–5 years, but one could easily imagine that with special focus it should be possible
to produce more reliable hard drives. Meanwhile, compared to a single hard drive,
a QKD system typically consists of a huge amount of components. For instance,
although APDs seem to have low failure probabilities [191], their parameters are
known to degrade over time. This would result in a reduction in the secret key
rate. Therefore, it is not easy to compare the lifetimes of the two alternatives.
So far I have only considered point-to-point links in this comparison. However,
when one starts to consider networks, the picture changes. The hard drive example
has no reusable parts, so a pair of hard drives is required between each pair of
participants in the network. Using QKD however, one could imagine a module
3In public key authentication schemes, Alice does not need to share a secret with Bob, but
she must have Bob’s public key. Bob’s public key may be publicly available, but Alice must still
make sure that it is really Bob’s and not Eve’s public key. On the internet, this is solved using
trusted(?) third-parties (for instance VeriSign Inc.) to verify the identity of the owner of the
Bob’s key. The public keys of these third-parties are embedded in the browser.
3 terabyte Commercial Experimental
hard drive QKD [190] QKD
Price 800 ¤ 80000 ¤+ dark ﬁber ? + dark ﬁber
Key rate at 50 km N/A 3.5 kbps 1Mbps [133]
Maximum distance Unlimited 100 km 250 km [26]
Time to generate a 3
terabyte key at 50 km 24 hours? 233 years 290 days
Table 6.1: Comparison between a 3 terabyte symmetric key, the best commercially
available QKD system and the best experimental QKD systems.
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able to play the role of either Alice or Bob. Therefore, each participant only needs
one such module. This is reﬂected in the huge diﬀerence in storage requirements:
if there are N participants, and each pair of participants share b bits of secret key,
each participant must store a total of b(N − 1) bits. As argued above, b = 3TB
for the hard drives, while for QKD, b must just suﬃce to authenticate a couple of
rounds of QKD. For large networks, the diﬀerence is huge!
It is my conclusion, that in order to compete with a pair of hard drives, QKD
must increase the transmission distance, secret key rate, and move to networks.
There is intense research going on to achieve this. However, it seems to me in
terms of distance, we are approaching the limit with optical ﬁber as the quan-
tum channel. Therefore, in order to increase the transmission distance, quantum
repeaters [192, 193] will become necessary. It remains an open question whether
quantum repeaters can become suﬃciently stable to be used in QKD.
At the end of the day, there seems to be a small, but growing market for QKD
systems. The current commercial systems combine the key generated from QKD
with a symmetric key distributed using public key encryption4. Therefore, in order
to break the security of the system, both key distribution schemes must be broken.
One could argue that this gives a higher level of security. Regardless of whether
QKD is the key distribution solution for the future, one thing is certain: as long
as there are governments and industries using QKD for high security tasks, it is
crucial that there are independent third parties scrutinizing the QKD systems to
reveal loopholes in the implementations to improve the security.
4The keys are simply XOR-ed together. Then, the combined key is as secure as the most
secure of the keys.
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Conclusion and future work
Assuming that Eve must obey the laws of quantum physics, QKD has been proven
secure with perfect devices. However, when QKD is implemented, one must use
actual devices available with current technology. In this setting, the security proofs
with perfect devices are not valid any more, and the actual devices must be modeled
and incorporated into practical security proofs. While there are already security
proofs that model and incorporate certain imperfections, the actual devices do not
necessarily comply with the existing proofs.
The contribution in this thesis is twofold: a theoretical part consisting of secu-
rity proofs for practical devices, and an experimental part examining how actual
devices comply with the models of the existing security proofs. Since the source in
QKD had already received considerable attention when I entered this ﬁeld, most
of this work relates to the detectors.
For the theoretical part, the results are very general security proofs, which lower
bound the asymptotic, secure key rate with arbitrary imperfections simultaneously
in the source and the detectors [41]. Furthermore, a detection scheme compatible
with these security proofs has been proposed in order to measure the detector
parameters [175].
In the experimental part, the results show that commercial QKD systems con-
tained ﬂaws in their implementation, which would allow an eavesdropper to capture
the full secret key, using oﬀ-the-shelf components without getting revealed by er-
rors in the key [57]. This important work caused discussions [178][179], and got
considerable media attention. Some of the media attention led the public to be-
lieve that QKD was insecure. But as stated in the beginning of this chapter, QKD
is proven secure once and for all with perfect devices. In fact, spectacular security
ﬂaws are usually found and patched in some phase of most security technologies.
One example is the widely adopted public key cipher RSA [68]. One could argue
that QKD is in this phase now, and as such I believe that this work is a mile-
stone. I believe that this work has led to increased awareness about imperfections
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in QKD, and therefore future implementations will be more secure.
There is still much work to be done. The long term goal should be to design
and implement a practical QKD scheme which is provable secure, while having
a useful key rate at a useful distance. On the theoretical side, this requires a
security proof which quantiﬁes the imperfections in the source and receiver. At
the moment, there are proofs considering imperfections in both the source and the
receiver, but unfortunately they handle loss such a way that in practice they would
only allow very short transmission distances. This could possibly be improved by
integrating the proofs with the decoy-state approach. Furthermore, while the
imperfections are quantiﬁed, for an actual implementation to be provable secure,
the imperfection parameters of the security proof must be measured or bounded.
While we have proposed how to do this for the detectors, it is still an unanswered
question for the source.
A bigger challenge is that most QKD systems contain collective errors, for
instance the afterpulsing of the detectors and/or imperfect random number gen-
erators. This is yet to be tackled in a security proof.
Imperfections in the source and the receiver, and ﬁnite key eﬀects have so
far been studied separately: imperfections with the asymptotic inﬁnite key, and
ﬁnite key with perfect devices. Therefore, future security proofs incorporating
imperfections should also incorporate the ﬁnite key size.
On the experimental side there is still work to do: implement and scrutinize
a detector scheme where the detector parameters are veriﬁed to be within the
model in the security proof. In the short term, this could involve designing and
implementing a calibrated light source in Bob, to avoid detector control attacks.
For both the experimental and theoretical future, the biggest challenge remains:
will it be possible to implement QKD in a way that is provable secure?
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• D. R. Hjelme, L. Lydersen and V. Makarov, book chapter on quantum
cryptography for the book “A Multidisciplinary Introduction to Information
Security”, to be published by CRC Press in 2011/2012, arXiv: 1108.1718
[quant-ph].
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Chapter 9
Contributions in papers
This section summarizes my contribution to each of the papers contained in this
thesis. The papers are labeled with the same letters as in this thesis. When I
state that I performed the analysis or wrote whole or parts of a paper, I have had
the main responsibility and made the major contribution to the task. However,
usually the tasks have been conducted with substantial help, guidance and input
from co-authors. Figure numbers in preprints refer to the ﬁgure number in the
preprint version reprinted in this thesis.
Paper A
L. Lydersen and J. Skaar, “Security of quantum key distribution with bit and
basis dependent detector ﬂaws,” Quantum Information & Computation 10, 60–
76 (2010).
My contribution: Analysis of the upper bound, and the example in Section 4.2.
Writing Sections 1, 2 and 4.2, making all ﬁgures.
Paper B
Ø. Marøy, L. Lydersen and J. Skaar, “Security of quantum key distribution with
arbitrary individual imperfections,” Physical Review A 82, 032337 (2010).
My contribution: Contributing to the concept to include both imperfections
in the source and the detector simultaneously, and to the model of the system,
especially the detectors.
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Paper C
L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov,
“Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumina-
tion,” Nature Photonics 4, 686–689 (2010).
My contribution: My contribution is stated in the “Author contributions” sec-
tion at the end of the paper: “V.M. conceived the idea and planned the study. L.L.
and V.M. conducted the Clavis2 experiment with the help of C. Wiechers, D.E. and
C. Wittmann. L.L. and V.M. conducted the QPN 5505 experiment. L.L. and J.S.
wrote the paper and Supplementary information, with input from all authors. J.S.
and V.M. supervised the project.”
Paper D
L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov,
“Avoiding the blinding attack in QKD,” Nature Photonics 4, 801 (2010).
Note: this is a reply to correspondence [178] regarding Paper C [57].
My contribution: Writing the paper.
Paper E
L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov,
“Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography,” Optics Express
18, 27938–27954 (2010).
My contribution: Conducting the main experiment with some guidance. Dis-
covering the thermal blinding eﬀect, analyzing the data, writing the paper, and
making all ﬁgures.
Paper F
C. Wiechers, L. Lydersen, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt,
V. Makarov and G. Leuchs, “After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem,” New
Journal of Physics 13, 013043 (2011).
My contribution: Major participation in the main experiment, and performing
an initial, minor part of the simulation.
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Paper G
L. Lydersen, V. Makarov and J. Skaar, “Secure gated detection scheme for quan-
tum cryptography,” Physical Review A 83, 032306 (2011).
My contribution: Conceiving the main idea, performing the analysis, writing
the paper, and making all ﬁgures.
Paper H
L. Lydersen, J. Skaar and V. Makarov, “Tailored bright illumination attack on
distributed-phase-reference protocols,” Journal of Modern Optics 58, 680–685
(2011).
My contribution: Conceiving the idea (possibly independently from V. Makarov
who also had the same general idea), performing the analysis, writing the paper,
and making all ﬁgures.
Paper I
N. Jain, C. Wittmann, L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, D. Elser, C. Marquardt,
V. Makarov and G. Leuchs, “Device calibration impacts security of quantum
key distribution,” accepted for publication in Physical Review Letters; arXiv:
1103.2327 [quant-ph].
My contribution: Major participation in one of the experiments (the data pre-
sented in ﬁgures 3 and 4), and verifying the theoretical equations (1)-(5).
Paper J
L. Lydersen, N. Jain, C. Wittmann, Ø. Marøy, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov
and G. Leuchs, “Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography,” ac-
cepted for publication in Physical Review A; arXiv: 1106.2119 [quant-ph].
My contribution: Conceiving the idea. Designing and having a major partici-
pation in the experiment. Analyzing the data, developing the theory, writing the
paper, and making all ﬁgures.
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Paper K
S. Sauge, L. Lydersen, J. Skaar, A. Anisimov and V. Makarov, “Controlling an
actively-quenched single photon detector with bright light,” submitted to Optics
Express; arXiv: 0809.3408 [quant-ph].
My contribution: Repeating the experiment from the initial manuscript (which
I did not co-author), and conducting additional experiments to verify the origin of
the observed detector response. Analyzing the data, and making ﬁgures 2, 3 and
5.
Paper L
L. Lydersen, M. K. Akhlaghi, A. H. Majedi, J. Skaar and V. Makarov, “Con-
trolling a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright
illumination,” submitted to New Journal of Physics; arXiv: 1106.2396 [quant-ph].
My contribution: Conducting the latched detector control experiment in Sec-
tion III together with V. Makarov. Writing Sections I, III, and V of the paper,
and making all ﬁgures.
Paper M
L. Lydersen, V. Makarov and J. Skaar, “Comment on ‘Resilience of gated avalanche
photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography’,” sub-
mitted to Applied Physics Letters; arXiv: 1106.3756 [quant-ph].
Note: this is submitted as correspondence to a publication [181].
My contribution: Writing the paper.
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1 Introduction
Quantum mechanics makes it possible to exchange a random bit string at a distance [1, 2, 3, 4].
In theory, the key distribution is secure, even if an eavesdropper Eve can do anything allowed
by the currently known laws of nature [5, 6, 7, 8].
In practical QKD systems there will always be imperfections. The security of QKD systems
with a large variety of imperfections has been proved [5, 9, 10, 11]. However, a QKD system
is relatively complex, and loopholes and imperfections exist that are not covered by existing
security proofs. A security loophole can be dealt with in two diﬀerent ways: Either you
modify the implementation, or you increase the amount of privacy ampliﬁcation [12] required
to remove Eve’s information about the key. The ﬁrst approach, to modify the implementation,
may often be done without decreasing the rate of which secret key can be generated. It
may however increase the complexity of the implementation, which in turn may lead to
new loopholes. The advantages of the second approach, to increase the amount of privacy
ampliﬁcation, are that the apparatus can be kept as simple as possible, and that existing
implementations can be made secure with a software update. A drawback is clearly the
reduced key rate, which is considered as a critical parameter in commercial QKD systems.
One of the imperfections to be considered in this paper, is called detector eﬃciency mis-
match (DEM) [13]. If an apparatus has DEM, Eve can control the eﬃciencies of Bob’s
aEmail: lars.lydersen@iet.ntnu.no
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detectors by choosing a parameter t in some external domain. Examples of such domains can
be the timing, polarization, or frequency of the photons [13, 14].
To be more concrete, consider DEM in the time-domain. In most QKD systems Bob’s
apparatus contains two single photon detectors to detect the incoming photons, one for each
bit value. (Equivalently, two diﬀerent detection windows of a single detector can be used for
the two bit values (time-multiplexed detector).) Normally the detectors are gated in the time-
domain to avoid high dark-counts. This means that electronic circuits are used to turn the
detectors on and oﬀ, creating detection windows. Diﬀerent optical path lengths, inaccuracies
in the electronics, and ﬁnite precision in detector manufacturing may cause the detection
windows of the two detectors to be slightly shifted, as seen in Fig. 1. The shift means that
there exist times where the two detectors have diﬀerent eﬃciencies.
η1(t)η0(t)
Eﬃciency
Time t
Fig. 1. An example of mismatched eﬃciency curves for two detectors in the time-domain. The
functions η0(t) and η1(t) are the eﬃciencies of detector 0 and 1, respectively. The parameter t can
be used to parametrize other domains as well.
Systems with DEM can be attacked with a faked-states attack [13]. The faked-states
attack is an intercept-resend attack where Eve does not try to reconstruct the original state
sent by Alice, but rather exploit the imperfections in Bob’s apparatus to hide errors. The
faked-states attack can be adapted to the Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04), Ekert,
and Diﬀerential Phase Shift Keying (DPSK) protocols, in addition to BB84 [15]. Another
attack on systems with DEM is the time-shift attack [16]. In this attack Eve just selects
the timing of each qubit randomly, thereby gaining information about the bit value when
Bob announces which qubits were received and which were lost. The major advantage of the
time-shift attack is that it does not introduce any quantum bit error rate (QBER). It has
been demonstrated experimentally that the security of a commercially available QKD system
can be compromised with a time-shift attack [17].
A frequently mentioned countermeasure for systems with DEM is called four-state Bob
[18, 19, 13, 16]. In a phase-encoded QKD system, Bob chooses from four diﬀerent phase
settings {0, π/2, π, 3π/2} instead of only two {0, π/2}. This will randomly assign the bit
values 0 and 1 to the detectors (or the detection windows, in the case of one time-multiplexed
detector) for each received state. Therefore Eve does not know which detector characteristics
that corresponds to the 0 and 1 detectors.
However, as mentioned previously [13, 16] Eve may use a large laser pulse attack [20, 21,
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22, 23] to read Bob’s phase modulator settings. In a large pulse attack Eve uses a strong laser
pulse to measure the reﬂections from either Alice’s or Bob’s apparatus. The setting of the
phase modulator may give a signature on the reﬂections, enabling Eve to obtain the phase.
First assume that Eve is able to read Alice’s modulator settings. Then Eve could obtain bit
and/or basis information before the pulse enters Bob’s apparatus, and therefore the security
would be seriously compromised. Fortunately, Alice’s implementation can easily be modiﬁed
to avoid the large pulse attack. A setup with a coherent laser source contains an attenuator,
and moving this to the end of the apparatus, as well as introducing an optical isolator, will
put impossible requirements on Eve’s laser [22]. In “plug-and-play” systems Alice already
uses a detector to monitor the input of her setup. Therefore a large pulse attack can easily
be revealed by monitoring the intensity of the input.
In a straightforward implementation of BB84, the phase modulator setting in Bob’s setup
only contains basis information. It usually poses no security threat if Eve reads the basis, as
she will get it during the public discussion anyway. One only has to avoid that Eve receives
the basis information before the pulse enters Bob’s apparatus. This can be taken care of by
placing a properly long coil of optical ﬁber at the entrance of Bob’s setup.
However, if the DEM loophole is patched with four-state Bob, the large pulse attack is
dangerous, because it may give Eve information about the detector assignments. Modifying
Bob’s setup to avoid large pulse attacks is not an easy task. The most practical solution
seems to be a beam splitter or an optical circulator combined with an intensity detector [22].
Note that the key rate will suﬀer; the the input of Bob’s setup is precious single photons.
Also the setup gets more complex, which should be avoided as far as possible, to limit the
number of “hidden surprises”. It is therefore not obvious whether such modiﬁcations should
be implemented, or whether the security should be regained with extra privacy ampliﬁcation.
Even though some systems implement four-state Bob, several of them lack countermeasures
for a strong pulse attack on Bob’s side. Therefore we will pursue the latter solution, i.e., we
assume that Eve is able to read Bob’s phase modulator setting after Bob’s detection.
Security bounds state a unconditionally secure key rate, positive a range in some param-
eter(s). Ideally one should be able to prove the converse, namely that with the parameter(s)
outside this range the QKD-system is provable insecure. Unfortunately this is not always
simple. Usually there is a third range of the parameter(s) where it is not known whether the
QKD-protocol is secure. For instance with perfect devices and one-way classical communica-
tion, the QKD-system is unconditionally secure for QBER < 11 % [8], and provable insecure
for QBER > 14.6 % [24]. Until the gap is closed the security bounds represent a lower bound
on the secure key rate, and the best known attacks represent an upper bound.
Fung et al. found a security bound for QKD systems with DEM [14]. QKD systems with
four-state Bob is proved to be secure, provided Eve cannot read Bob’s phase settings with a
large pulse attack. The security proof assumes the so-called squashing model [11].
In this paper we ﬁrst establish an upper bound for the secure key rate of QKD-system
with DEM by presenting two powerful attacks, one of which even applies to implementations
with four-state Bob (Section II). Then we will establish a lower bound for the secure key rate
by providing a simple security proof of QKD systems with general, basis and bit dependent
detector ﬂaws (Section III), generalizing the proof by Fung et al. More precisely, any basis
dependent, possibly lossy, linear optical imperfections in the channel and receiver are covered
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by the proof. For example, the proof covers mixing between all available optical modes,
misalignments, mode-dependent losses, DEM, and any basis dependence of those eﬀects. The
proof is formulated for a decoy-state BB84 protocol and does not assume a squashing model.
Finally, in Section IV we will examine some examples, including DEM, DEM with mode
mixing, and DEM with misalignment.
2 Security analysis: upper bound
In this section we analyse two powerful attacks on systems with DEM. Such attacks are im-
portant because they establish a regime where QKD-systems with DEM is provable insecure.
To analyze the attacks, for the moment we deﬁne η = max {mint η1(t)/η0(t),mint η0(t)/η1(t)} ∈
[0, 1], representing the smallest eﬃciency ratio available for both bit values. For individual
attacks the secret key rate is given by [12, 25] (given one-way classical communication)
R = I(α : β)− I(α : ), (1)
where I(· : ·) denotes mutual information and α, β, and  represent Alice’s, Bob’s and Eve’s
bits.
In the previous analysis of the faked-states attack [13], the attack was limited by the
introduced QBER rather than Eve’s insuﬃcient knowledge about the key. By attacking only
a fraction of the bits with the faked-states attack one can compromise the security for even
higher values of η. The other fraction could be attacked with the time-shift attack [16] which
introduces no QBER.
To tailor E, the QBER measured by Alice and Bob, the fraction r attacked by the faked-
states attack is given by
r =
E
Efs
= E
1 + 3η
2η
, (2)
where Efs = 2η/(1 + 3η) is the QBER introduced by the faked-states attack. The mutual
information between Alice and Eve is given by
I(α : ) = rI(α : )fs + (1− r)I(α : )ts
= 1− E − h( η
1 + η
)
(
1− 1 + 3η
2η
E
)
,
(3)
where r is given in (2) and I(α : )fs = 1 − E and I(α : )ts = 1 − h(η/(1 + η)) denote the
mutual information in the faked-states and the time-shift attack, respectively, as given in Refs
[13, 16]. h(·) is the binary entropy function. Since Alice and Bob does not know how each
bit is attacked, I(α : β) is simply given by 1− h(E). The key rate (1) thus becomes
R = E + h(
η
1 + η
)
(
1− 1 + 3η
2η
E
)
− h(E). (4)
Without considering DEM, Alice and Bob think that the key is secure when QBER < 11%
(symmetric protocols with one-way classical communication [8]). Solving the equality R = 0,
where R is given by (4), and setting E = 0.11 gives η = 0.215.
The above combined attack is implementable with current technology. Up to η = 0.160 it
represent an upper bound on the secure key rate (see Fig. 3). However with four-state Bob,
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the attack is impossible since the faked-states attack requires knowledge of the bit-detector
mapping before Bob receives the pulse.
For higher values of η there exists an even more eﬃcient attack. The optimal individual
attack in the absence of imperfections is known [24]. Here Eve lets the qubit from Alice
interact with a probe. After the basis is revealed, Eve’s probe is in one of two non-orthogonal
states [24]
|ξ0〉 = |0〉 (5a)
|ξ1〉 = cosϕ|0〉+ sinϕ|1〉, (5b)
where ϕ is related to the QBER by
cosϕ = 1− 2E. (6)
Eve has to separate between |ξ0〉, corresponding to the bit value 0 at Alice, and |ξ1〉, corre-
sponding to the bit value 1. The two states occur with an a priori probability 1/2.
In the presence of DEM, we improve the attack as follows: In addition to using a probe,
Eve launches a time-shift attack. If Bob announces receipt, the probabilities of the two bit
values is now {1/ (1 + η) , η/ (1 + η)} according to the time-shift attack [16]. Then after the
public discussion, Eve has to separate between the states (5) with the a priori probabilities
{1/ (1 + η) , η/ (1 + η)}. The optimal measurement is projective [26], and the probability p of
Eve measuring the correct bit value is found to be
p =
(
1
1 + η
)
cos2
[
1
2
arctan
(
sin 2ϕ
1
η − cos 2ϕ
)]
+
(
η
1 + η
)
sin2
[
ϕ+
1
2
arctan
(
sin 2ϕ
1
η − cos 2ϕ
)]
,
(7)
where ϕ is related to the QBER as in Eq. (6).
Since Eve has probability p to have the same bit value as Alice, I(α : ) is simply 1−h(p).
I(α : β) is given by 1− h(E). The key rate (1) for this improved optimal individual attack is
thus
R = h(p)− h(E), (8)
where p is given by (7).
Without considering DEM, Alice and Bob think that the key is secure when QBER < 11%.
Solving the equality R = 0, where R is given by (8), and setting E = 0.11 gives η = 0.252. In a
commercial QKD system η was found to be approximately 0.25 (see Fig. 3 in [17]) b. Therefore,
this attack could be used to compromise the security of such QKD systems. Note that the
attack does not require the bit-detector mapping until the post-processing step. Therefore
systems patched with four-state Bob are vulnerable to the attack combined with a large pulse
attack.
Note that the both attacks represent a substantial improvement compared to the previ-
ously published attacks which require η < 0.066 [13]. Fig. 3 shows the range of E, η which
compromises security, and compares the two attacks.
bAlso note that the DEM found in this system is heavily asymmetric, and the attacks might be more powerful
if optimized for asymmetric DEM.
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3 Security analysis: lower bound
In this section we will prove the security of the BB84 protocol in the presence of bit and
basis dependent detector ﬂaws, and establish the secure key generation rate. We will prove the
security in a general setting, lifting the so-called squashing model assumption. That is, Eve
may send any multimode, photonic state, and Bob uses practical threshold detectors. Alice
may use a single-photon source or phase-randomized faint laser pulses; in the latter case, Alice
may use decoy states [27, 28, 29] to estimate photon-number dependent parameters. Alice’s
source is otherwise assumed perfect: It emits an incoherent mixture of photonic number states,
randomly in logical modes “0” or “1”, randomly in the X or Z bases, with no correlation
between the bits, bases, and photon number statistics [30].
The state space accessible to Eve consists of the Fock space associated with all photonic
modes supported by the channel. The channel and receiver is modeled as a basis-dependent
quantum operation, CZ and CX , in front of two threshold detectors. Here Z and X denote the
bases chosen by Bob. Since reduced detector eﬃciencies can be absorbed into the quantum
operations, we can let Bob’s threshold detectors have perfect eﬃciency. Dark counts are
attributed to Eve, and for double click events, Bob assigns a random value to his bit [9, 11].
In our security proof, the key condition of CZ and CX is that they are passive, in the sense
of
|0〉 → |0〉, (9)
where |0〉 denotes the vacuum state of all modes. In other words, vacuum incident to all
modes gives vacuum out. This condition is rather general; it includes all linear and nonlinear
optical transformations of the modes supported by the channel.
For simplicity, however, we will restrict ourselves to linear optical imperfections. Bob’s
two detectors may still have diﬀerent eﬃciencies, depending on the time, frequency, and/or
polarization of the incoming states. Moreover, there may be imperfections in the channel
and Bob’s receiver. This can be described as arbitrary, square matrices CZ and CX , acting
on the channel modes after Eve’s intervention. The linear-optical property of CZ and CX is
ensured from the fact that they are classical transformations (or transfer matrices) operating
on the physical, photonic modes (e.g. temporal modes and polarization modes) rather than
the total Fock space of the modes. Each mode can contain any photonic state such as number
states or coherent states. Although CZ and CX have ﬁnite dimension, the associated, induced
quantum operations CZ and CX operate on an inﬁnite dimensional Fock space. We use the
convention that Bob’s basis selector is included in CX (see Subsection 4.1).
With singular value decomposition, we can write
CZ = UZFZVZC, (10)
where UZ and VZ are unitary operators, and FZ is a diagonal, positive matrix. In addition to
the usual singular value decomposition, we have included an extra matrix factor C, governing
losses and imperfections in the channel and/or receiver, independent of the basis chosen by
Bob. The matrix C may for example describe loss of the channel and time-dependent detector
eﬃciencies common for the two detectors. The operator C can be absorbed into Eve’s attack,
thus it never appears in the following analysis. The unitary operators UZ and VZ mix the
modes together. For example, VZ is the result of sending the modes through a network
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isomorphic to the type in [31]. The diagonal matrix FZ represents the diﬀerent eﬃciencies of
the two detectors (in addition to basis-dependent absorptions in the receiver), and satisﬁes
|FZ |2 = diag
[
ηZ0(t1) ηZ1(t1) ηZ0(t2) ηZ1(t2) . . .
]
. (11)
The parameters tj , j = 1, 2, . . . label diﬀerent modes. For example, tj may correspond to
diﬀerent temporal modes. In the absence of UZ and VZ , ηZ0(tj) and ηZ1(tj) can be viewed
as the eﬃciencies of detector 0 and 1 in the Z-basis. Otherwise the eﬃciencies ηZ0(tj) and
ηZ1(tj) do not necessarily correspond to the detectors 0 and 1, respectively, nor to detection
time tj . However, the notation is selected as in the special case for intuition. Note that FZ
may be represented as a collection of beam splitters with transmittivities ηZ0(t1), ηZ1(t1),
and so forth. Then each mode is incident to its own beam splitter, and the vacuum state is
sent into the other input.
The resulting model is shown in Fig. 2a. In the model we have included an extra measure-
ment, giving information to Eve whether the total state is equal to the vacuum |0〉. While
this information actually comes from Bob, it is convenient to let Eve obtain this information
from a separate measurement. Note that this extra vacuum measurement does not disturb
Bob’s measurement statistics for any basis choice.
Vacuum?
UXVX
FX
UX
FX
VX
VZ
FZ
UZ
Vacuum?
U †Z
F¯Z
V †Z UXVX
FX
VZ
FZ
UZ
Vacuum?
Eve
2d)
2c)
Eve
2b)
Eve
(Detectors)
2a)
Eve D
√
ηZI D
D
D
Fig. 2. a) Actual protocol. b) Estimation of Alice’s virtual X-basis measurement. c) Simpliﬁcation
of Fig. 2b from Bob’s point of view. d) Actual parameter estimation in the X-basis.
We will prove security using Koashi’s argument [32, 33, 30] which we brieﬂy summarize
here. In the BB84-like actual protocol Alice generates a large number of bipartite states,
where her part consists of a qubit which she measures randomly in the X- or Z-basis. The
other part of the pairs is sent to Bob via Eve. Bob measures what he receives from Eve
randomly in two diﬀerent bases, which we will refer to as the “X-basis” or the “Z-basis”.
For example, for polarization encoding Bob’s two measurements should ideally correspond to
threshold detectors in horizontal/vertical or ±45◦ polarization bases, with double clicks as
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random assignment. Alice and Bob discard all events where they used incompatible basis.
Further he publicly announces receipt if he receives something diﬀerent from vacuum. Let QX
and QZ be the fractions of non-vacuum results in each basis. Alice and Bob compare their
X-basis measurement results to estimate QX and the error rate EX . The N states measured
in the Z-basis yield NQZ non-vacuum results. For these NQZ events Alice’s measurement
result is the raw key.
The required amount of privacy ampliﬁcation can be found as follows: imagine a virtual
experiment where Alice measures the qubits for the raw key in the X-basis instead of the
Z-basis. Bob tries to predict the result of Alice’s virtual X-basis measurement. Bob does not
perform such a prediction in practice; thus in this prediction we may let Bob do everything
permitted by quantum mechanics, as long as he does not alter the information given to
Eve. Let HvirtX(A|B = μ) denote the entropy of Alice’s virtual X-basis measurement result,
given measurement result μ in Bob’s prediction. It turns out that HvirtX(A|B = μ) can be
bounded using EX and QX , so assume that HvirtX(A|B = μ) ≤ H. Since the uncertainty
about Alice X-measurement is less than H, the entropic uncertainty relation [34] suggests
that any prediction (including Eves prediction) of the measurement result of Alice Z-basis
measurement will have at least NQZ −H entropy. Thus Alice can extract NQZ −H bits of
secret key. Rigorously, this rate is found by concertizing the privacy ampliﬁcation procedure
by universal hashing. Although Koashi’s original proof is formulated with an obsolete security
deﬁnition based on accessible information, the proof can easily be adapted to a composable
security deﬁnition [35, 36, 37].
Bob must ensure that he has an identical raw key. Since it does not matter to Eve what
Bob does (as long as he gives Eve the same information), he measures the bits for the raw
key in the Z-basis. Alice and Bob compares a subset of the raw key to ﬁnd the error rate
EZ (consuming some of the raw key, but negliable in the asymptotic limit), and Alice sends
Bob NQZh(EZ) bits of error correcting information consuming NQZh(EZ) bits of previously
established secret key. In the asymptotic limit N → ∞ the net secure key generation rate
becomes
RZ ≥ 1− H
NQZ
− h(EZ). (12)
Note that H is needed to ensure that Alice’s key is secret, and this only requires X-
basis parameters to be estimated by Alice and Bob. Thus there is no need to invoke the
classicalization argument [7] regarding statistics of measurements involved in the simultaneous
estimation of EX and EZ .
For his prediction, Bob will use the virtual measurement in Fig. 2b. Bob ﬁrst applies
the unitary operator U †Z , followed by the ﬁlter F¯Z , and the unitary operator V
†
Z . Then he
applies the operator CX = UXFXVX . Finally he performs an X-basis measurement. Note
that we retain Eve’s vacuum measurement and all components preceding it, so Eve obtains
the identical information as in Fig. 2a. The matrix F¯Z is diagonal, and is given by
F¯ZFZ =
√
ηZI, (13)
where
ηZ = min
ij
{ηZi(tj)}. (14)
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Similarly to FZ , the ﬁlter F¯Z is implementable by beam splitters acting separately on each
mode. The largest element of |F¯Z |2 is 1, while the smallest element is ηZ/maxij{ηZi(tj)}.
To analyze how well Bob performs in his prediction, we will now simplify the system in
Fig. 2b to determine Bob’s measurement statistics. To do this, we introduce an extra vacuum
measurement right before Bob’s detectors, assuming nobody records the outcome. Clearly,
Bob’s measurement statistics are not altered by the presence of this extra measurement. The
ﬁlter UXFXVXV
†
Z F¯ZU
†
Z obeys (9), being a linear optical transformation. As a result, we show
in the appendix that the output state, after the extra vacuum measurement, is independent
of the presence of Eve’s vacuum measurement (i.e., the ﬁrst vacuum measurement, after UZ
in Fig. 2b). Thus, to estimate Bob’s measurement statistics, we can remove Eve’s vacuum
measurement. We end up with the simpliﬁed system shown in Fig. 2c. Note that the simpliﬁed
system is identical to the system in Fig. 2d, the actual protocol when Bob has chosen the
X-basis, except for one thing: There is an extra, mode-independent absorption ηZ in the
channel. This fact will be used for estimating the performance of Bob’s prediction.
To prove the security also for the multiphotonic case, we use the parameters q
(1)
X and
e
(1)
X assumed known from the decoy state protocol. q
(1)
X is the fraction of Bob’s X-basis non-
vacuum events that originate from single photons at Alice. e
(1)
X is the QBER for single photon
events in the X-basis (only single photons generate secure key). Consider the prediction in
Fig. 2b-c. Let NQZ be the number of states in the raw key. In a worst case, the number
of detection events that originate from single photons at Alice, will be only ηZq
(1)
X QXN ,
due to the ﬁlter
√
η
Z
I (note that ηZQX < QZ). For each of these events Bob’s entropic
uncertainty about Alice’s bit is (asymptotically) h(e
(1)∗
X ), where e
(1)∗
X is the associated error
rate. We note that e
(1)∗
X is not measured in the actual protocol; it will rather be estimated
below. For the events lost in the ﬁlter
√
η
Z
I, Bob’s entropic uncertainty about Alice’s bit is
1, since he has no detection result. Summarizing, Bob’s entropic uncertainty about Alice’s
QZN bits (corresponding to the number of detection events in Fig. 2a) is at most H =
QZN − ηZq(1)X QXN [1− h(e(1)∗X )]. In our analysis we have ignored the events associated with
Alice sending the vacuum state [30]; their contribution will only give a marginally larger rate.
From (12) the secure key rate becomes
RZ = −h(EZ) + ηZq(1)X QX/QZ
[
1− h(e(1)∗X )
]
. (15)
It remains to bound the parameter e
(1)∗
X , which is the QBER for single photon events in
the estimation Fig. 2b-c. Recall that e
(1)
X is the estimated QBER for single photon events in
the X-basis, Fig. 2d. The only diﬀerence between the setup in Fig. 2c and Fig. 2d is the ﬁlter√
η
Z
I, which represent identical absorption in all modes. However, the removal of detection
events by this ﬁlter is dependent on the photon number, so e
(1)∗
X 	= e(1)X in general c. To bound
e
(1)∗
X we use the fact that the ﬁlter only alter the detection statistics by removing detection
events. (An exception occurs for the few coincidence counts; these can be taken into account
easily.) In a worst case,
e
(1)∗
X ≤
e
(1)
X
ηZ(1− e(1)X ) + e(1)X
≤ e(1)X /ηZ . (16)
cNote that although Alice send a single photon for a particular event, Eve may send any state.
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Putting these results together, we obtain the secure key generation rate
RZ ≥ −h(EZ) + ηZq(1)X QX/QZ
[
1− h(e(1)X /ηZ)
]
. (17)
A similar result holds when Alice and Bob have chosen the X-basis in the actual protocol:
RX ≥ −h(EX) + ηXq(1)Z QZ/QX
[
1− h(e(1)Z /ηX)
]
. (18)
Ineqs. (17) and (18) are valid for any basis and bit dependence of the channel and re-
ceiver/detectors, as long as the imperfections (CZ and CX) can be described as possibly
lossy, linear optical operators acting on the photonic modes.
To compare our result (17) to that of Ref. [14], we let Alice only send single photons. The
rate then becomes
R ≥ −h(E) + η[1− h(E/η)], (19)
where we have assumed symmetry between the bases, and therefore omitted the Z and X
subscripts. The rate (19) coincides with the rate found in [14] (see Subsection 4.2 for a
discussion on how to identify η). Note, however, that (19) is a stronger result in the sense
that it applies to any basis-dependent linear optical imperfections, not only the case where
UZ,X = I, and VZ,X do not mix modes associated with diﬀerent logical bits. Also it does not
require the squashing model assumption.
Under the assumption that Eve only sends single photons, it is easy to realize that (16)
can be replaced by e
(1)∗
X = e
(1)
X . Then (19) is improved to
R ≥ −h(E) + η[1− h(E)]. (20)
Fig. 3 shows the security bounds resulting from (19) and (20) when the right-hand side is
set equal to zero.
4 Examples
4.1 DEM in the time-domain
Consider the case where Bob’s detectors have time-dependent eﬃciencies, as indicated in
Fig. 1. We assume that the eﬃciencies are independent of the basis chosen by Bob (FX = FZ).
The channel and receiver are otherwise assumed perfect, except for a background loss C. The
background loss may be mode dependent, but independent of the basis chosen by Bob.
With these assumptions, we may take CZ = FZC and CX = FXHC = FZHC, where
H is a block-diagonal matrix consisting of 2× 2 Hadamard matrices H(2), interchanging the
bases Z and X for each time:
H = diag
[
H(2) H(2) H(2) . . .
]
. (21)
To maximize the secure key rate, as much as possible of the detector ﬂaws should be absorbed
into C. Therefore, we factorize
FZ = FF
′, (22)
where
F ′2 = diag
[
η′(t1) η′(t1) η′(t2) η′(t2) . . .
]
, (23)
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Fig. 3. Security bounds when Alice sends single photons (q
(1)
Z = q
(1)
X = 1), assuming symmetry
between the bases. The bounds are found by setting the associated key generation rates equal to
zero. Solid line: General security bound, as resulting from (19). Dash-dotted line: Security bound
(20) assuming Eve sends single photons. Dashed line: The improvement of the optimal individual
attack from Section 2, as resulting from (8). Dotted line: The combined attack from Section 2,
as resulting from (4). For the attacks it is assumed that the DEM is equal for the two bit values.
The dark grey region is proved to be insecure while the white region is proved to be secure with
extra privacy ampliﬁcation. The light grey region should be assumed insecure.
and η′(tj) = max{ηZ0(tj), ηZ1(tj)}. Noting that F ′ and H commute, we can absorb F ′ into
C. The remaining diagonal matrix F then has the role of FZ (and FX) in the security proof.
The parameter ηZ = ηX to substitute into the secure key generation rate (17) is therefore the
minimum diagonal element of |F |2:
ηZ = min
t
min
{
ηZ0(t)
ηZ1(t)
,
ηZ1(t)
ηZ0(t)
}
. (24)
4.2 DEM and restricted mode mixing
Consider the case treated by Fung et al. [14], where there is no mixing between modes
associated with diﬀerent logical bits. Then CZ can be written in block diagonal form
CZ =
[
C0 0
0 C1
]
C, (25)
provided we reorder the modes as in
|FZ |2 = diag
[
ηZ0(t1) ηZ0(t2) . . . ηZ1(t1) ηZ1(t2) . . .
]
, (26)
to be compared to (11). As in Ref. [14] we assume basis independence in the sense
CX =
[
C0 0
0 C1
]
HC. (27)
Here,
H =
1√
2
[
I I
I −I
]
, (28)
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with the present choice of mode order. We assume that CZ is nonsingular. (Otherwise, the
secure key generation rate would be zero.)
We should associate as much as possible of the imperfections to the common channel
operator C. Let the singular-value decomposition of C0C
−1
1 be usv, where u and v are
unitary matrices, and s is diagonal and positive. Let λ2 be the maximum of max s and
max s−1. Factorize
CZ = λ
[
us1/2 0
0 v†s−1/2
]
1
λ
[
s−1/2u†C0 0
0 s1/2vC1
]
C. (29)
Deﬁning
C ′ =
1
λ
[
s−1/2u†C0 0
0 s1/2vC1
]
, (30)
and noting that s−1/2u†C0 = s1/2vC1, we have C ′H = HC ′. This gives
CZ = λ
[
us1/2 0
0 v†s−1/2
]
C ′C, (31a)
CX = λ
[
us1/2 0
0 v†s−1/2
]
HC ′C. (31b)
Similarly to the reasoning in Section III, Bob applies a virtual ﬁlter to transform CZ into an
operator proportional to CX . Applying
1
λ
[
us1/2 0
0 v†s−1/2
]
H
1
λ
[
s−1/2u† 0
0 s1/2v
]
,
the operator CZ is transformed into CX/λ
2. Following Section III,
√
η = 1/λ2. This gives
√
η = min(min s,min s−1). (32)
Equivalently, η is the minimum value of the eigenvalues and inverse eigenvalues of C0C
−1
1 (C0C
−1
1 )
† =
C0(C
†
1C1)
−1C†0 . This η should be substituted into (17) to ﬁnd the secure key generation rate.
The parameter η can be measured as follows. For single photon input in a given super-
position ψ of logical “0” modes, the probability of a click in detector 0 is given by ψ†C†0C0ψ.
Similarly, we may use the identical superposition ψ of “1” modes to ﬁnd the detection prob-
ability of detector 1. Note that ψ denotes a classical ﬁeld vector, where each element corre-
sponds to a separate mode. The parameter η turns out to be equal to the minimum detection
probability ratio
η = min
(
min
ψ
ψ†C†0C0ψ
ψ†C†1C1ψ
,min
ψ
ψ†C†1C1ψ
ψ†C†0C0ψ
)
. (33)
In other words, η is given by the minimum eﬃciency mismatch ratio for all superpositions of
input modes.
To see this, let us2u† be the spectral decomposition of C0(C
†
1C1)
−1C†0 . Then we have
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C−1†0 (C
†
1C1)C
−1
0 = us
−2u†, and
ψ†C†1C1ψ
ψ†C†0C0ψ
=
ψ′†C−1†0 C
†
1C1C
−1
0 ψ
′
ψ′†ψ′
=
ψ′†u†s−2uψ′
ψ′†ψ′
= s−2.
(34)
Combining (32) and (34) gives the desired result.
4.3 DEM and misalignments
In addition to the detector eﬃciency mismatch in Subsection 4.1, suppose that Bob’s
detectors are misaligned. The misalignments may be dependent on Bob’s choice of basis, and
are described by unitary matrices VZ and VX . This gives the channel operators CZ = FZVZC
and CX = FXVXHC. Assuming no coupling between diﬀerent temporal modes (no multiple
reﬂections), VZ and VX are block-diagonal matrices. For example,
VZ = diag
[
V
(2)
1 V
(2)
2 V
(2)
3 . . .
]
, (35)
where V
(2)
j are unitary 2× 2 matrices. Here we have used the same order of modes as in the
original deﬁnition (11). Taking FX = FZ and factorizing as in Subsection 4.1, we ﬁnd that
the parameter ηZ = ηX again is given by (24). The secure key generation rate is then found
from (17).
If there is coupling between modes associated with diﬀerent t’s (in addition to the mis-
alignment), we must retain the general deﬁnition of ηZ in (14). For unnormalized detection
eﬃciencies, this deﬁnition can be rewritten
ηZ =
mini,t{ηZi(t)}
maxi,t{ηZi(t)} . (36)
Eq. (36) is obtained by absorbing the maximum detector eﬃciency maxi,t{ηZi(t)} into C.
Omitting the requirement FX = FZ , (36) must be rewritten as
ηZ =
mini,t{ηZi(t)}
max (maxi,t{ηZi(t)},maxi,t{ηXi(t)}) . (37)
4.4 Characterizing DEM of Bob’s receiver
To estimate the secure key generation rate, Bob must characterize his receiver to ﬁnd ηZ
and ηX (or η ≡ min{ηZ , ηX}). We note that rather diﬀerent results are obtained dependent on
whether or not there are coupling between diﬀerent modes. For the case of DEM in the time-
domain, since it is diﬃcult to eliminate multiple reﬂections in Bob’s receiver, a conservative
approach is to use (37).
For the case with gated detectors, the eﬃciencies approach zero at the edges of the detec-
tion window. When there are coupling between diﬀerent temporal modes, the resulting key
generation rate will therefore be close to zero. Even if no such coupling is present, the key
generation rate may approach zero, since at the edges of the detection window the eﬃciency
L. Lydersen and J. Skaar 73
ratio may be very small. (Although the average detection probability at the edges may be
small, Eve may compensate this by replacing the channel by a more transparent one, or by
increasing the power of her pulses [13].) A possible solution may be that Bob monitors his
input signal at all times, to ensure that Eve does not send photons outside the central part
of the window. Then η can be obtained by measuring the minimum and maximum detection
eﬃciency for (superpositions of) modes with times inside this central part.
Such a measurement may be cumbersome due to many degrees of freedom of the possible
inputs. Alternatively, one could specify the maximum possible amount of mode coupling in
the system, and use this information to lower bound η. Suppose that the maximum (power)
coupling from one mode j to all other modes is δ. Then the unitary matrix VZ satisﬁes∑
i,i =j |Vij |2 < δ in addition to
∑
i |Vij |2 = 1, omitting the subscript Z for clarity. Let |fj |2
be the jth diagonal element of FZ . By measuring the detection eﬃciency when photons are
incident to the jth mode, we obtain
∑
i |Vij |2|fi|2 = |fj |2+
∑
i,i =j |Vij |2
(|fi|2 − |fj |2). Hence,
the elements |fj |2 can be found from the detection eﬃciency as a function of j of the incident
mode, up to an error
∣∣∣∑i,i =j |Vij |2 (|fi|2 − |fj |2)∣∣∣ < δ. A lower bound of η is therefore
η >
mint,basis,bit(detection eﬃciency)− δ
maxt,basis,bit(detection eﬃciency) + δ
. (38)
The required measurement is to obtain the detection eﬃciency as a function of t and logical
bit value for both bases. For detection eﬃciency mismatch in the time-domain the test pulses
should be suﬃciently short, in order to capture all details. An upper bound of the parameter
δ may be estimated from the (worst case) multiple reﬂections and misalignment’s that may
happen in the system.
5 Discussion and conclusion
In this work we have proved the security of BB84 in the presence of any basis dependent,
possibly lossy, linear optical imperfections in the channel and receiver/detectors. The security
proof thus covers a combination of several imperfections: Detection eﬃciency mismatch,
misalignments, mixing between the modes, multiple reﬂections, and any basis dependence
of those eﬀects. Contrary to most previous security proofs, this proof does not require a
squashing detector model.
A speciﬁc implementation of a QKD system may have several diﬀerent imperfections.
Ideally there should be a universal security proof with a set of parameters that cover all
(worst case) imperfections and tolerances of the equipment. We have made a step towards
this goal by describing generic imperfections at the detector, and by providing a compact
proof, which may hopefully prove useful for an even more general description.
We have established an upper bound for the secure key rate by providing two powerful
attacks. One of the attacks may be applied to systems even with the four-state Bob patch,
and this demonstrates the seriousness of the detection eﬃciency loophole. This attack is
based on a combination of an optimal individual attack, a time shift attack, and a large pulse
attack. As a consequence of such types of attacks, the key generation rate may not increase
substantially as a result of the four-state Bob patch. A possible countermeasure is to use the
general bounds (17) and (18) for estimating the required amount of privacy ampliﬁcation.
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Appendix A Properties of vacuum measurement
Let {|n〉} be an orthonormal basis for a state space of interest. We refer to the state |0〉 as
the “vacuum state of all modes”, although it could in principle be any ﬁxed, pure state. A
vacuum measurement is a projective measurement with projectors P = |0〉〈0| and I −P . We
claim that if F is any quantum operation satisfying (9), i.e.,
F(|0〉〈0|) = |0〉〈0|, (A.1)
the presence of a vacuum measurement before F does not change the statistics and output
state of a vacuum measurement after F , see Fig. A.1.
This result can be proved by using the fact that any quantum operation can be viewed as
a unitary transformation on an extended state space, with a standard state |0〉aux as auxiliary
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Vacuum? Vacuum? Vacuum?
F F≡
Fig. A.1. The statistics and output state of the vacuum measurement after F is not changed by
the introduction of a vacuum measurement before F .
input. Due to (A.1), we can assume that the unitary transformation transforms
|0〉 ⊗ |0〉aux → |0〉 ⊗ |0〉aux, (A.2)
with no loss of generality.
Consider the right-hand side of the identity (Fig. A.1). Let Paux = |0〉aux〈0|aux. A
vacuum measurement at the input can now be described as a projective measurement with
P ⊗ Paux and I − P ⊗ Paux, since the auxiliary input is ﬁxed at |0〉aux. Clearly, it does not
matter if we measure the auxiliary output with projectors Paux and I − Paux. In total, the
extended measurement at the output is described by projectors P ⊗ Paux, P ⊗ (I − Paux),
(I −P )⊗Paux, and (I−P )⊗ (I −Paux). Transforming the projector P ⊗Paux backwards, we
ﬁnd that the corresponding projector at the input is P ⊗ Paux. In other words, the extended
vacuum measurement at the output contains the vacuum measurement at the input, so the
latter is redundant.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a method for distribut-
ing a secure key to two communicating parties, Alice and Bob.
The most common QKD protocol, Bennett-Brassard 1984
(BB84) [1], has been proved secure by a number of approaches,
some of which include different kinds of imperfections in the
equipment [2–7]. The ultimate goal of QKD security analysis
is to take all kinds of imperfections into account, at least those
that cannot be eliminated completely by a suitable design
of the setup. So far, most of the available security proofs
for BB84 consider imperfections at the source or detector
separately. An exception is the work by Gottesman et al. [5],
which treats the security in the presence of source ﬂaws and a
squashing detector with certain limited imperfections. Also
of interest is the article by Hayashi [8], which combines
ﬁnite-length key analysis with photon number imperfections
at the source. Proving security for a realistic system with
arbitrary imperfections simultaneously in the source, channel,
and detectors has so far been an open problem.
A particularly suitable approach for practical QKD is to
limit the assumptions about the equipment. By considering
entanglement-based protocols with detectors in both ends of
the system [9], one can prove security in a rather general setting
[10], assuming collective attacks and individual imperfections
[11]. While these protocols and security proofs are promising,
they do not necessarily provide security for realistic devices.
All realistic systems have large losses due to the channel and
limited detector efﬁciencies. An eavesdropper Eve may use
imperfect detection efﬁciencies to effectively control Bob’s
basis choice [12,13]. Using this detection loophole, she may
perform the identical measurement as Bob to obtain a perfect
copy of the key.1
In this work we prove security for BB84 with any combi-
nation of individual imperfections, as well as channel losses.
By individual imperfections we mean that the operation of the
devices for a particular signal is independent of earlier signals.
To obtain such generality, we describe the actual physics
*oystein.maroy@iet.ntnu.no
1For any protocol, Bob’s basis choice (or more generally, mea-
surement setting) must be random and come from a trusted
random-number generator; otherwise, Eve could perform the same
measurement as Bob to obtain a perfect copy of his result.
in the protocol rather than using, for example, squashing
models with “tagging.” Thus, the detectors are described
as a basis-dependent quantum operation on the actual state
space in front of a three-outcome measurement (“0”, “1”, and
“vacuum”). Describing the detector in this way also enables
an elegant solution to the problem of combining errors in the
detectors and errors in the source.
To get around the detection loophole, we anticipate that
at least two parameters must be known or bounded about
the system; one for the source and one for the detectors.
Our proof is formulated with two such parameters; the
basis dependence of the source and a detector-blinding
parameter. In addition to these parameters, we include a
third parameter quantifying leakage from Bob’s detectors.
Once these parameters are bounded, the system may con-
tain bit and basis leakage from Alice, multimode behavior,
basis-dependent misalignments, losses, nonlinearities, basis-
dependent threshold detectors with detector efﬁciency mis-
match and information leakage, dark counts, etc. In that sense,
our proof offers the generality of the entanglement-based
scenarios [11], applies to realistic scenarios with loss, and pro-
vides universal composable security against the most general
attacks.
II. PROTOCOL
Consider the following BB84-like protocol as the actual
protocol. Alice chooses basis a = Z or a = X randomly
according to some probability distribution and prepares the
state |χa〉, where
|χZ〉 = √pZ|0〉|β0〉 +
√
1 − pZ|1〉|β1〉, (1a)
|χX〉 = √pX|+〉|β+〉 +
√
1 − pX|−〉|β−〉. (1b)
Here pZ and pX are probabilities, |0〉,|1〉 are some orthonormal
qubit basis states, and |±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2. Alice measures
the qubit in the a basis (this measurement can be delayed
to the end of the protocol). She repeats the procedure to
obtain a large number of “β states,” which are sent via
Eve to Bob. These β states include any system that is
correlated to Alice’s system and to which Eve has access.
Note that Eve is free to send anything to Bob, including
parts of β and/or any state of her own choice. Depending
on Alice’s source, the four different β states will differ in
photon number statistics, polarization, wavelength, etc. Any
1050-2947/2010/82(3)/032337(7) 032337-1 ©2010 The American Physical Society
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leakage in nonphotonic side channels will also be included
in these states. With no loss of generality, the β states
are assumed to be pure; if they were mixed, we could
simply purify them, sending the auxiliary, purifying system to
Eve.
For each state received by Bob, he chooses a “basis”
variable b according to some probability distribution and
conducts measurements Mb. The measurements Mb have three
outcomes: “0”, “1”, and “vacuum.” When he obtains “0” or
“1”, he publicly acknowledges receipt. After transmission,
Alice and Bob broadcast a and b. When b = X, they openly
compare their measurement results to estimate the fraction qX
of nonvacuum events at Bob when a = X, the corresponding
error rate δX, and the fraction qph of nonvacuum events when
a = Z. After this estimation only the n states for which
a = b = Z are kept. Discarding all events where Bob detected
“vacuum,” Alice and Bob each end up with nqZ bits. Alice’s
bits are the raw key.
We now summarize Koashi’s generic framework for secu-
rity proofs [14,15]. Imagine a virtual experiment where Alice
measures her ﬁnal nqZ qubits (corresponding to the raw key)
in the X basis instead of Z basis. In this virtual experiment,
instead of measuring MZ , Bob now tries to predict the outcome
of Alice’s measurement. To do this, he may do whatever is
permitted by quantum mechanics, as long as he does not alter
the information given to Eve. Let HvirtX(A|B = μ) denote the
entropy of Alice’s result, given measurement result μ in Bob’s
prediction. Let HvirtX(A|B = μ)  H for some constant H .
Since the uncertainty after Bob’s prediction is less than H ,
the entropic uncertainty relation [16] suggests that anyone
(including Eve) cannot predict the outcome of a Z-basis
measurement by Alice with less entropy than nqZ − H . This
indicates that Alice can extract nqZ − H bits of secret key.
The quantity H is to be found from the estimated parameters
qX, δX, and qph.2 The detailed proof [14] of the fact that
Alice can extract nqZ − H bits of secret key is based upon
the universal, composable security deﬁnition and consid-
ers the actual privacy ampliﬁcation protocol by universal
hashing.
To ensure that Bob has the identical key, we note that
it does not matter to Eve what Bob does (as long as he
gives the same receipt acknowledgment information); he
can as well measure MZ . Then Bob obtains the identical
raw key from his measurement result and nqZh(δZ) extra
bits of error correction information from Alice, consuming
nqZh(δZ) of previous established secure key. Here h(·) is the
binary Shannon entropy function, and the error rate δZ can
be estimated by sacriﬁcing a subset of the raw key (whose
size we can neglect in the asymptotic limit n → ∞). We
therefore obtain the asymptotic net secure key generation
rate
RZ  1 − H/nqZ − h(δZ). (2)
2The Z-basis error rate δZ is not needed to ensure that Alice’s
key is secret; thus, there is no need to invoke the classicalization
argument [17] regarding statistics of measurements involved in the
simultaneous estimation of δX and δZ .
III. INDIVIDUAL IMPERFECTIONS IN THE DETECTORS
We ﬁrst consider the situation where Alice’s source is
perfect (|χX〉 = |χZ〉) and Bob’s detectors can be subject to
any kind of individual imperfections. With the understanding
that Bob chooses his bit randomly for coincidence counts [3,5],
his detectors can be modeled by a basis-dependent quantum
operation (EZ andEX) in front of a measurement with three pos-
sible outcomes: “0”, “1”, and “vacuum.” Note that there is no
need to require a squash model [5,18,19] in our proof as Bob’s
basis selector is included into the basis-dependent quantum
operation.
In addition to the optical modes, there may also be other
relevant degrees of freedom in the detector. For example,
dark counts are caused by physical processes internally in the
detector. Thus, we consider an extended state space consisting
of the Fock space of all optical modes in addition to the state
space associated with “electronic” degrees of freedom inside
the detectors. Pessimistically, we let Eve control all degrees of
freedom.
The quantum operations EZ and EX are decomposed as
follows: First there is a basis-dependent quantum operation
(FZ and FX) acting on the Fock space associated with all
optical modes. This operation contains Bob’s basis selector.
The operations FZ and FX are assumed to be passive in the
sense that if vacuum is incident to all modes, there will also be
vacuum at the output. Then there is another quantum operation
F describing interaction between the photonic state and the
internal degrees of freedom in the detectors (see Fig. 1). The
quantum operation F may be active in the sense that even
though vacuum is incident to all optical modes, there may
be nonvacuum detections. When the optical modes contain the
vacuum state, we can (pessimistically) assume that Eve has full
control over Bob’s detectors through F ; in other words, she
controls the dark counts directly with the “electronic” modes.
The quantum operation F is assumed to be independent of
“0”
“vacuum”
“1”
F
σ2
σ
To Eve
basis b
Eb
Fb
σ1 ⊗ σ2
Alice’s bit
From Eve
ρ
FIG. 1. Bob’s detectors consist of a basis-dependent quantum
operation (EZ = F ◦ FZ and EX = F ◦ FX) in front of a three-
outcome measurement. The fact that Eve gets arrival information from
Bob is included through a dedicated vacuum measurement preceding
Bob’s three-outcome measurement. On the input side of F , the lower
line contains the electronic modes of the detector, while on the output
side of F , the lower line indicates the part of the Hilbert space leaked
to Eve. Alice’s classical bit, indicated in the upper part of the ﬁgure,
is included in the state σ .
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Bob’s basis choice. This assumption is natural as Bob’s basis
choice does not inﬂuence internal degrees of freedom in the
detector. In other words, when Eve emits the vacuum in all
optical modes, Bob’s basis choice will not affect the detection
statistics.
To achieve a completely general detector model, we
should not only let Eve control the detectors; in addition,
we must let information return to Eve. Consider the case
where Bob has chosen the Z basis. In the most general
case, the information leakage is quantum; that is, a part of
the total Hilbert space is given directly to Eve. Replacing
this part of the Hilbert space with some standard state σ2,
we can quantify the leakage Z by the trace distance D(·,·)
as follows:
Z = min
σ2
max
ρ
D(σ,σ1 ⊗ σ2). (3)
Here ρ is any state at Bob’s input (including Alice’s part of
the system; see Fig. 1), σ is the state of Alice and Bob before
leakage, and σ1 = Tr2(σ ) is the state of the remaining Hilbert
space after leakage. Note that these density operators refer to a
single signal, not the entire block of n signals. The parameter
Z measures the correlation between the leaked quantum
state and the state of Alice and Bob, maximized over states
sent by Eve. More precisely, Z is the maximum probability
that the actual state before leakage can be distinguished
from the state where the leaked part is replaced by the
standard state σ2 [20]. Equation (3) has another very useful
physical interpretation: Choose a ﬁxed σ2, dependent on EZ ,
but independent of the state coming from Eve. For any σ ,
the probability of a measurement result of σ1 ⊗ σ2 deviates
no more than Z from the corresponding probability when
measuring σ [20].
Although we now have a general detector model, we add
one little feature. In the actual protocol, Eve gets to know
whether a particular signal was detected. This can be included
as an extra projective measurement with projectors P and
I − P , where I − P is a projector onto the subspace corre-
sponding to detection result “vacuum” in Bob’s measurement.
Clearly, this addition does not disturb Bob’s measurement
statistics. The composed measurement consisting of EZ fol-
lowed by this projective measurement will be referred to as
Eve’s vacuum measurement. It can be described by some
positive operator-valued measure (POVM) elements E and
I − E, where I − E corresponds to detection result “vacuum”
at Bob. Including Eve’s vacuum measurement separately,
rather than absorbing it into the quantum leakage (3), leads
to a better rate. The reason is that the information from the
vacuum measurement is classical and available to Bob, as
opposed to general, leaked quantum information.
Having described the model, we now turn to the security
analysis. As before, Alice extracts the key in the Z basis. In
Koashi’s security proof, Bob wants to predict the outcome
of a virtual X-basis measurement by Alice. In this virtual
prediction there is only one important restriction: Bob is not
allowed to alter the information going to Eve. Thus, Eve’s
vacuum measurement must be retained.
The setup used by Bob to perform the virtual X-basis
prediction is depicted in Fig. 2. The state from Eve is incident
to a ﬁrst vacuum measurement, Bob’s vacuum measurement,
“0”
“1”
“vacuum”EXEZ
From Eve
To Eve
Q, I −Q
ersal
Rev-
P, I − P
FIG. 2. Bob’s setup for virtual X-basis prediction. The optical
and electronic modes are denoted by a single line in this ﬁgure.
a projective measurement with certain projectors Q and
I − Q, corresponding to results “nonvacuum” and “vacuum,”
respectively. Then it goes through the quantum operation
EZ and leaks partially back to Eve. The remaining part is
measured by Eve’s vacuum measurement and sent through
a reversal operation. The goal of the reversal operation is
to reverse the effect of the vacuum measurement so that the
combined operation consisting of Eve’s vacuum measurement
and the reversal operation is identity, with a certain probability.
Finally, the quantum operation EX and Bob’s three-outcome
measurement are applied.
To analyze Bob’s virtual prediction, we note the following
observations. The quantum operation EZ can be viewed as
a unitary operation on an extended state space. Moreover,
since Bob’s reversal operation does not have to be realizable
in practice (only in principle), we may assume that Bob has
access to any extra degrees of freedom used to “unitarize”
EZ . He does not have access to the quantum state leaked to
Eve; however, the leakage disturbs the probabilities of Bob’s
prediction by no more than Z . Therefore, for the moment
we can ignore the leakage, taking it into account in the ﬁnal
expression for the key rate.
To proceed, we need the following results.
Lemma 1 (Koashi and Ueda [21]). Let E, acting on a
Hilbert space H, be a POVM element associated with some
measurement M . If any state in some subspace Q ⊆ H
is measured with M , the measured state can be reversed
to the original state, with maximum joint probability of
outcome E and successful reversal inf|〉∈Q,〈|〉=1〈|E|〉.
It is possible to know when the reversal is successful or
not.
Lemma2.The output of a quantum operation Eb is measured
with projectors P0, P1, and I − P0 − P1, corresponding to
detection results “0”, “1”, and “vacuum,” respectively, or
alternatively, with P ≡ P0 + P1 and I − P . Let I − Q be a
projector onto an input subspace of Eb that leads to detection
result “vacuum” with certainty. The measurement statistics
are not changed by the presence of a projective measurement
{Q,I − Q} before Eb.
Proof. Lemma 2 is not as trivial as it may appear at ﬁrst sight
since states in the support of Q may also lead to detection result
“vacuum.” Thus, the measurement before Eb gives extra infor-
mation. Nevertheless, the quantum operation Eb can be viewed
as a unitary transformation on an extended Hilbert space, with
a standard state as auxiliary input. Clearly, it does not matter
if we measure the extra degrees of freedom at the output.
This measurement can be constructed so that the total output
measurement distinguishes between input states in the support
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of Q or I − Q. Then, an input measurement {Q,I − Q}
is redundant.
More precisely, the unitary operator can be chosen such
that the projective measurement at the output is implemented
as a measurement of a single qutrit in the computational basis.
Thus, it transforms
|01〉|0〉aux → |v〉|ψ1〉, (4a)
|02〉|0〉aux → |v〉|ψ2〉, (4b)
and
|11〉|0〉aux → |v〉
∣∣φv1 〉+ |0〉∣∣φ01 〉+ |1〉∣∣φ11 〉, (5a)
|12〉|0〉aux → |v〉
∣∣φv2 〉+ |0〉∣∣φ02 〉+ |1〉∣∣φ12 〉, (5b)
etc. Here |0i〉 and |1i〉 are bases for the support of I − Q
and Q, respectively; |0〉aux is the auxiliary standard state; and
|0〉〈0| = P0, |1〉〈1| = P1, and |v〉〈v| = I − P0 − P1. The ψ
and φ vectors are (not necessarily normalized) states of the
remaining part of the output state space. Since 〈1i |0j 〉 = 0, we
have 〈φvi |ψj 〉 = 0 for any i,j . Thus, by a measurement of the
ψ or φ part of the output state space in addition to the qutrit,
we can distinguish between the |0i〉 states and |1i〉 states. 
We deﬁne the projector I − Q so as to project onto vacuum
in all photonic modes and onto the biggest subspace of the
“electronic” modes that gives detection result “vacuum” in
Eve’s vacuum measurement. The orthogonal subspace, which
is the support of Q, is denoted Q. Lemma 2 ensures that
Bob’s vacuum measurement does not change the statistics of
Eve’s vacuum measurement. When Eve’s vacuum measure-
ment gives result “vacuum,” or the reversal operation is not
successful, the reversal operation is assumed to output a state
in the support of I − Q. Thus, in these cases the output of
Bob’s virtual prediction is “vacuum” with certainty.
If the outcome of Bob’s vacuum measurement is “vacuum,”
the outcome of Eve’s vacuum measurement is “vacuum,”
and the reversal operation is successful with certainty. Suppose
the outcome of Bob’s vacuum measurement is “nonvacuum.”
According to Lemma 1, the maximum joint probability of
result E in Eve’s vacuum measurement and successful reversal
is ηZ = inf|〉∈Q,〈|〉=1〈|E|〉. When result E and the
reversal is successful (and Bob knows when it is), the statistics
of Bob’s measurement compared to Alice’s virtual X-basis
measurement will be identical to that of Alice’s and Bob’s
ordinary parameter estimation in the X basis, except for
any disturbance by Bob’s vacuum measurement. According
to Lemma 2 such disturbance does not exist. The number
of detection events E in Eve’s vacuum measurement is
nqZ; of these nqXηZ is successfully reversed and detected
as “0” or “1” in Bob’s virtual prediction. Thus, we obtain
H  (nqZ − nqXηZ) + nqXηZh(δX), which gives us the rate
RZ  ηZqX/qZ[1 − h(δX)] − h(δZ). (6)
The parameter ηZ = inf|〉∈Q,〈|〉=1〈|E|〉 is the mini-
mum probability that a state in Q gives result E by Eve. This
parameter has a clear physical interpretation. When vacuum
is incident to the optical modes, recall that with no loss of
generality we may assume that Eve has full control of the
detectors through the “electronic” modes. Then there are no
losses of her excitation in the “electronic” modes through the
quantum operation F . Thus, we identify ηZ as the minimum
probability that a nonvacuum photonic state is detected by
Bob. In other words, 1 − ηZ is the maximum probability that
a nonvacuum photonic state is absorbed in the detectors and
detected as vacuum in the actual setup (Fig. 1).
So far we have ignored the effect of any quantum leak-
age from the detectors. Parametrizing the leakage by (3),
Z quantiﬁes the maximum deviation of any measurement
probabilities. In the absence of leakage, the probabilities
of correct and incorrect predictions are qXηZ(1 − δX) and
qXηZδX, respectively, while the probability of vacuum result
is 1 − qXηZ . When there is leakage, in the worst case these
probabilities are changed to qXηZ(1 − δX) − Z , qXηZδX +
Z − ξ , and 1 − qXηZ + ξ , respectively. Here ξ is an unknown
parameter satisfying 0  ξ  Z . Of the nqZ nonvacuum
results in Eve’s vacuum measurement, there are n(qXηZ − ξ )
nonvacuum results in Bob’s virtual prediction. This leads to
H  nqZ − n(qXηZ − ξ )
+ n(qXηZ − ξ )h
(
qXηZδX + Z − ξ
qXηZ − ξ
)
 nqZ − nqXηZ + nqXηZh
(
δX + Z
qXηZ
)
. (7)
The last inequality in (7) can be found after some algebra
using the facts that h(u) − h(u − )  h′(u) for   0 and
u  1/2, and h′(u)(1 − u)  1 for u  0.277. Here we have
set u = δX + ZqXηZ .
This gives the rate
RZ  ηZ
qX
qZ
[
1 − h
(
δX + Z
qXηZ
)]
− h(δZ) (8)
for δX + ZqXηZ  0.277. An expression for the rate, also
valid for 0.277  δX + ZqXηZ  0.5, can be derived straight-
forwardly; however, this regime is only relevant for very small
δZ and large δX and/or ZqXηZ .
IV. INDIVIDUAL IMPERFECTIONS IN
THE ENTIRE SYSTEM
From the previous section we note that when the reversal
operation is successful (and Bob knows when it is), the
measurement statistics in the prediction becomes identical to
the statistics if Bob measured in the X basis. This makes it
possible to consider simultaneous imperfections at the source
and detector. We may then consider the case where Alice
creates a general state ρa depending on the basis choice a. The
basis dependence of the source is characterized by the ﬁdelity
F (ρZ,ρX) ≡ Tr(√ρZρX√ρZ) 12 . We let this dependence be
bounded by a parameter  deﬁned by F  1 − 2. By
Uhlmann’s theorem there exist puriﬁcations, |χa〉 of ρa , such
that 〈χZ | χX〉 = 1 − 2. We note that |χa〉 can be expressed
as in Eq. (1).
Again, we ﬁrst ignore the detector leakage, taking it into
account in the ﬁnal expression for the rate. Since Bob wants
to predict Alice’s virtual X-basis measurement on |χZ〉, the
error rate δX and the transmission rate qX in (6) must be
replaced with δph and qph, respectively. Here δph is the error
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rate when Alice measures her part of |χZ〉 in the X basis and
Bob measures his part using MX.
In BB84 such a measurement is not actually performed, but
δph can be bounded from the measured error and transmission
rates. We expand the statistical argument from [14] to include
“vacuum” as a possible measurement result. Assume that for
the systems used in the random sampling Alice chooses her
basis by measuring a quantum coin in the Z basis. Then
these systems can be described by state |〉 = (|χZ〉|0〉 +
|χX〉|1〉)/
√
2, with the last system being that of the quantum
coin.
We then consider the situations where Alice and Bob
both conduct X-basis measurements. For each measurement
a variable t is assigned the value t = 0 if their results are
the same, t = 1 if there is an error, and t = 2 if Bob gets
no result. Alice then measures her quantum coin in the Z
basis, getting the result c. We obtain the following conditional
probabilities.
p(t = 0|c = 1) = qX(1 − δX), (9a)
p(t = 0|c = 0) = qph(1 − δph), (9b)
p(t = 1|c = 1) = qXδX, (9c)
p(t = 1|c = 0) = qphδph, (9d)
p(t = 2|c = 1) = 1 − qX, (9e)
p(t = 2|c = 0) = 1 − qph. (9f)
Assuming that the systems used to estimate error and transmis-
sion rates are randomly chosen, the probabilities given c = 0
are also valid for the systems used to extract the raw key.
Now assume that for some states Alice measures the coin
in the X basis, getting measurement result c¯. Note that∑
j
p(t = j )p(c¯ = 1|t = j ) = . (10)
Using (9), (10), and the bound [22],
[1 − 2p(c¯ = 1|t = j )]2 + [1 − 2p(c = 0|t = j )]2  1,
we ﬁnd
1 − 2 
∑
j
√
p(t = j |a = Z)p(t = j |a = X)
= √qX(1 − δX)qph(1 − δph) +√qXδXqphδph
+√(1 − qX)(1 − qph). (11)
δph can now be taken to be the maximal value for which the
inequality is obeyed.
Similarly to the analysis in the previous section, we
can include detector leakage by modifying the detection
probabilities. As in (8), the leakage is accounted for by adding
a term proportional to the leakage parameter Z ,
˜δph  δph + Z
qphηZ
. (12)
We have arrived at our main result.
Theorem 1. In BB84 the basis dependence of Alice’s
source is bounded byF (ρX,ρZ)  1 − 2. Bob’s detectors are
modeled by a passive, basis-dependent quantum operation (FZ
and FX) acting on the multimode photonic state, followed by a
basis-independent quantum operation (F) describing interac-
tion with internal degrees of freedom in the physical detector,
followed by a measurement with three outcomes: “0”, “1”, and
“vacuum.” Suppose Eve controls the photonic modes and the
internal degrees of freedom in the detectors and that a quantum
state leaks back to Eve from the detectors. Then the asymptotic
secure key generation rate for key extraction in the Z basis
satisﬁes
RZ  ηZqph/qZ[1 − h( ˜δph)] − h(δZ), (13)
provided ˜δph  0.277. Here δZ is the estimated error rate in the
Z basis, ˜δph is given by (11) and (12), 1 − ηZ is the maximum
probability that a nonvacuum photonic state is detected as
“vacuum,” and qph/qZ is the ratio between the transmission
rates for Bobs measurements MX and MZ given that Alice
sends in the Z basis.
The rate (13) is valid for any kind of individual imperfection
and loss. The parameters qX, qZ , qph, δX, and δZ are estimated
directly in the protocol, while , ηZ , and Z characterize the
practical setup.
V. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
In this discussion we assume that the quantum channel is
symmetric with respect to loss; that is, qX = qph = qZ ≡ q.
This will be approximately true for most setups. We also
assume no information returned to Eve from the detectors,
Z = 0, anticipating that such errors could be avoided by
modifying the setup.
In this case (11) reduces to
2
q
 1 −√(1 − δX)(1 − δph) −√δXδph (14)
and the estimated worst possible error rate is
δph = min
{
1
2
, δX + 8
q
[(
1 − 
q
)
(1 − 2δX)
+
√

q
(
1 − 
q
)
δX(1 − δX)
]}
. (15)
We see that errors in the source are more critical when the
transmission is low. In fact, both the basis dependence of
the source, , and transmission rate, q, only appears in the
equation in the form 
q
. If the source is perfect,  = 0,
loss in the channel does not affect the secret key rate. This
relationship between the source error and the transmission
rates is due to Eve’s control of the channel, which let her
pass to Bob only the systems where her operation has given
her the most information for the least disturbance. The upper
limit on the source error for which key gain is possible
is 
q

√
2−1
2
√
2
≈ 0.146. This is independent of the blinding
parameter ηZ , as long as it is nonzero, but demands error rates
equal to zero. For larger error rates the limit depends heavily
on ηZ (Fig. 3).
Channel loss and imperfect sources only contributes to an
increase in δph. A better estimate of δph would increase the
rate. This is related to the method of decoy states [23–25],
where Alice instead of producing ρZ , sometimes produces a
decoy state with a different mean photon number. From the
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FIG. 3. Plots showing the security bounds RZ = 0 for different
values of the blinding parameter ηZ , the basis dependence of the
source , and the error and transmission rates δ and q. The security
bound is found by setting RZ = 0 in (13). Positive key gain is possible
for parameter values to the left of the curves. We have assumed
Z = 0, δX = δZ = δ, and qX = qph = qZ = q.
transmission and error rates for this state, Alice and Bob are
able to derive a stricter bound on δph, effectively reducing
RZ’s dependence of channel loss. To generalize this method,
using decoy states where other properties of the signal state are
varied might prove useful when operating with an imperfect
source. However, creating such states may require the detailed
output statistics of the source and might be experimentally
difﬁcult in general.
Considering the special case of a perfect source, our
rate is larger than the rate proved for restricted detector
ﬂaws in previous literature [6,7]. Key gain is possible for
ηZ  h(δZ )1−h(δX) . Unlike previous results, our rate applies to all
relevant, individual imperfections at the detectors, for ex-
ample, mode coupling including misalignments and multiple
reﬂections, nonlinearities, mode-dependent losses and detector
efﬁciency mismatch, and any basis dependence of those
effects. Moreover, it applies to threshold detectors with dark
counts.
Note that the detector-blinding parameter ηZ is not sup-
posed to contain the transmission efﬁciency of the channel.
Generally, one should factorize EZ = ˜EZ ◦ E and EX = ˜EX ◦ E
to put as much as possible of the imperfections into the
basis-independent operation E . By absorbing E into Eve and
treating ˜EZ and ˜EX as the new imperfections, ηZ will be
maximal. For example, for the case where reduced detector
efﬁciencies can be described as beam splitters in front of
ideal detectors, and if there is no coupling between modes
associated with different logical bits, ηZ is the minimum
ratio between the two detection efﬁciencies [7]. For detec-
tors that cannot be modeled by beam splitters in front of
ideal detectors, our security proof clearly shows the danger
associated with the possibility of detector blinding [13]: If
the detection probability of a nonvacuum state is zero, our
proof predicts zero key rate. For the case where the detectors
can only be partially blinded, our proof can predict positive
rate.
Returning to the general case, the rate (13) is dependent
on , ηZ , and Z , in addition to estimated parameters. For a
speciﬁc QKD setup,  and Z must be upper bounded, and ηZ
must be lower bounded. How to deal with this in practice is an
interesting question for future research.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proved security for arbitrary, individual imper-
fections in a BB84 system. The detector model includes
a basis-dependent quantum operation, possibly with quan-
tum leakage back to Eve, followed by a three-outcome
measurement with outcomes “0”, “1”, and “vacuum.” Such
a general detector model can describe detector efﬁciency
mismatch, nonlinear blindable behavior, response to multiple
modes, mode coupling and multiple reﬂections, misalign-
ments, back-reﬂection leakage, nonoptical leakage, etc. By
reversing the measurement which gives Eve information about
whether a particular signal was detected (Eve’s vacuum
measurement), we show how to treat the general case with
a lossy channel and general, individual imperfections at
the source, combined with the ﬂawed detector. The ﬁnal
rate is dependent on three parameters which describe the
equipment, in addition to error and transmission rates. These
parameters are the basis dependence of the source and a
blinding parameter and a leakage parameter characterizing the
detector.
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Abstract: It has previously been shown that the gated detectors of
two commercially available quantum key distribution (QKD) systems are
blindable and controllable by an eavesdropper using continuous-wave
illumination and short bright trigger pulses, manipulating voltages in
the circuit [Nat. Photonics 4, 686 (2010)]. This allows for an attack
eavesdropping the full raw and secret key without increasing the quantum
bit error rate (QBER). Here we show how thermal effects in detectors
under bright illumination can lead to the same outcome. We demonstrate
that the detectors in a commercial QKD system Clavis2 can be blinded
by heating the avalanche photo diodes (APDs) using bright illumination,
so-called thermal blinding. Further, the detectors can be triggered using
short bright pulses once they are blind. For systems with pauses between
packet transmission such as the plug-and-play systems, thermal inertia
enables Eve to apply the bright blinding illumination before eavesdropping,
making her more dif¿cult to catch.
© 2010 Optical Society of America
OCIS codes: (040.1345) Avalanche photodiodes (APDs); (040.5570) Quantum detectors;
(270.5568) Quantum cryptography; (270.5570) Quantum detectors.
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1. Introduction
In theory quantum mechanics allows two parties, Alice and Bob, to grow a private, secret key,
even if the eavesdropper Eve can do anything permitted by the laws of nature [1–4]. The ¿eld of
quantum key distribution (QKD) has evolved rapidly in the last two decades, with transmission
distance increasing from a table top demonstration to over 250km in the laboratory [5], and
commercial QKD systems available from several vendors [6].
However the components used for the experimental realizations of QKD have imperfections.
As for any security technology, it is crucial to scrutinize the implementations in order to obtain
a high level of practical security. The discovery of security loopholes does not prove that QKD
is insecure, but rather that principles of QKD are not suf¿ciently well implemented.
Numerous imperfections have been addressed in security proofs [7–12]. For some loopholes
it took several years from their discovery until they were covered by security proofs, for instance
the Trojan-horse [13, 14] loophole and detector ef¿ciency mismatch [15–17]. The latter was
exploited in the time-shift attack [18] on a commercial QKD system [19]. Other loopholes
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include a variety of side-channels [20–23].
Common to the loopholes mentioned so far is that the corresponding attacks are not imple-
mentable in practice, leave Eve with a probabilistic advantage, or introduce a QBER close to the
tolerable limit. For instance, the implementation of the time-shift attack [19] gave Eve a prob-
abilistic, information-theoretic advantage. With probability 0.04 the unconditional security is
broken; however, extra information is needed and a nontrivial computational task remains to ob-
tain the secret key. In the practical phase-remapping attack [23], Eve caused 19.7% QBER [24]
compromising the rarely used two-way post-processing protocol which produces secure key at
QBER up to 20% [25, 26].
There is however one class of attacks which stands out in terms of implementability, Eve’s
information and QBER: The blinding attacks [27–29] are fully implementable with current
technology, and give Eve the whole raw key while causing zero additional QBER. The latter
is essential as the QBER is measured to reveal Eve’s presence. In these attacks, the APDs are
tricked to exit the single-photon sensitive Geiger mode, and are so-called blind. Eve uses a
copy of Bob’s apparatus to detect Alice’s signals, but resends bright trigger pulses instead of
single photons, as in the after-gate attack [30]. When the detectors are blind, Bob will only
detect the bright trigger pulses if he uses the same basis as Eve. Otherwise his detectors remain
silent. Hence Eve gets a full copy of the raw key while causing no additional QBER. Both
passively quenched detectors [27], actively quenched detectors [28] and the gated detectors of
two commercially available QKD systems [29] have been shown to be vulnerable to blinding.
In the case of the passively-quenched detectors, this loophole has been exploited in the ¿rst full-
scale implementation of an eavesdropper [31], which was inserted in the middle of the 290m
transmission line in an experimental entanglement-based QKD system [32, 33], and recovered
100% of the raw key.
Previously the gated detectors in the commercially available system Clavis2 from manufac-
turer ID Quantique were subject to continuous-wave (CW) blinding [29]. The blinding illumi-
nation caused the bias voltage at the APDs to drop due to the presence of DC impedance of the
bias voltage supply, and therefore the APDs were never in Geiger mode. Shortly after the result
was published, Yuan et al. proposed that removing the bias voltage impedance or lowering the
comparator threshold in the detectors would hinder blinding in gated detectors [34]. However,
in this paper we show how the same detectors, regardless of the impedance of the bias volt-
age supply, can be blinded by heating the APD, so-called thermal blinding. Furthermore we
show how the AC-coupling of the detectors allows a blinding technique which may blind the
detectors even if the comparator threshold is lowered. We show that thermal blinding is more
sophisticated form of attack than previously reported CW-blinding [29] because the APD can
be heated well in advance of the detection times, and is as such harder to catch. Especially for
Clavis2, all the detector parameters such as temperature of the cold plate, bias voltage and APD
current indicate single photon sensitivity while the detectors are in fact blind.
In this paper we ¿rst brieÀy review how APDs in the linear mode can be exploited to eaves-
drop on QKD systems (Section 2). Then the detector design in Clavis2 is discussed (Section 3)
before we show how it is possible to thermally blind and trigger the detectors (Section 4).
Finally we brieÀy discuss countermeasures in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
2. Eavesdropping exploiting APDs in linear mode
In this section we brieÀy review how APDs in the linear mode can be exploited to eavesdrop
on QKD systems [28, 29].
In Geiger mode operation, an electron-hole pair produced by an absorbed single photon is
ampli¿ed to a large current in the APD, which exceeds a current comparator threshold and
reveals the photon’s presence. This is referred to as a click [35].
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Fig. 1. The last beam splitter (BS) as well as the detectors in a phase-encoded QKD system.
I0 and I1 is the current running through APD 0/1, and Ith is the comparator threshold current
above which the detector registers a click. Here we assume that the APDs are in the linear
mode, and that Eve sends a bright pulse slightly above the optical power thresholds. a) Eve
and Bob have selected matching bases. Therefore the full intensity in the pulse from Eve
hits detector 0. The current caused by Eve’s pulse crosses the threshold current and causes
a click. b) Eve and Bob have selected opposite bases. Therefore half the intensity of Eve’s
pulse hits each detector (corresponding to 50% detection probability in either detector for
single photons). This causes no click as the current is below the threshold for each detector.
In the linear mode however, when an APD is reverse-biased at a constant voltage below the
breakdown voltage [36], the current through the APD is proportional to the incident optical
power. Usually the APD is placed in a resistive network, and also has an internal resistance.
Hence, the current through the APD lowers the bias voltage, and the current through the APD
is monotonically increasing with the incident optical power. In this regime, the comparator
current threshold translates to a classical optical power threshold [29].
If APDs are used as detectors in a QKD system, and they are optically accessible to Eve
when biased under the breakdown voltage, Eve may eavesdrop on the QKD system with an
intercept-resend (faked-state [37]) attack. Eve uses a copy of Bob to detect the qubits from
Alice in a random basis. Eve resends her detection results, but instead of sending single photons
she sends bright pulses, just above the classical optical power threshold. Bob will only have a
detection event if his basis choice coincides with Eve’s basis choice (see Fig. 1), otherwise no
detector clicks.
After the raw key exchange, Bob and Eve are identical both in bit values and basis choices.
Since Eve uses a copy of Bob’s detectors, Bob’s photon-number detection statistics is equal
with or without Eve. Therefore the attack works equally well on the BB84 protocol [1], the
Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) [38] and decoy-state BB84 protocols [39–41]. In
addition to attacking the quantum channel, Eve listens on the classical channel between Alice
and Bob. Afterwards Eve performs the same classical post-processing as Bob to obtain the
identical secret key.
Note that the classical optical power threshold has to be suf¿ciently well de¿ned for success-
ful perfect eavesdropping. To be precise, let an optical power of P100%,i or greater always cause
a click when applied to detector i. Likewise, let an optical power of P0%,i or less never cause a
click when applied to detector i. The suf¿cient condition for Eve to be able to make any single
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Fig. 2. Equivalent detector bias and comparator circuit. Taps T1-T3 are analog taps of the
APD gates (Vgate,0/1), the APD bias (Vbias,0/1) and the comparator input (Vcomp,0/1). The
digital tap T4 of the detector output (Vclick,0/1) has been converted to logic levels in all
oscillograms. For the experiments presented in section 4, the resistor R3 has been shorted.
detector click while none of the other detectors click, can be expressed as
max
i
{P100%,i}< 2
(
min
i
{P0%,i}
)
. (1)
Note that since Alice and Bob openly report the failure due to too high QBER, it is unneces-
sary for Eve to know the classical optical thresholds P0%,i,P100%,i beforehand. In particular, she
could start with a high optical power, lowering it each time the protocol fails until it succeeds.
Then she knows that she has found the proper trigger pulse power. Note that to avoid causing
the protocol to fail, she could probe just a part of the transmission [37].
3. Detector design
3.1. Detector circuit
Figure 2 shows an equivalent detector bias and comparator circuit diagram for the detectors in
Clavis2, based on reverse engineering. The system ships with factory settings for the detectors,
ready for QKD, which we used. The APD is biased just above its breakdown voltage by the
high voltage supply VHV,0 =−42.89V, VHV,1 =−43.08V. On top of this bias the APD is gated
with 2.8ns TTL pulses every 200ns from DD1 to create Geiger mode gates. The gates are
applied as PECL signals from the mainboard, and the buffer converts them to TTL levels, 0V
and approximately 3V. The anode of the APD is AC-coupled to a fast comparator DA1 with
the thresholds Vth,0 = 78mV and Vth,1 = 82mV.
The normal operation of the detector circuit can be seen in Fig. 3. A number of techniques
have been developed for compensating the capacitive pulse through APDs in the absence of an
avalanche [42–45], but this particular detector simply sets the comparator thresholds above the
amplitude of the capacitive pulse.
As a side note, applying CW illumination to the APD allowed us to measure the timing of
the quantum ef¿ciency curve within the gate quite precisely, see Appendix B.
3.2. Detector cooling
To reduce the probability of dark counts, APDs are usually cooled to a low temperature. The
two APDs in this QKD system are cooled together by one 4-stage thermoelectric cooler (TEC)
(Osterm PE4-115-14-15 [46]). The system software reports the temperature measured by a
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Fig. 3. An example of electrical signals during two gates in detector 1 without any illumina-
tion. In the ¿rst gate thermal Àuctuations or trapped carriers have caused an avalanche, and
a click at the comparator output (dark count). A typical amplitude of the avalanche peak is
200mV for detector 0 and 300mV for detector 1. Normally the system removes 50 gates
after a detection event, but for this oscillogram this feature has been disabled. In the second
gate there is no detection event. When no current runs through the APD, it is equivalent to
a capacitor, and thus approximately the derivative of the gate pulse shape propagates to the
comparator input, with peak positive amplitude ≈ 35mV.
thermistor mounted on the cold side of the top stage (cold plate), and close to where the APDs
are mounted. Note that the cold plate temperature is not always the same as the APD chip
temperature, as there is actually a quite substantial thermal resistance between the two. This
will become an important point in section 4.2. The hot side of the TEC is mounted on a large
heatsink with a fan, such that it stays at approximately room temperature.
The temperature of the cold plate is maintained at a pre-set value by a closed-loop controller
that adjusts the TEC current. When the system is switched on, the cold plate (and thus the
APDs) is ¿rst cooled to the target temperature, −50◦C. The system will not start operation un-
less the cold plate settles at a temperature below −49.8◦C. After this the temperature controller
always tries to maintain the target temperature. However, there seems to be no alarm: QKD
proceeds even if the cold plate temperature is several tens of degrees different from the target
temperature.
4. Blinding and control
Blinding is achieved when the system is insensitive to single photons. This can be achieved
by ensuring that the APD bias voltage is below the breakdown voltage, or by lowering the
voltage in front of the comparator such that the avalanche current does not cross the comparator
threshold. The detectors are controllable if they are accessible to Eve in the linear mode with a
suf¿ciently well de¿ned classical optical power click threshold, as in Eq. (1).
We have previously reported that blinding Clavis2 can be achieved by CW illumination due
to the bias voltage supply impedance R3 = 1kΩ, which makes the bias voltage drop to a level
where the APD is never in Geiger mode [29], even inside the gate.
One fast and easy countermeasure could be to use a low-impedance bias voltage source in
the detectors. Therefore, in this paper we consider a modi¿ed version of the detectors with
R3 shorted (see Fig. 2). We present three different blinding techniques which may be used
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Fig. 4. Calculated heat dissipation (based on measured APD current and voltage) versus
the optical illumination for each of the two detectors.
against detectors with a low-impedance bias voltage source, and show that the detectors can
be controlled by trigger pulses in the blind state. The technique in section 4.1 clearly works
against high-impedance biased detectors as well as against low-impedance biased detectors
since it has been demonstrated [29]. The difference is that with a low-impedance bias voltage
source, the blinding originates from thermal effects instead of bias voltage drop. The technique
in section 4.2 has been used on low-impedance biased detectors, but we see no reason why it
should not work similarly well against the unmodi¿ed high-impedance biased detectors. The
technique in section 4.3 has been used on both high- and low-impedance biased detectors, but
we only present the results for the low-impedance biased detectors in this paper.
4.1. Thermal CW-blinding
It turns out that it is possible to blind also low-impedance biased detectors (R3 = 0) by CW
illumination. When an APD is illuminated, the power dissipated in the APD is transformed
to heat, which may increase the APD temperature. The breakdown voltage is temperature de-
pendent: increasing the temperature increases the breakdown voltage [47, 48]. Since the bias
voltage is constant, this makes the APD leave the Geiger mode. Two effects contribute to the
power dissipation: electrical heating (VAPD · IAPD) and the small contribution by the absorption
of the optical power. For the heat dissipation calculations, we simply assume that all the optical
power is absorbed and transformed to heat. Figure 4 shows how the heat dissipation increases
with the optical illumination.
When the sum of the heat dissipations of the two detectors is approximately 300mW, the
cooling system is running at its maximum capacity with a TEC current of about ITEC = 2.37A
(the air temperature at the heatsink fan intake at this time was 23.6◦C). When the optical il-
lumination is increased beyond this point, the cold plate (and thus APD) temperature starts to
increase. Figure 5 shows how the temperature of the cold plate increases with the total amount
of heat dissipated in the APDs. When the optical illumination, and thus the load is increased
beyond the maximum capacity of the TEC, the cold plate temperature increases approximately
linearly with the heat dissipated by the APD. While not in the speci¿cations of this speci¿c
TEC [46], other data sheets of similar TECs [49] show that the temperature difference between
the hot and cold plate decreases linearly with respect to the load, given a constant TEC current.
When the temperature of the APDs increases, the breakdown voltage also increases with the
coef¿cient of about 0.1V/K [50]. In this experiment we illuminated both detectors simultane-
ously, to get suf¿cient temperature increase without risking a permanent damage to the APDs.
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Fig. 6. Click probability versus power of CW illumination applied to both detectors simul-
taneously.
We used a ¿bre-optic coupler (see appendix A for the experimental setup) to illuminate both de-
tectors, with 46.75%/53.25% of the optical power going to detector 0/1. This is approximately
equal to the measured splitting ratio for the beam splitter in front of the detectors in the system,
when illuminated through the short arm of the interferometer [51–53].
Figure 6 shows the click probability versus the CW illumination of the two detectors. The
click probability drops below the normal dark count probability (about 10−4), before it becomes
exactly zero when the illumination exceeds 8.8mW and 10mW at the detectors. In the exper-
iment the blinding caused clicks for several minutes before the APDs were properly heated.
However, the blinding only needs to be turned on once, afterwards Eve remains undetected.
After the cold plate has been heated by APD illumination, it takes several tens of seconds
before it cools to the target temperature of −50◦C. Therefore, the detectors stay blind for some
time after the CW blinding illumination is turned off. Detectors 0 and 1 regain dark counts when
the cold plate (and thus the APDs) becomes colder than −39.8◦C and −40.1◦C, respectively.
To verify that the detectors could be controlled, the detectors were blinded with 9.5mW at
detector 0 and 10.7mW at detector 1, and controlled by superimposing a 3ns long laser pulse
slightly after the gate. The click probability thresholds are listed in Table 1. The thresholds
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Table 1. Control pulse peak power at 0 % and 100 % click probability thresholds, in CW
thermal blinding mode
Detector Click probabilities0 % 100 %
0 1.12mW 1.31mW
1 1.71mW 2.02mW
satisfy Eq. (1), and thus the eavesdropping method described in Section 2 should be possible
when the detectors are thermally blinded by CW illumination.
After observing thermal blinding in this experiment, we realized that this could be the reason
why the PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR actively-quenched detector module remained blind at bright
pulse frequencies above 400kHz, despite no substantial bias voltage drop [28]. Therefore we
did more precise measurements which con¿rm that PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR can be thermally
blinded [54].
4.2. Thermal blinding of frames
As this QKD system is of plug-and-play type, it sends the qubits in packets called frames
to avoid Rayleigh back-scattered photons to arrive during the gates and increase the QBER
[51, 55]. For our experiment we used 1072 qubits per frame [56]. With a 200ns bit period this
makes the frame length 214.4μs. The break in between the frames varies with the ¿bre length
between Alice and Bob, but is always longer than the frame itself. In our experiment we simply
used a 250μs frame break, which makes a total frame + break period of 464.4μs.
It turns out that the APD chip and the inner parts immediately touching it (not the APD pack-
age and not the cold plate) act as a thermal reservoir on the frame period time scale. Therefore
bright illumination between the frames heats the APD suf¿ciently that it stays blind throughout
the whole frame. Based on the optical power where the frames went blind, and the average
current through the APDs, the thermal resistance between each APD chip and the cold plate is
estimated to be at least 190K/W.
To heat the APDs we used 225μs long pulses timed in between the frames and ¿red at both
APDs simultaneously. The whole frame went blind at approximately 1.5mW and 1.7mW pulse
power at detector 0 and 1 respectively. The oscillograms in Fig. 7 show the electrical and optical
signals in detector 1 when frames of 1072 gates are thermally blinded by the 225μs long pulses
with 3.5mW in-pulse power at detector 0, and 4mW in-pulse power at detector 1. While the
system was blind, the cold plate temperature reading was −49.5◦C, and the TEC was running
well below its maximum capacity at ITEC = 2.006A. Therefore it seems that even though this
system does not check the cold plate temperature after the initial check, further checks of the
cold plate temperature would probably not reveal that the detectors are in fact blind.
To verify that the detectors could be controlled, we checked the response to a 4ns long
control pulse timed slightly after the gate of one of the ¿rst bits of the frame, and the last bit of
the frame. The detection probability thresholds for the second [57] and the last bit are given in
Tables 2 and 3. Figure 8 shows oscillograms from detector 1 when it is blinded and controlled
in the second bit of the frame.
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Fig. 7. Thermal blinding of frames. The oscillograms show electrical and optical signals
when frames of 1072 gates in detector 1 are thermally blinded by a 225μs blinding pulse,
with 3.5mW pulse power at detector 0, and 4mW pulse power at detector 1. The blinding
pulse causes a detection event outside the frame, where the system probably does not reg-
ister clicks (If the click is registered, it could easily be avoided by increasing the power of
the blinding pulse gradually, such that the comparator input AC-coupling keeps the voltage
below the comparator threshold).
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Fig. 8. Detector control during thermal blinding of frames. The oscillograms show electrical
and optical signals when frames of 1072 gates in detector 1 are thermally blinded by a
225μs blinding pulse, with 3.5mW pulse power at detector 0, and 4mW pulse power at
detector 1, and the detector is controlled by a 4ns long control pulse timed slightly after
the second gate in the frame. In the upper and lower left sets of oscillograms, the 580μW
control pulse never causes any click. In the lower right set, the control pulse is applied after
the same gate in the frame, but now its increased 747μW peak power always causes a click.
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Table 2. Control pulse peak power at 0 % and 100 % click probability thresholds for the
second bit in the frame, when the frame is thermally blinded
Detector Click probabilities0 % 100 %
0 401μW 533μW
1 580μW 747μW
Table 3. Control pulse peak power at 0 % and 100 % click probability thresholds for the
last bit in the frame, when the frame is thermally blinded
Detector Click probabilities0 % 100 %
0 305μW 420μW
1 340μW 532μW
The click probability thresholds in Tables 2 and 3 each satisfy Eq. (1) individually. However,
P0%,0 in the last bit of the frame is less than 1/2 of P100%,1 in the second bit of the frame. This
means that the control pulse power would have to be decreased throughout the frame. Since
the second and the last bit of the frame can be controlled, it is plausible that the eavesdropping
method described in Section 2 could be applied to any bit of the frame.
What is remarkable about this blinding method is that due to the low thermal conductivity
between the APD chip and the cold plate, as well as the thermal inertia of the nearby parts, the
cold plate thermistor reports a value very close to the normal value. Therefore monitoring the
cold plate temperature would not suf¿ce to prevent thermal blinding.
In fact the system needs not to be operating in frames for such blinding to take place: Eve
may heat the detectors accepting a 50% QBER for some sessions, eavesdropping on the next
sessions.
4.3. Sinkhole blinding
It is natural to ask whether the framed blinding technique can be applied at the single gate
level, i.e. what happens if bright illumination is applied between adjacent gates? It turns out
that this also leads to blinding, but not primarily due to thermal effects. Since the comparator
input is AC-coupled (see Fig. 2), the signal at the input of the comparator has the same area
over and under 0V level when averaged over time much longer than R4·C1 = 165ns. Thus by
sending long bright pulses between the gates and no illumination near the gate, it is possible
to superimpose a negative-voltage pulse at the comparator input at the gate time. We call this
negative pulse a sinkhole. An avalanche that occurs within it can have a normal amplitude yet
remain below the comparator threshold level.
Using a 140ns long pulse beginning about 25ns after the gate, detector 0 becomes completely
blind when Plaser > 205μW, and detector 1 becomes blind when Plaser > 400μW. To keep both
detectors blind, Plaser = 500μW is used subsequently. When a large pulse is applied between
the gates, the detector will always experience a dark count in the gate due to trapped carriers.
Figure 9 shows detector 1 blinded by a 140ns long, 500μW bright pulse, starting about 25ns
after the gate.
Initially when the blinding pulses are turned on, there is a transient with about 20-100 clicks,
which would be easily detectable in post-processing. Note again that the blinding only needs to
be turned on once, and that the blinding can be turned on before the raw key exchange to avoid
the clicks being registered.
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Fig. 9. Sinkhole blinding. The oscillograms show electrical and optical signals when de-
tector 1 is blinded by a 500μW, 140ns long laser pulse in between the gates. The avalanche
amplitude is about 130mV and would cause a click if it were not sitting in the negative-
voltage pulse. It seems that the reduction in avalanche amplitude (compare to Fig. 3) is
caused by heating of the APD, which effectively rises the breakdown voltage.
Table 4. Control pulse peak power at 0 % and 100 % click probability thresholds, during
sinkhole blinding
Detector Click probabilities0 % 100 %
0 655μW 751μW
1 773μW 908μW
Detector control is obtained by a 3.2ns long laser pulse timed shortly after the gate. The click
probability thresholds found are listed in Table 4. Figure 10 shows oscillograms from detector 1
when it is blind and controlled. Once again, the thresholds in Table 4 satisfy Eq. (1), and thus
the eavesdropping method described in Section 2 should be possible when the detectors are
sinkhole blinded.
5. Discussion and countermeasures
First of all, the numerous detectors proved blindable and controllable [27–29, 31, 54], and the
large number of independent blinding methods available show that avoiding this loophole is
non-trivial. Further the results presented in this paper clearly show that removing the impedance
of the bias voltage supply is far from being a suf¿cient countermeasure for this detector design.
Yuan et al. proposed to lower the comparator threshold, but as seen from the oscillograms in
Fig. 9 sinkhole blinding can produce a very low amplitude on the comparator input by choosing
an appropriate duty cycle of the blinding illumination. Therefore, lowering the comparator
threshold also seems to be an insuf¿cient countermeasure.
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Fig. 10. Detector control during sinkhole blinding. The oscillograms show electrical and
optical signals when detector 1 is blinded with a 500μW, 140ns long laser pulse in between
the gates, and controlled with a 3.2ns long laser pulse timed shortly after the gate. To the
left, the 773μW control pulse never causes any click. To the right, the 908μW control
pulse always causes a click.
At this point it is not clear to us how to design hack-proof detectors. As we pointed out previ-
ously, the most obvious countermeasure is to monitor the optical power at Bob’s entrance with
an additional detector. However as we also pointed out it is not obvious that this actually closes
the loophole; the click threshold close to the gate may be very low, allowing for practically
non-detectable control pulses [29]. Thus it is not clear how to set the threshold value for the
entrance monitor; in any case the threshold should be derived from and incorporated into a se-
curity proof. It would also be crucial that this monitoring detector is not blindable, while being
extremely sensitive. Until a detection scheme with a monitoring detector is proven secure, we
believe that it cannot be considered as a suf¿cient countermeasure.
For the passively quenched scheme it has been proposed previously to monitor APD parame-
ters such as APD bias voltage, current and temperature [27]. However, the results in Section 4.2
show that normal APD parameters do not necessarily guarantee single photon sensitivity: for
thermal blinding of frames all the APD parameters report normal values during the frames
while the detectors are in fact blind.
It is worth emphasizing that the loophole opens when Eve drives the detectors into an ab-
normal operating regime, namely the linear mode. However, there are also quantum detectors
which are actually designed to operate in linear mode. For example, homodyne detectors used
in continuous-variable QKD [58, 59] are probably not susceptible to the described attack.
6. Conclusion
The detectors in the Clavis2 QKD system have proved to be blindable by a variety of methods,
even with a low-impedance bias voltage supply. Further, the detectors can always be controlled
in the blind state. This allows eavesdropping on the QKD system, using the method described in
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Section 2. Since Eve may use an exact copy of Bob’s system, no parameters currently available
to Bob reveal Eve’s presence. In practice, this should allow for perfect eavesdropping where
Eve has an exact copy of Bob’s raw key, and thus can extract the full secret key. The eavesdrop-
ping strategy described in Section 2 has been implemented and used to capture 100% of the
raw key in a 290m experimental entanglement-based QKD system [31]. We see no practical
dif¿culties implementing the same eavesdropper for this commercial QKD system, using off-
the-shelf components. Actually we have proposed a plug-and-play eavesdropper scheme [29]
for easy deployment.
Many detectors have already been proved blindable and controllable by Eve [27–29], and
the large variety of blinding methods available for the system tested could probably be used
on other detector designs as well. While it is relatively easy to design a countermeasure that
prevents blinding attacks with the speci¿c parameters chosen in the present work, it is unclear
to us how to build generic secure detectors.
This work further emphasizes the importance of thoroughly investigating the non-idealities
of each component in a QKD system, as well as battle-testing the system as a whole. This has
been a necessary step for any security technology, and will surely be a crucial step for QKD as
well. QKD cannot be cracked nor broken, since the principles have been proven secure once
and for all. Now the challenge is to make a truly secure implementation of QKD where the
components behave within the assumptions of the security proofs.
ID Quantique has been noti¿ed about the loophole prior to this publication, and has imple-
mented countermeasures.
A. Measurement setup
Figure 11 shows the measurement setup used for this experiment. The trigger signal is tapped
directly from the PECL gate signal (before DD1 in Fig. 2).
When pump current is used to control the power of the laser, the pulse width will vary slightly
with the peak power. In our experiment, the observed change in pulse width is less than 10 %
after doubling the laser power. Also, the comparator threshold does not seem to be signi¿cantly
dependent on the pulse width, thus we consider our results valid despite this small change in
the laser pulse width.
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Fig. 11. The setup used in the experiment. Both detectors were illuminated simultaneously
by inserting a 50/50 ¿bre-optic coupler (not shown in the diagram) before the APDs.
B. Direct measurement of quantum ef¿ciency
When CW illumination is applied to the APD, the applied electrical gate “propagates” to the
comparator input. This might be caused by a change in linear multiplication coef¿cient caused
by the electrical gate. This allowed us to measure the quantum ef¿ciency mapped inside the
“propagated” gate with about 200ps precision.
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Fig. 12. Quantum ef¿ciency measured directly within the electrical gate for detector 1. The
photon sensitivity drops about 1ns before the falling edge of the gate, because avalanches
that start late do not have time to develop a large enough current to cross the comparator
threshold.
The single photon sensitivity was measured using a id300 short-pulsed laser attenuated to
a mean photon number of 1 per pulse. The quantum ef¿ciency η was derived from the data
assuming that the detector is linear (i.e. that an n-photon state is detected with probability 1−
(1−η)n). The timing of the photon arrival at the APD relative to the applied gate was aligned
by observing a response to unattenuated laser pulse on top of the 2.1mW CW illumination.
Figure 12 shows the result of the measurement on detector 1.
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Abstract. We present a method to control the detection events in quantum key
distribution systems that use gated single-photon detectors. We employ bright
pulses as faked states, timed to arrive at the avalanche photodiodes outside the
activation time. The attack can remain unnoticed, since the faked states do not
increase the error rate per se. This allows for an intercept–resend attack, where
an eavesdropper transfers her detection events to the legitimate receiver without
causing any errors. As a side effect, afterpulses, originating from accumulated
charge carriers in the detectors, increase the error rate. We have experimentally
tested detectors of the system id3110 (Clavis2) from ID Quantique. We identify
the parameter regime in which the attack is feasible despite the side effect.
Furthermore, we outline how simple modiﬁcations in the implementation can
make the device immune to this attack.
6 These authors contributed equally to this work.
7 Author to whom any correspondence should be addressed.
New Journal of Physics 13 (2011) 013043
1367-2630/11/013043+14$33.00 © IOP Publishing Ltd and Deutsche Physikalische Gesellschaft
2Contents
1. Introduction 2
2. Intercept–resend attack using faked states 3
3. Detectors in Clavis2 4
4. Description of loopholes in the system 5
4.1. Linear mode avalanche photodiodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Faked states applied during the dead time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Characterization of afterpulsing side effect 7
6. Simulations of after-gate attack and quantum bit error rate estimation 9
6.1. Strategy of Eve with dead time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.2. Strategy of Eve without dead time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Countermeasures 12
8. Conclusions 12
Acknowledgments 13
References 13
1. Introduction
An intriguing feature of quantum optics is that it enables communication protocols that are
impossible to achieve by classical means. One prominent example is quantum key distribution
(QKD) [1, 2], which in principle allows two parties (Alice and Bob) to communicate with
unconditional security. It is thus impossible for an arbitrarily powerful eavesdropper (Eve) to
obtain knowledge of the transmitted information.
In the well-known Bennett–Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol in its original form [3], Alice
sends single photons of different polarizations to Bob. Under ideal conditions, the security of
this protocol can be rigorously proved [4]. Furthermore, practically feasible procedures for
distilling a secret key from the exchanged quantum states are known [5]. During the distillation,
Alice and Bob generate a key sequence out of their raw data stemming from the quantum state
exchange. Eve’s attempt to gain knowledge results in a perturbation of the quantum states, such
that her information about the raw key can be upper bounded. Alice and Bob can thus shrink
their raw data such that Eve’s knowledge of the resulting key sequence becomes negligible.
Rigorous security proofs show that Eve cannot successfully attack an ideal implementation
of BB84. However, real implementations always exhibit deviations from the ideal model. In
order to guarantee secure communication, such deviations must be included into the security
proofs. One example is the use of weak coherent states instead of single photons, which
is considered in the Gottesman–Lo–Lütkenhaus–Preskill security proof [6]. The resulting
reduction of the key rate can be mitigated by modiﬁcations to the protocol, such as in the decoy
state method [7]–[9] or in the Scarani–Acin–Ribordy–Gisin 2004 (SARG04) protocol [10].
More subtle deviations can result in side channels through which information can unnoticeably
leak to Eve. For example, photons might carry information in unwanted degrees of freedom [11].
Once such side channels are known, they need to be considered in a more general security
proof.
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3Nowadays, quantum cryptography has matured to the point where several commercial
products are available8,9. Each system might have loopholes that are particular to its
implementation. Some implementations are, for example, susceptible to non-conforming light
pulses that Eve sends into Alice’s or Bob’s devices. Eve could use reﬂectometry to read
modulator states [12] or take control of the detectors by sending faked states [13, 14], time-
shifted pulses [15] or by detector blinding combined with faked states [16]. The impact of such
interventions strongly depends on the particular implementation. It is thus difﬁcult to include
them in general security proofs. Alternatively, speciﬁc countermeasures could be devised by
adapting hardware or software of the systems, such that all assumptions in the security proof
about the QKD module are again valid.
In this paper, we investigate a particular attack on the QKD device id3110 Clavis2 from
ID Quantique. The ﬁber-based system utilizes the plug&play principle [17], where the quantum
states are encoded as the relative phase of two pulses. In our experiment, we send irregular,
bright light pulses (faked states) outside the activation time of the gated detectors. We show
that we can generate measurement results in the Bob module with only a slight increase in the
quantum bit error rate (QBER), if the side effects of the attack are considered properly.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic principles of our attack. In
section 3, we elaborate on the particular implementation of the detectors in the Clavis2 system.
In section 4, we present the imperfections found in the system. Section 5 discusses the side effect
of the faked-state attack, which actually partly protects the security of the system. Section 6
presents all of the necessary elements for simulations and shows the parameters for which the
Clavis2 system is not secure. In section 7, we discuss possible countermeasures against the
proposed attack before concluding in section 8.
2. Intercept–resend attack using faked states
In the BB84 protocol [3], Alice randomly chooses one of two non-orthogonal bases to encode
her quantum bit. Bob independently chooses his measurement basis at random. If his basis
matches Alice’s, he will measure the quantum state correctly. In half of the cases, however,
Bob chooses the wrong basis. Alice and Bob compare the encoding and measurement basis
via a classical authenticated channel and remove all events with basis mismatch from their
raw data.
In an intercept–resend attack, Eve places a copy of Bob’s apparatus into the quantum
channel. Then she performs the same kind of measurement as Bob, tries to reproduce the
original quantum state and sends it to Bob. Since Eve is unaware of Alice’s basis choice, she
will inevitably introduce errors in case of a basis mismatch between her basis and the one used
by Alice and Bob. Eve will thus always be detected in a perfect implementation of a QKD
system [5, 6].
In case of an imperfect implementation, however, Eve may attack the QKD system by
sending faked states instead of quantum states [13]. Her aim is to generate faked states that only
produce a detection event in the Bob module if Eve’s basis matches Bob’s basis. In this case,
after Alice and Bob discard their non-matching bases, all that remains in the key are bits for
which Alice, Eve and Bob had the same basis. Thus, Eve generates no errors.
8 ID Quantique, URL: http://www.idquantique.com.
9 MagiQ Technologies, URL: http://www.magiqtech.com.
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4Figure 1. Equivalent circuit diagram of Bob’s detectors in Clavis2. See text for
description.
After the attack, Bob and Eve share identical bit values and basis choices. The attack works
on widely used QKD protocols, namely BB84, SARG04 and the decoy method. The attack
exhibits an extra 3 dB loss because of the possible basis mismatch of Eve and Bob. This is easily
compensated in a practical Eve, since she may use better detector efﬁciencies and exclude loss
in the line [13].
3. Detectors in Clavis2
The impact of faked states strongly depends on the implementation of the detection scheme
in a QKD system. We will focus on systems employing avalanche photodiodes (APDs) in the
Geiger mode, as is the case in many QKD systems [18, 19], and all commercially available
realizations (see footnotes 8 and 9). Furthermore, we assume that the APDs are gated, i.e.
activated only in time intervals when signal states are expected to arrive. During the activation
time, a large reverse voltage is applied to the APDs such that the APDs are biased above
the breakdown voltage. Then a single photon can trigger a carrier avalanche that results in a
macroscopic current. If the generated current exceeds a certain threshold, a detection event
(click) is registered.
As an example, we consider the behavior of the gated detectors in ID Quantique’s Clavis2
QKD system. A detector circuitry reverse-engineered by us is shown in ﬁgure 1. In the
following, we explain the circuitry and mention the detector parameters that were preset by the
manufacturer. The APDs are biased by the high-voltage supply with VHV;D0/D1 almost as large as
the breakdown voltage (VHV;D0 = −42.89 V and VHV;D1 = −43.08 V). The detectors are gated
in the Geiger mode by means of TTL signals, which are applied on top of the bias voltage with
a period of 200 ns. The gates are supplied as PECL logic-level signals from the main board and
converted to TTL signals by the buffer DD1. The comparator DA1 monitors the APD current
and registers a click in the detector when the current peak passes a threshold (VTh;D0 = 77 mV,
VTh;D1 = 84 mV). The comparator produces a PECL output pulse for each detection event.
During all of the time not covered by the gate, each APD is biased at a constant value
VHV;D0/D1 below the breakdown voltage. The current through the APD is then approximately
proportional to the incident optical power. The circuit behaves similarly to a linear photodiode
followed by a comparator.
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Figure 2. Principle of detector control. In the detection part of a phase-encoded
QKD, the two pulses that could be generated by Eve as a faked state interfere
at a 50 : 50 beamsplitter. (a) For Bob’s basis choice matching Eve’s, the signals
interfere such that detector D0 clicks deterministically, because the photocurrent
surpasses the detection threshold ITh;D0. (b) For Bob’s basis choice not matching
Eve’s, the power is split 50 : 50 to both detectors. The photocurrent does not
surpass the threshold. Therefore, the faked state is not detected.
4. Description of loopholes in the system
In the following subsections, we describe two unexpected deviations of the detection system
from the idealized behavior implicitly assumed by the designers of the QKD system. We start
by explaining the detection process in detail. In an ideal plug&play system, the relative phase
between the signal states and reference pulses in the receiver module (0, π/2, π , 3π/2) is
determined by a combined phase modulation of Alice and Bob, i.e. by a combination of Alice’s
bit and basis (0, π/2, π , 3π/2) and Bob’s measurement basis (0, π/2).
Let us consider a standard intercept–resend attack. For a matching basis choice of Alice,
Eve and Bob, the phase difference is 0 or π . This restricts the possible outcome of the
measurement to a single detector and results in a conclusive outcome for Bob. For a mismatched
basis choice, the phase difference is π/2 or 3π/2. In this case, either of their detectors will click
randomly. This clearly causes a QBER of 25%.
4.1. Linear mode avalanche photodiodes
In the linear regime of the APDs, Eve can substitute the quantum states with bright coherent
states [16]. Figure 2 shows examples of pulses that generate a click only if Bob’s and Eve’s
bases match, since the comparator following the APD will only click if the input optical power
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Figure 3. Detection click thresholds in Clavis2 for a pulse duration of 0.12 ns.
(a) Power thresholds PD0,D1;0%,100% for 0 and 100% probability of a bright pulse
detection in detectors D0 and D1. The ﬂuctuations are reproducible and are
probably caused by the ﬂuctuating bias voltage after the gate. (b) Calculated
(t) (see equation (1)), which shows that an atttack is possible for delays of
4.5–10 ns with an optimal and comfortable margin of  at 7.5 ns.
surpasses a critical power threshold. In case of a basis mismatch, the optical power is distributed
equally among the detectors and no detection click is generated.
To exploit the loophole experimentally, we look closer at the detector characteristics.
As mentioned, the APDs are biased below the breakdown voltage before and after the gate.
Optically, Bob’s phase modulation extends temporally on either side of the gate pulse by
approximately 10 ns. We have veriﬁed that the system accepts clicks at least 10.5 ns after the
gate, still assigning the click to the bit slot associated with the gate.
We send bright laser pulses to both detectors before and after they are gated, in order to
ﬁnd the click thresholds of each detector. A perfect control of Bob is possible if the maximum
power at which the detectors do not produce clicks is higher than half the power at which they
always produce a click. This can be written as
(t) = min
{
PD0;0% (t) , PD1;0% (t)
}
max
{
PD0;100% (t) , PD1;100% (t)
} > 0.5, (1)
where t is the time between the leading edge of the gate and the bright pulse, PD0;0%(t) is the
maximum power that does not generate a click in D0 and PD0;100%(t) is the minimum power that
certainly generates a click in D0 (analogously for D1).
We have found that the linear behavior prior to the gate cannot be exploited, since charge
carrier generation results in a large afterpulse effect during the gate. For an attack after the gate,
ﬁgure 3 shows the experimentally measured power thresholds and the corresponding values of
(t) for 0.12 ns long 1550 nm laser pulses. The ﬁgure shows that an attack is feasible in a wide
time window with the maximum value of (t) at 7.5 ns after the gate. At this time, a 587 μW
laser pulse can cause a click in both detectors, while a 293.5 μW laser pulse will never cause
a click in any detector. This result reveals a weak spot in the system. We have found, however,
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Figure 4. Dead time extension behavior. The ﬁgure shows that if a bright pulse
(or avalanche) causes a dead time (1st DT), any bright pulse during the dead time
will be a valid detection and causes an extra dead time (2nd DT). Therefore, it
extends the effective dead time. (upper oscillogram) The gate pattern applied
to the detector. (lower oscillogram) Optical power of successive bright pulses
impinging on the detector with a delay of 4 μs.
that the attack cannot be applied straightforwardly, because of an afterpulsing side effect, which
is discussed in section 5. Therefore, we attacked at the point 7.75 ns after the gate to slightly
reduce the maximum laser power applied to the system. At 7.75 ns after the gate, a 575 μW
laser pulse can cause a click in both detectors, while a 287.5 μW laser pulse will never cause a
click in any detector.
4.2. Faked states applied during the dead time
As a second loophole in the system, we have found that the system registers detection events
from bright faked states at any time. Typically, the device applies a dead time of 10 μs whenever
the system registers a click at any of the detectors, not gating both APDs for the duration of the
dead time [22]. However, we have found that the time between the detection events originating
from our faked states can be as short as 30 ns.
Figure 4 shows the effect of a bright pulse arriving during the dead time. The electronic
logic registers a valid click and subsequently resets the dead time to another 10 μs after the
second bright pulse. We found experimentally that in the dead time all faked states with a laser
peak power of 575 μW were detected by detector D0 while the detection probability of Bob’s
D1 was ηB > 0.99985. In section 6.2, we will show how this loophole can be exploited in order
to overcome the negative side effect of afterpulses, which is described in the next section.
5. Characterization of afterpulsing side effect
Once a detection is registered in a gated APD, a long dead time is typically applied to reduce
afterpulsing. This dead time is considerably longer than the inverse of the gating frequency and
is typically of the order of several microseconds.
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Figure 5. Afterpulses caused by the after-gate attack. The chart shows the
experimentally measured cumulative probability to obtain at least one dark count
after a 287.5 μW pulse applied to both detectors (red dots), and a Monte Carlo
simulation of the same process using the parameters from table 1 (solid line).
The afterpulse effect is due to carrier traps, which are populated by avalanche current in
the detection process [19, 23]. We have found that bright pulses also populate the carrier traps,
irrespective of whether they generate detection events or not. Without a registered detection, a
dead time is not applied by the detector’s circuitry. The carriers released from traps can therefore
cause afterpulsing in the detector. These uncontrollable clicks will contribute to the QBER.
We have characterized this side effect of the after-gate attack in the successive gates by
plugging a laser directly to one of the ﬁber inputs of the 50 : 50 beamsplitter of ﬁgure 2. The
laser pulses have a peak power of 287.5 μW for each detector. As expected, the pulse never
causes a click immediately. However, very often it causes an afterpulse within the following
gates. Figure 5 shows the cumulative probability to obtain a click in any of the two detectors in
the next gates. After 50 gates, the cumulative probability to obtain a random click has reached
84%, which could jeopardize Eve’s attack by causing a too high QBER.
Note that the system sends frames of 1075 pulses as dictated by the send–return
conﬁguration [17]. Therefore, the attack can always be applied in the end of the frame with
a reduced risk of a random afterpulse. If the system requires on average only one detection
per two frames, then the security is completely compromised. Additionally, the attack may be
applicable for a different set of system parameters, e.g. different operation frequencies of Bob.
We have modeled the afterpulse effects of carrier traps. We have found that the probabilities
Pap;D0/D1(t j) of a detection event after a faked-state attack can be modeled using a double
exponential decay for the detectors,
Pap;D0/D1(t j) = Pdark;D0/D1 + (1 − Pdark;D0/D1)
2∑
i=1
Ai;D0/D1e−t j/τi;D0/D1, (2)
where Pdark;D0/D1 is the dark count probability, Ai;D0/D1 are probability amplitudes that depend
on the number of carriers that are generated in the detector, and τi;D0/D1 are the associated
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were used for the Monte Carlo simulation shown in ﬁgure 5.
Detector 0 Detector 1
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Pdark;D0 1.158 × 10−4 Pdark;D1 3.812 × 10−4
A1;D0 3.572 × 10−2 A1;D1 1.068 × 10−1
A2;D0 2.283 × 10−2 A2;D1 5.054 × 10−2
τ1;D0 1.159 μs τ1;D1 0.705 μs
τ2;D0 4.277 μs τ2;D1 3.866 μs
decay constants. The afterpulse probabilities in ﬁgure 5 were reproduced by a Monte Carlo
simulation using the double exponential decay model given by equation (2). By iterating the
Monte Carlo simulation, the decay parameters were found by minimizing the squared distance
between the measurement data and the simulation data, equivalent to the method of least squares
in regression analysis. Table 1 shows the resulting decay parameters, and the ﬁnal Monte Carlo
simulation is shown in ﬁgure 5. The decay parameters are in agreement with earlier published
data on APDs [19, 23].
6. Simulations of after-gate attack and quantum bit error rate estimation
We estimate the QBER for different attack scenarios using a Monte Carlo simulation. In our
simulation, Alice and Bob use the BB84 protocol. Eve performs a faked-state attack by putting
her modiﬁed Bob and Alice modules in the channel. Eve places her Bob module in the beginning
of the line next to Alice. We assume that Alice sends an optimized signal amplitude [20] where
the sent mean photon number μ is equal to the channel transmittance T . Unless otherwise
noted, Eve measures this signal with perfect detectors (100% efﬁciency and noiseless) and a
lossless apparatus. Then she reproduces a bright faked state with the corresponding bit value
for Bob.
Bob’s module is simulated, including realistic parameters that were determined
experimentally for our device. Besides the parameters for the afterpulsing and dark count effects
(see table 1), there are the optical transmittance of Bob’s setup (TB = 0.412), the quantum
efﬁciency of the detectors (ηB = 0.1) and the detector dead time (τdead = 10 μs).
In the simulation, we process the consecutive gates of a frame separately. We incorporate
the side effect by increasing the afterpulse probability of a detector, if carriers were generated
either by a regular avalanche or by bright pulses with full or half power10. We have
experimentally veriﬁed that for the operation frequency and used optical powers, the carrier
traps in the detectors are not saturated by our attack and that the afterpulses of the two
carrier-generating processes with different lifetimes occur independently and with Poissonian
statistics [21]. The afterpulse probability of a gate at time t j is then increased by a previous gate
10 Carrier generation by the half-power pulses is the most important effect, because the system does not apply the
dead time after them.
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Figure 6. We attack only the last χ gates of the total number of gates N = 1075
in the frame, such that the raw key rate generated by the attack on each frame is
equal to the rate without eavesdropping.
with carrier generation at time tk as
Pnewap;D0/D1(t j) = Poldap;D0/D1(t j) + (1 − Poldap;D0/D1(t j))
2∑
i=1
γi;D0/D1 Ai;D0/D1e−(t j−tk)/τi;D0/D1, (3)
where γi;D0/D1 is a correction of the probability amplitude Ai;D0/D1. In case of a bright
pulse attack with 287.5 μW pulses, γi;D0/D1 = 1. For a bright pulse attack with full 575 μW
power to one detector (successful attack), we increase the afterpulse probability by applying
equation (3) twice. We have measured that a regular avalanche in D0 and D1 has {γi;D0, γi;D1} =
{1.836, 3.673}.
6.1. Strategy of Eve with dead time
We ﬁrst simulated the QBER without the dead-time loophole described in section 4.2, i.e.
assuming that Bob rejects detection events during the detector dead time. To increase the
performance of Eve’s attack, she adopts the following strategy. (i) Attack only the last χ gates
of the total of N gates of a frame, as shown in ﬁgure 6. This will lead to a larger trapped carrier
density at the end of the frame, which, when gates are absent, is ignored by the detectors. (ii) Use
a small classical memory (up to three consecutive gates), which allows for checking whether
she received several consecutive clicks. These are then sent to Bob as a burst attack. This will
lead to a decreased time between failed attacks and following attacks, which suppresses the
afterpulsing by forcing earlier dead time. (iii) After the burst attack, wait as long as the dead
time of Bob’s detectors, in order to avoid carrier generation and afterpulsing directly after the
dead time.
We perform a simulation of the QBER induced by the attack for varying repetition rate and
channel transmittance. Repetition rates between 100 kHz and 10 MHz are simulated, because
the maximal gate frequency of 8 MHz speciﬁed for stand-alone single-photon counters id201
from ID Quantique11 suggests that gate frequencies in this range are feasible. The simulation
consists of two major steps. Firstly, Eve adjusts the number of attacked gates χ in order to adjust
the channel transmittance T to the one anticipated by Alice and Bob. Eve tries to maximize the
burst length in her attack. For a decreasing channel transmittance, Eve, however, receives fewer
photons from Alice. Therefore, the maximal burst length decreases for decreasing transmittance
11 Datasheet id201, ID Quantique.
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Figure 7. Simulated attack performance for the case when Bob discards
clicks during the detector dead time. (a) Burst length for different channel
transmittances and gate frequencies. (b) QBER generated by the attack. We show
contour lines for QKD security proofs that are more [24] or less [5] tolerant to
errors, allowing for a QBER of 20 or 11%, respectively.
(see ﬁgure 7(a)). Secondly, the QBER is simulated for 104 frames. The average QBER is shown
in ﬁgure 7(b) and compared to upper bounds of two different security proofs [5, 24]. The
protocol in [24] would require a single photon source and is therefore not directly applicable
in Clavis2. Therefore, we ﬁnd that the attack cannot compromise the security of Clavis2
due to increased afterpulse probability at the gate repetition rate of 5 MHz. However, the
security would be compromised for a more advanced system using single photons and the
protocol in [24], or for gate frequencies below about 1 MHz. We note that there are numerous
experimental setups and a commercial QKD system (see footnote 9) working below the critical
operation frequency of about 1 MHz. Additionally, technological improvements in the detectors
could reduce the afterpulse effects and thereby enable the attack for high frequencies.
6.2. Strategy of Eve without dead time
Eve can adapt her attack strategy if she has access to both the after-gate and the dead-time
loopholes. In the following, we show a strategy that is not an optimized one, but a rather intuitive
and (as it turns out) successful approach. Eve again attacks the end of the frame, as shown in
ﬁgure 6. Her strategy is to attack as frequently as possible. Thereby, she quickly enters a dead
time of Bob’s detectors. She will generate detection events during the dead time and, thereby,
can prolong the detector dead time, as shown in section 4.2. Ideally, a major part of the attack
happens during the dead state, which would completely remove the effect of afterpulses and
result in negligible QBER for this part of the attack.
In the simulation, we again adjust the number of attacked gates χ and simulate the QBER
for 104 frames. Figure 8 shows that for high transmittance, the QKD system is vulnerable against
the advanced attack, including for an eavesdropper with detection efﬁciency implementable
today. The photon statistics are maintained during the attack. It is therefore also applicable to
decoy state protocols [7]–[9].
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Figure 8. Simulated attack performance without dead time. The ﬁgures show
the QBER generated by the attack, taking advantage of the sensitivity of the
detectors during the dead time together with the elongation of the dead time.
(a) QBER with a perfect Eve. The attack is feasible for all repetition rates and
a wide range of channel transmittances. (b) QBER with a realistic Eve with
a detection efﬁciency TBηB = 0.5 and a dark count probability Pdark = 10−5,
corresponding to a technically advanced but feasible eavesdropper.
7. Countermeasures
Note that both eavesdropping strategies (especially the latter one) leave strong ﬁngerprints.
In the latter case, the distance between two valid detection events can be smaller than the
dead time of 10 μs. Therefore, one countermeasure is to search for too closely timed detection
events. Furthermore, rejecting detections during the dead time would restrict eavesdropping
to lower frequencies, as shown by our ﬁrst simulation (see ﬁgure 7). A complete protection
against the presented attacks is guaranteed if the detection times are resolved, such that Bob can
discriminate between detections inside and outside the single-photon-sensitive part of the gate.
Note, however, that this is highly non-trivial since the intrinsic jitter caused by the avalanche
build-up is about equal to the length of the gate itself. Alternatively, a watchdog detector can
be placed at Bob’s input in order to detect bright faked states. Since such a detector cannot be
an avalanche detector (this can be hacked), the countermeasure is only effective against bright
faked states.
8. Conclusions
We have demonstrated that gated detectors in QKD systems can be controlled by an external
eavesdropper using bright laser pulses during the linear mode operation. In particular, we have
analyzed the attack parameters for the commercial QKD system Clavis2 from ID Quantique.
In principle, the system is controllable by bright trigger pulses arriving after the gate time.
Other present and future detector technologies will have to be tested for this vulnerability.
However, we have found a side effect: afterpulse generation due to the faked states. The side
effect generates high QBER, and therefore actually protects the system from a straightforward
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faked-state attack. Eve can, however, take advantage of a second imperfection, namely that the
system accepts the bright pulses even in the dead time and, furthermore, resets the remaining
dead time. In a simulation of the attack, we have found that the system is insecure if clicks
are accepted during the dead time. The presented after-gate attack can be used independently
or together with the blinding attack in [16]. Although the after-gate attack in contrast to the
blinding increases the QBER, it has the advantage that the optical power sent into the Bob
module is weaker. Therefore, the after-gate attack is harder to detect with a watchdog detector.
Another advantage is that this attack can be applied to detectors that are not blindable.
ID Quantique has been notiﬁed about this loophole prior to the submission of the
manuscript, and has implemented countermeasures. Part of their countermeasure is to remove
gates at random times, and check whether detection events still occur without a gate12. This
would likely reveal the after-gate attack, with the bright pulses placed well behind the gate.
However, it is not obvious that this fully negates the after-gate attack, since it might be possible
to shift the trigger pulse close to the gate, making it trigger only in the presence of a gate.
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Several attacks have been proposed on quantum key distribution systems with gated single-photon detectors.
The attacks involve triggering the detectors outside the center of the detector gate, and/or using bright illumination
to exploit classical photodiode mode of the detectors. Hence a secure detection scheme requires two features:
The detection events must take place in the middle of the gate, and the detector must be single-photon sensitive.
Here we present a technique called bit-mapped gating, which is an elegant way to force the detections in the
middle of the detector gate by coupling detection time and quantum bit error rate. We also discuss how to
guarantee single-photon sensitivity by directly measuring detector parameters. Bit-mapped gating also provides
a simple way to measure the detector blinding parameter in security proofs for quantum key distribution systems
with detector efﬁciency mismatch, which up until now has remained a theoretical, unmeasurable quantity. Thus if
single-photon sensitivity can be guaranteed within the gates, a detection scheme with bit-mapped gating satisﬁes
the assumptions of the current security proofs.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.83.032306 PACS number(s): 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum mechanics allows two parties, Alice and Bob,
to grow a random, secret bit string at a distance [1–4]. In
theory, the quantum key distribution (QKD) is secure, even if
an eavesdropper Eve can do anything allowed by the currently
known laws of nature [5–9].
In practical QKD systems there will always be imperfec-
tions. The security of QKD systems with a large variety of
imperfections has been proved [5,10–17]. Device-independent
QKD tries to minimize the number of assumptions on the
system, but unfortunately the few assumptions [2,18,19] in
the security proofs seem to be too strict to allow useful
implementations [20] with current technology [21].
Several security loopholes caused by imperfections have
been identiﬁed, and attacks have been proposed and in
some cases implemented [15,22–34]. With notable exceptions
[22,23,27,30,33], most of the loopholes are caused by an
insufﬁcient model of the detectors.
While several detection schemes exist, most implementa-
tions use avalanche photodiodes (APDs) gated in the time
domain to avoid a high rate of dark counts. Gated means that
the APD is single-photon sensitive only when a photon is
expected to arrive in a time window called the detector gate.
Attacks on these detection schemes are based on exploiting
the classical photodiode mode of the APD, or the detector
response at the beginning and/or end of the detector gate.
In the attacks based on the classical photodiode mode of
the APD, the detectors are triggered by bright pulses [28,31].
If necessary, the APDs can be kept in the classical photodiode
mode, in a so-called blind state, using additional bright
background illumination [28,29,31,34,35]. When the detectors
are blind, they are not single-photon sensitive any more, but
only respond to bright optical trigger pulses. In most gated
systems, blinding is not necessary because the APDs are in
the classical photodiode mode outside the gates. Therefore, in
*lars.lydersen@iet.ntnu.no
the after-gate attack [36], the trigger pulses are simply placed
after the gate.
Several attacks are based on detector efﬁciency mismatch
(DEM) [24]. If Bob’s apparatus has DEM, Eve can control
the efﬁciencies of Bob’s detectors individually, by choosing
a parameter t in some external domain. Examples of such
domains can be the timing, polarization, or frequency of the
photons [14,24]. As an example, consider DEM in the time
domain. Usually Bob’s apparatus contains two single-photon
detectors to detect the incoming photons, one for each bit
value. Owing to different optical path lengths, inaccuracies
in the electronics, and ﬁnite precision in detector manufac-
turing, the detection windows and hence the efﬁciency curves
of the two detectors a and b are slightly shifted, as seen in
Fig. 1(a). Several attacks exploit DEM [15,24,25] in various
protocols [37], some of which are implementable with current
technology. The time-shift attack [25] has been used to gain an
information-theoretical advantage for Eve when applied to a
commercially available QKD system [32]. In the experiment,
Eve captured partial information about the key in 4% of her
attempts, such that she could improve her search over possible
keys.
After each loophole has been identiﬁed, effort has been
made to restore the security of the detection schemes. DEM is
now included in the receiver model of several security proofs
[14,15,17] as an efﬁciency mismatch or blinding parameter η,
deﬁned differently according to the generality of the proof. For
arbitrary systems that can be described with linear optics [15],
η = mint {ηa(t),ηb(t)}
maxt {ηa(t),ηb(t)} , (1)
where ηa(t) and ηb(t) are the detection efﬁciencies of the
two detectors. Here t labels the different optical modes; in
the special case without mode coupling it labels the different
temporal modes. An example is given in Fig. 1(a). In the
most general case η is given by the lowest probability that a
nonvacuum state incident to Bob is detected [17]. For either
deﬁnition of η, there is an inﬁnite number of modes involved
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Bit-mapped gating. (a) Detector gates with
DEM. ηa(t) (blue, dashed) and ηb(t) (red, solid) are the efﬁciencies
of the two detectors a and b with respect to time t . (b),(c) Possible
optical bit mapping (teal) when the software bit mapping is set to
a → 0, b → 1 (b) and a → 1, b → 0 (c). In a phase-encoded system
the two levels would correspond to 0 and π phase shift in one basis,
and π/2 and 3π/2 phase shift in the opposite basis. Note that software
bit mapping and optical bit mapping coincide in the bit-mapped gate,
which is well within the detector gates. (d) QBERmin(t) (green) as
obtained from (8) with the bit-mapped gate shown in (b) and (c).
(all superpositions of temporal modes [15]), which makes the
blinding parameter difﬁcult to measure or bound in practice.
For a given value of η, the secret key rate is given by [17]
R  −h(E) + η[1 − h(E)], (2)
where E is the quantum bit error rate (QBER) measured
by Alice and Bob, and h(·) is the binary Shannon entropy
function. Here we have assumed symmetry between the bases
in the protocol; in addition, we have ignored any basis
leakage from Alice and back reﬂection from Bob (the most
general expression is given in the original reference [17]).
Unfortunately, in practical systems the rate (2) will usually be
zero, because η → 0 owing to the edges of the detector gates.
For the commercial QKD system subject to the time-shift
attack, η < 0.01 [estimated from the curves in Fig. 3 of
Ref. [32] using Eq. (1)].
As noted in Ref. [15], one way of obtaining a better η would
be to discard pulses near the edge of the detector gate. Then
η could be calculated from (1) including only the modes t
that are accepted as valid detections. However, this is highly
nontrivial. The avalanche in an APD is a random process, and
the jitter in the photon-timing resolution is of the same order
of magnitude as the duration of the detector gate. A good
photon-timing resolving detector still has 27-ps jitter [38].
Furthermore, the unavoidable difference in the acceptance
windows for the different detectors will also contribute to
DEM (one detector accepts clicks while the other discards
them).
A frequently mentioned countermeasure for systems with
DEM is called four-state Bob [24,25,39,40]. Then Bob uses
a random detector–bit mapping, randomly assigning the bit
values 0 and 1 to the detectors a,b for each gate. In a
phase-encoded QKD system, this can be implemented by Bob
choosing from four different phase settings {0,π/2,π,3π/2}
instead of only two {0,π/2}. Then Eve does not know
which detector characteristics correspond to which bit value.
However, as mentioned previously [15,24,25], this patch does
not close the loophole. Eve may use a Trojan-horse attack
[22,23,41,42] to read Bob’s phase modulator settings. While
Alice’s system is usually secured against the Trojan-horse
attack by the optical attenuator at her entrance, this solution
will not work for Bob’s system because the attenuator would
also absorb nearly all the single photons from Alice. Note
also that the four-state Bob patch does not secure against
the after-gate attack [36] nor any of the detector control
attacks [31,35].
Here we present a novel way of securing Bob’s receiver
called bit-mapped gating (Sec. II). It secures the system against
all kinds of pulses outside the central part of the detector gate
in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) and related protocols
[1,43–45]. The technique is compatible with the existing
security proofs [14,15,17] and makes it simple to ﬁnd η.
In general, it represents a useful concept, where parameters
from characteristics of the QKD system are coupled to the
parameters estimated by the protocol. In this case η becomes
coupled to the QBER. Subsequently we analyze the security
of bit-mapped gating (Sec. III), discuss how to characterize
detectors, and how to implement a guarantee of single-photon
sensitivity (Sec. IV). Finally we conclude (Sec. V).
II. BIT-MAPPED GATING
Let us start with two deﬁnitions. Software bit mapping
determines how the signals from detectors a and b are mapped
into the logical bits 0, 1. Similarly, optical bit mapping, which
can be implemented by generalizing the basis selector, maps
quantum states with bit values 0,1 (for instance, |0〉,|1〉 in the
Z basis) to the detectors a,b. Note that if software bit mapping
and optical bit mapping do not coincide, the bit value 0 sent
by Alice will be detected as the bit value 1 by Bob.
Bit-mapped gating works as follows:
(1) Somewhere in between the detector gates, Bob randomly
selects software bit mapping, assigning detectors a,b to bit
values 0,1.
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(2) Likewise, the basis is selected randomly between the X
and Z basis, along with random optical bit mapping. Because
this happens between the detector gates, jitter is not critical.
(3) Inside the detector gate, optical bit mapping is matched
to software bit mapping. The period with matching optical and
software bit mapping is the bit-mapped gate.
Note that optical bit mapping can be equal on both sides of
the bit-mapped gate to minimize the need for random numbers.
Figure 1 shows a typical time diagram.
As an example, consider a phase-encoded implementation
of the BB84 protocol, where the basis selector at Bob is usually
a phase modulator. The zero-phase shift corresponds to the
Z basis and the π/2 phase shift corresponds to the X basis.
Optical bit mapping can be selected by adding either 0 or π to
the phase shift. Hence in this implementation the bit-mapped
gating patch could be implemented as follows: Bob randomly
selects software bit mapping somewhere between the gates.
Furthermore, Bob selects a random basis, i.e., 0 or π/2 phase
shift between the gates, and adds either 0 or π to the phase
shift to apply the random optical bit mapping. During the gate,
the software and optical bit mapping coincide.
All states received and detected outside the bit-mapping
gate cause random detection results (owing to the random
optical and software bit mapping), and thus introduce a QBER
of 50%. The measured QBER could be used to estimate the
fraction of detections that must have occurred in the center of
the gate (in Fig. 1: Close to zero QBER would mean that most
detection events must have passed the basis selector, and thus
hit the detector, in the middle of the gate). This can be used
to limit the DEM, because considering only the modes in the
center of the detector gate gives less DEM than considering
all modes.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The goal of this section is to derive an expression for the
minimum QBER introduced by any state received by Bob,
during the transition to and from the bit-mapped gate. Ideally,
the minimum QBER is 0 inside the bit-mapped gate, and 1/2
outside the bit-mapped gate.
The input of Bob’s detection system consists of many
optical modes t , for instance, corresponding to different arrival
times at Bob’s system. Each mode t may contain a mixture of
different number states. Note that Bob could have measured
the photon number in each mode without disturbing the later
measurement; thus it sufﬁces to address speciﬁc number states.
We use the usual assumption that each photon in a n-photon
state is detected individually. Under these assumptions, we
ﬁrst calculate the minimum QBER caused by a single photon
arriving in a single mode at Bob. Then, in the Appendix, we
show that multiple photons in this mode, or photons in other
modes, can only increase the minimum QBER.
Consider a single photon arriving at Bob in a given mode t .
Because the BB84 protocol is symmetric with respect to the
bit values and the bases, we may assume without loss of
generality that Alice sent Z0 and that Bob measures in the
Z basis. Outside the bit-mapped gate, Bob performs four
different measurements depending on the software and optical
bit mapping. For each measurement, Bob will obtain one out of
three measurement outcomes, bit 0, bit 1, or vacuum denoted
by subscript v.
Let ηa,ηb be the efﬁciencies of the two detectors, |θ〉 =
cos θ |0〉 + sin θ |1〉 and |θ⊥〉 = sin θ |0〉 − cos θ |1〉. During a
bit-mapped gate, θ is varied from 0 to π/2. For each value of
θ , Bob performs one out of the four measurements,
M0 = ηa|0〉〈0|, M1 = ηb|1〉〈1|, (3a)
Mv = I − M0 − M1,
M ′0 = ηb|0〉〈0|, M ′1 = ηa|1〉〈1|, (3b)
M ′v = I − M ′0 − M ′1,
M ′′0 = ηa|θ〉〈θ |, M ′′1 = ηb|θ⊥〉〈θ⊥|, (3c)
M ′′v = I − M ′′0 − M ′′1 ,
M ′′′0 = ηb|θ〉〈θ |, M ′′′1 = ηa|θ⊥〉〈θ⊥|, (3d)
M ′′′v = I − M ′′′0 − M ′′′1 .
If Bob uses the four measurements with equal probabil-
ities, the statistics will be given by using the measurement
operators,
E0 = 14 (M0 + M ′0 + M ′′0 + M ′′′0 )
= 14 (ηa + ηb)[(1 + cos2 θ )|0〉〈0| + sin2 θ |1〉〈1|
+ sin θ cos θ (|0〉〈1| + |1〉〈0|)], (4a)
E1 = 14 (M1 + M ′1 + M ′′1 + M ′′′1 )
= 14 (ηa + ηb)[sin2 θ |0〉〈0| + (1 + cos2 θ )|1〉〈1|
− sin θ cos θ (|0〉〈1| + |1〉〈0|)], (4b)
Ev = 14 (Mv + M ′v + M ′′v + M ′′′v )
=
(
1 − ηa + ηb
2
)
I. (4c)
Note that Ev ∝ I , so the detection probability is indepen-
dent of the photon state ρ:
pdet = 1 − Tr[ρEv] = ηa + ηb2 . (5)
The eigenvalues of operators E0 and E1 are given by
pdet(1 ± cos θ )/2. Thus the minimum and maximum proba-
bility of detecting bit values 0 and 1 for any single photon sent
by Eve is given by
p0, min = p1, min = pdet2 (1 − cos θ ), (6)
p0, max = p1, max = pdet2 (1 + cos θ ). (7)
Because Alice sent Z0, the minimum QBER introduced by a
single photon is given by
QBERmin = p1, min
pdet
= 1
2
(1 − cos θ ). (8)
As expected, for θ = π/2, QBERmin = 1/2. For multiphotons,
a random bit value is assigned to double clicks [10,16].
The Appendix shows that sending multiple photons can only
increase the QBER caused by detection events. Hence Eq. (8)
gives the minimum QBER for any photonic state sent by Eve.
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The security proofs in Refs. [14,15,17] involve Bob
predicting the results of Alice’s virtual X-basis measurement.
Because the prediction is not carried out in practice, Bob can
perform any operation permitted by quantum mechanics. In
the proofs Bob’s prediction consists of a ﬁlter followed by
an “X-basis” measurement. When nothing is known about the
distribution of the detection events within the gate, the worst-
case assumption is that all the detection events occur with
maximum DEM. Therefore, the best ﬁlter we can construct can
only guarantee that a fraction η of the inputs can successfully
pass the ﬁlter.
With our patch, we may use the QBER to determine a
lower bound for the number of detection events which must
have occurred in the central part of the detector gate. Assuming
that t labels temporal modes, consider the number of detection
events that occurred in the range where QBERmin < E′ (see
Fig. 2). Here, E′ is a threshold selected by Bob. Let η′ be
the blinding parameter for the modes for the range where
QBERmin < E′. It can be calculated from Eq. (1), but where t
only runs over this range. If the measured QBER is equal to
E, a fraction
f = E
′ − E
E′
(9)
must have been detected in the modes where QBERmin < E′.
Note that increasing E′ increases f , and may decrease η′ (see
Fig. 2). As will become apparent below, E′ should be selected
to maximize f η′.
For decoy protocols [43–45], E should be replaced with the
QBER estimated for single-photon states. This improves the
estimate of the fraction f , especially for large distances where
the dark counts become a major part of the total QBER.
In the worst case, a fraction f experienced a reduced
DEM η′. Therefore, the ﬁlters in the security proofs can be
replaced as follows: The new ﬁlter discards pulses in the
ηb(t)ηa(t)
Detector eﬃciency
Time
QBERmin
0
0.5
Time
E
FIG. 2. (Color online) Curves (a) and (d) from Fig. 1. The dashed
line shows how a threshold E′ can be used to limit the range of modes
t used to calculate or bound η′.
modes for which QBERmin > E′. For the modes inside the
bit-mapped gate, where QBERmin < E′, the new ﬁlter reverts
the quantum operation from the receiver in the opposite basis
in the same way that the old ﬁlter reverted it for all modes, but
now having a success rate η′. Because we can guarantee that
a fraction f of the photons are in the bit-mapped gate, at least
f η′ pulses will successfully pass the new ﬁlter. Therefore the
parameter η in all the proofs [14,15,17] can be replaced with
f η′, and the rate (2) becomes
R  −h(E) + f η′[1 − h(E)], (10)
when one assumes symmetry between the bases, and no source
errors. Without symmetry between the bases, all parameters
become basis dependent, and the rate is the sum of the rates in
each basis.
Let us see how bit-mapped gating could improve the secure
key rate for the commercial QKD system in Ref. [32]. For
this system, η < 0.01. In the same experiment, the QBER is
measured to be 5.68%. Assuming E′ = 0.45 and η′ = 0.9, f η′
becomes 0.79, thus a substantial improvement. In fact, the rate
obtained from Eq. (2) without the patch is 0, while the rate
obtained from Eq. (10) is 0.227, so clearly the patch can be
used to resecure an insecure implementation.
IV. DETECTOR DESIGN AND CHARACTERIZATION
When designing Bob’s system, one should ensure that the
bit-mapped gate is well within the detector gate, i.e., that
the detector efﬁciencies are approximately equal within the
bit-mapped gate. Then, it should be possible to measure or
bound the detector efﬁciencies and the basis selector response
θ (t) in the temporal domain. In a phase-encoded system this
would correspond to measuring the detector efﬁciencies and
the phase modulation as a function of time [46], over the
range of wavelengths and polarizations accepted by Bob. With
this data, the minimum QBER as a function of time can
be calculated from (8), and a diagram similar to Fig. 2 can
be obtained. After selecting an appropriate limit E′, η′ can be
calculated by (1) but where t runs only over the modes where
QBERmin < E′, and not over all available modes.
In general, there might be coupling between the differ-
ent temporal modes owing to misalignments and multiple
reﬂections [14,15]. The bit-mapped gate ensures that the
pulse passed the basis selector inside the temporal detector
gate, but does not guarantee the actual detection time. For
example, a pulse could pass in the center of the bit-mapped
gate, but afterwards take a multiple reﬂection path such that
it hits the detector outside the detector gate. This can be
handled by characterizing the worst-case mode coupling as
described previously [15]. Let δ be the worst-case (power)
coupling of modes inside the bit-mapped gate to outside the
gate. This will typically be the worst-case multiple-reﬂection
path after the basis selector, and should be boundable from
component characteristics. Then, the parameter δ can be
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interpreted as
δ = # pulses that hits the detector outside the gate
# pulses sent into the gate
. (11)
In the worst case, δ of the f detection events might have
happened outside the central part of the detector gate; thus one
must let f → f (1 − δ).
Finally one must guarantee that the detectors are not blind
within the gate [31], and fulﬁll the assumptions in Sec. III
during the transition of the optical bit mapping. Note that
the transition ends when there is no longer any correlation
between software bit mapping and optical bit mapping. If a
signiﬁcant correlation exists also after the detector gate, it
could be exploited in the after-gate attack [36].
Although it is tempting to place an optical watchdog detec-
tor at the entrance of Bob, the absence of bright illumination
does not necessarily mean that the detectors are single-photon
sensitive. For instance, owing to the thermal inertia of the APD,
it can remain blind for a long time after the bright illumination
is turned off [35].
A cheap way to guarantee single-photon sensitivity is
to monitor all detector parameters [29], such as APD bias
voltage, current, and temperature. It seems difﬁcult to monitor
the temperature of the APD chip [35], but monitoring the
bias voltage and current should make it possible to predict
the heat generated by the APD, and thus prevent thermal
blinding [35].
The ultimate way of guaranteeing single-photon sensitivity
is to measure it directly. This can be done by placing a
calibrated light source inside Bob that emits faint pulses at
random times [34] (see Fig. 3). Then the absence of detection
events caused by this source would indicate that the detector
C APD
LD
PMB
Bob
PBS
Short arm
Long arm
R
LD
Att.
DL
FIG. 3. (Color online) A calibrated light source inside Bob. The
ﬁgure shows the Bob module in a plug-and-play system [4,47–49],
which has two possible implementations of the calibrated light source:
either a separate attenuated laser diode (LD) at a suitable place, or
in the case of send-return systems where Bob already contains a
laser diode, a weakly reﬂective element (R) to reﬂect some light back
into the APDs. In one-way systems [3,50], Bob does not normally
contain any light source, therefore a separate laser diode would be the
only option. A short delay line (DL, delay > gate period/2) at Bob’s
input guarantees that Eve cannot interfere with the detector operation
based on whether the source is activated or not. PBS: polarizing
beam splitter; Att.: optical attenuator; PM: phase modulator; 50 : 50
ﬁber-optic coupler.
is blind. Further, a calibrated light source inside Bob could be
useful in more ways, for instance, to characterize and calibrate
detector performance in deployed systems.
The patch could cause a minor reduction in QKD perfor-
mance compared to running an (insecure) system without the
patch. In particular, the detector gates might have to be longer
to contain the basis-selector gate. This would increase the dark
count rate, and thus limit the maximum transmission distance.
A calibrated light source inside Bob would also cause a minor
reduction in the performance because the gates used for testing
the detector sensitivity likely cannot be used to extract the
secret key. However, both these effects are minor, and are
easily justiﬁed by the restoration of security.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this work, we have presented a technique called “bit-
mapped gating” to secure gated single-photon detectors in
QKD systems. It is based on a general concept where hardware
imperfections are coupled to the parameters estimated by
the protocol. Bit-mapped gating causes all detection events
outside the central part of the detector gate to cause high
QBER.
Bit-mapped gating is compatible with the current se-
curity proofs for QKD systems with detector efﬁciency
mismatch [14,15,17]. In particular, it provides a simple
way of measuring the detector blinding parameter. A secure
gated detection scheme is obtained if bit-mapped gating
is combined with detectors guaranteed to be single-photon
sensitive.
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APPENDIX: MINIMUM QBER FOR MULTIPHOTONS
Here we prove that the minimum QBER can only increase
when the number of photons sent to Bob is increased. As noted
previously, we use the usual assumption that each photon in a
n-photon state is detected individually. This means that each
photon hits a separate set of detectors, and then the detection
results are merged to give the detection results of threshold
detectors.
Let us ﬁrst consider the case where Bob receives a large
number of two-photon states. Let the two photons within the
states be labeled 1 and 2. Individually, each of the two photons
would have caused the minimum QBER Q1 and Q2 [as found
from Eq. (8)]. Again we assume that Alice sends the bit value 0,
without loss of generality. For two-photon states there will be
three cases of detected events: either only photon 1 is detected,
only photon 2 is detected, or both photons are detected (in our
model, this latter possibility corresponds to the case where both
sets of detectors register a click). Let there be n1 events where
only photon 1 was detected, n2 events where only photon 2 was
detected, and c events where both photons were detected. For
photon i, out of the ni = ni,0 + ni,1 events, ni,0 and ni,1 were
detected as the bit value 0 and 1, respectively. Likewise, out
of the c = ci,0 + ci,1 events where both photons are detected,
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ci,0 and ci,1 were detected as the bit value 0 and 1 for photon
i (remember that in the model each photon hits a separate set
of detectors).
When only one of the photons is detected, the situation is
identical to the single-photon case treated in Sec. III. Hence
states such that Qi = ni,1/ni give the lowest possible QBER.
For the events where both photons are detected, the detections
can have any correlation, but for each photon ci,1  cQi ,
because Qi represents the lowest fraction of the bit value 1
possible, regardless of the correlation with any other photon.
The total QBER Q can be found from merging the detections
from the two sets of detectors. Double clicks are assigned a
random bit value [10,16], therefore half of the double clicks
get the bit value 1. This gives the total QBER,
Q = n1,1 + n2,1 +
1
2 (c1,1 + c2,1)
n1 + n2 + c

Q1
(
n1 + c2
)+ Q2(n2 + c2)
n1 + n2 + c
 min(Q1,Q2). (A1)
By repeating the argument above, but replacing the detec-
tion of photon 1 with the detection of N photons, it is easy
to see that Q  min (QN,QN+1). Hence, by induction, any
detection event caused by more than one photon can only
cause a higher QBER than the single-photon case.
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Characterizing the physical channel and calibrating the cryptosystem hardware are prerequisites
for establishing a quantum channel for quantum key distribution (QKD). Moreover, an inappro-
priately implemented calibration routine can open a fatal security loophole. We propose and ex-
perimentally demonstrate a method to induce a large temporal detector eﬃciency mismatch in a
commercial QKD system by deceiving a channel length calibration routine. We then devise an
optimal and realistic strategy using faked states to break the security of the cryptosystem. A ﬁx for
this loophole is also suggested.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Ac, 42.50.Ex
Quantum key distribution (QKD) oﬀers uncondition-
ally secure communication as eavesdropping disturbs the
transmitted quantum states, which in principle leads to
the discovery of the eavesdropper Eve [1]. However,
practical QKD implementations may suﬀer from techno-
logical and protocol-operational imperfections that Eve
could exploit in order to remain concealed [2, 3].
Until now, a variety of eavesdropping strategies have
utilized diﬀerences between the theoretical model and the
practical implementation, arising from (technical) im-
perfections or deﬁciencies of the components. Ranging
from photon number splitting and Trojan-horse, to leak-
age of information in a side channel, time-shifting and
phase-remapping, several attacks have been proposed
and experimentally demonstrated [4–8]. Recently, proof-
of-principle attacks [9–11] based on the concept of faked
states [12] have been presented. Eve targets imperfec-
tions of avalanche photodiode (APD) based single-photon
detectors [13] that allow her to control them remotely.
Another important aspect of QKD security not yet in-
vestigated, however, is the calibration of the devices. A
QKD protocol requires a classical and a quantum chan-
nel; while the former must be authenticated, the latter
is merely required to preserve certain properties of the
quantum signals [2, 14]. The establishment of the quan-
tum channel remains an implicit assumption in security
proofs: channel characterization (e.g. channel length)
and calibration of the cryptosystem hardware, especially
the steps involving two-party communication, haven’t yet
been taken into account. As we show, the calibration of
the QKD devices must be carefully implemented, other-
wise it is prone to hacks that may strengthen existing, or
create new eavesdropping opportunities for Eve.
In this Letter, we propose and experimentally demon-
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FIG. 1. Typical detection system in a Mach-Zehnder interfer-
ometer based QKD implementation: The bit and basis choices
of Alice and Bob (phases ϕAlice and ϕBob) determine the inter-
ference result at the 50:50 beam splitter (BS), or which of the
two detectors D0 or D1 would click. It is thus crucial that D0
and D1 are indistinguishable to the outside world (i.e. Eve).
If gated mode APDs are employed, the detector control board
ensures that the activation of D0 and D1 (via voltage pulses
V0(t) and V1(t)) happens almost simultaneously, to nullify any
existing temporal eﬃciency mismatch.
strate the hacking of a vital calibration sequence during
the establishment of the quantum channel in the com-
mercial QKD system Clavis2 from ID Quantique [15].
Eve induces a parameter mismatch [16] between the de-
tectors that can break the security of the QKD system.
Speciﬁcally, she causes a temporal separation of the or-
der of 450 ps of the detection eﬃciencies by deceiving
the detection system, shown in Fig. 1. This allows her
to control Bob’s detection outcomes using time, a pa-
rameter already shown to be instrumental in applying
a time-shift attack (TSA) [7]. Alternatively, she could
launch a faked-state attack (FSA) [16] for which we cal-
culate the quantum bit error rate (QBER) under realistic
conditions. Since FSA is an intercept-resend attack, Eve
has full information-theoretic knowledge about the key
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FIG. 2. Manipulation of the calibration routine: (a) Sim-
pliﬁed version of Alice and Bob devices and Eve (in italic)
gearing for the hack. FM: Faraday mirror, CD: classical pho-
todiode, DLs: delay loops, VOA: variable optical attenuator,
CR: coupler, BS: 50:50 beam splitter, PBS: polarizing beam
splitter, C: optical circulator. The hexagonal-shaped objects
are phase modulators (PMs); ϕX, where X is Bob, Alice or
Eve, represents the applied modulation. (b) Timeline for a
cycle of the hacked LLM. Vπ: PM voltage for a π phase shift.
as long as Alice and Bob accept the QBER at the given
channel transmission T , and do not abort key genera-
tion [17]. Constricting our FSA to match the raw key
rate expected by Bob and Alice, i.e. maintaining T at
nearly the exact pre-attack level, we ﬁnd that the secu-
rity of the system is fully compromised. Our hack has
wide implications: most practical QKD schemes based
on gated APDs, in both plug-and-play and one-way con-
ﬁgurations [19–21], need to perform channel characteri-
zation and hardware calibration regularly. A careful im-
plementation of these steps is required to avoid leaving
inadvertent backdoors for Eve.
The optical setup of Clavis2 is based on the plug-
and-play QKD scheme [15, 19]. An asymmetric Mach-
Zehnder interferometer operates in a double pass over the
quantum channel by using a Faraday mirror; see Fig. 2(a)
without Eve. The interference of the paths taken by two
pulses travelling from Bob to Alice and back is deter-
mined by their relative phase modulation (ϕBob−ϕAlice),
and forms the principle for encoding the key. Any bire-
fringence eﬀects of the quantum channel are passively
compensated. As a prerequisite to the key exchange,
Clavis2 calibrates its detectors in time via a sequence
named Line Length Measurement (LLM). Bob emits a
pair of bright pulses and applies a series of detector gates
around an initial estimate of their return. The timing
of the gates is electronically scanned (while monitoring
detector clicks) to reﬁne the estimation of the channel
length and relative delay between the time of arrival of
the pulses at D0 and D1. Alice keeps her phase mod-
ulator (PM) switched oﬀ, while Bob applies a uniform
phase of π/2 to one of the incoming pulses. Therefore,
both detectors are equally illuminated and their detection
eﬃciencies, denoted by η0(t) and η1(t), can be resolved
in time. Any existing mismatch can thus be minimized
by changing the gate-activation times (see Fig. 1).
However, the calibration routine does not always suc-
ceed; as reported in [7], a high detector eﬃciency mis-
match (DEM) is sometimes observed after a normal run
of LLM. For example, we have noticed a temporal mis-
match as high as 400 ps in Clavis2. This physical limita-
tion of the system – arising due to fast and uncontrollable
ﬂuctuations in the quantum channel or electromagnetic
interference in the detection circuits – is the vulnerabil-
ity that the TSA exploits. However, the attack has some
limitations: it is applicable only when the temporal mis-
match happens to exceed a certain threshold value, which
is merely 4% of all the instances [7]. Also, Eve can nei-
ther control the mismatch (as it occurs probabilistically),
nor extract its value (as it is not revealed publicly).
We exploit a weakness of the calibration routine to
induce a large and deterministic DEM without needing
to extract any information from Bob. As depicted in
Fig. 2(a), Eve installs her equipment in the quantum
channel such that the laser pulse pair coming out of Bob’s
short and long arm passes through her PM. Eve’s modu-
lation pattern is such that a rising edge in the PM volt-
age ﬂips the phase in the second (long arm) optical pulse
from −π/2 to π/2, as shown in Fig. 2(b). As a result of
this hack, when the pulse pair interferes at Bob’s 50:50
beam splitter, the two temporal halves have a relative
phase diﬀerence (ϕBob − ϕEve) of π and 0, respectively.
This implies that photons from the ﬁrst (second) half of
the interfering pulses yield clicks in D1 (D0) determin-
istically. As the LLM localizes the detection eﬃciency
peak corresponding to the optical power peak, an arti-
ﬁcial temporal displacement in the detector eﬃciencies
is induced. An inverse displacement can be obtained by
simply inverting the polarity of Eve’s phase modulation.
In the supplementary section [22], we describe a proof-
of-principle experiment to deceive the calibration routine.
With this setup, we record the temporal separation Δ01,
i.e. the diﬀerence between the delays for electronically
gating D0 and D1, for several runs of LLM. Relative to
the statistics from the normal runs (denoted by ΔnoEve01 ),
the hacked runs yield an average shift, ΔEve01 −ΔnoEve01 =
459 ps with a standard deviation of 105 ps. Figure 3
shows the detection eﬃciencies η0(t) and η1(t) (mea-
surement method explained in [22]) for the normal and
hacked cases. It also provides a quantitative comparison
between the usual and induced mismatch. Note that a
larger mismatch can be obtained by modifying the shape
of laser pulses coming from Bob.
After inducing this substantial eﬃciency mismatch,
Eve can use an intercept-resend strategy employing
‘faked states’ [12] to impose her will upon Bob (and Al-
ice). Compared to her intercepted measurements, she
prepares the opposite bit value in the opposite basis and
sends it with such a timing that the detection of the op-
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FIG. 3. Induced temporal mismatch: Eﬃciencies η0(t) (dot-
ted) and η1(t) (dashed) from normal LLMs, on the left, and
after Eve’s hack that induced a separation of 459 ps, on the
right. The logarithm of their ratio, quantifying the degree of
mismatch (solid line), is at least an order of magnitude higher
in the ﬂanks after Eve’s hack: the dash-dot line indicates zero
mismatch. To eavesdrop successfully, Eve times the arrival of
“appropriately bright” faked states at t = t0 or t1 in Bob.
posite bit value is suppressed due to negligible detection
eﬃciency. As an example, assume that Eve measures bit
0 in the Z basis [in a phase-coded scheme, measuring in Z
(X) basis ⇔ applying ϕ = 0 (π/2)]. Then, she resends
bit 1 in the X basis, timed to be detected at t = t0 (see
Fig. 3), where D1 is almost blind. Using the numerical
data on the induced mismatch, Eq. 3 from [16] yields a
QBER < 0.5% if the FSA is launched at times t0 and t1
where the eﬃciency mismatch is high.
However, it can be observed that the detection proba-
bilities for D0 and D1 are quite low in this case. A con-
siderable decrease in the rate of detection events in Bob
could ensue an alarm. Also, the (relatively increased)
dark counts would add signiﬁcantly to the QBER. In fact,
Eve needs tomatch the channel transmission T that Alice
and Bob expect, without exceeding the QBER threshold
at which they abort key generation [17]. Experimentally,
we ﬁnd that the abort threshold depends on the channel
loss seen by Clavis2; for an optical loss of 1–6 dB (corre-
sponding to 0.79> T > 0.25), it lies between 5.94–8.26%.
Eve solves these problems by increasing the mean
photon number of her faked states. To evaluate her
QBER, we elaborate the approach of [16] by general-
izing table I from this reference. Our attack strat-
egy, carefully accounting for all the involved factors,
is summarized in Table I. For instance, in the ﬁrst
row we replace the probability of detection η0(t0)/2
by 1 − exp (−μ0η0(t0)/2) for a coherent-state pulse of
mean photon number μ0 impinging on Bob’s detectors
at time t0. Including the eﬀect of the dark counts into
this expression, Bob’s probability to register 0 becomes
q0 = d0 + (1− d0) (1− exp (−μ0η0(t0)/2)), where d0 is
the dark count probability in detector D0. A row for
double clicks, i.e. simultaneous detection events in D0
and D1, is added for every (re-sent) state.
Due to the FSA, the D0/1 click probability at time t
no longer depends solely upon η0/1(t). Summing over all
the states sent by Alice (by extending Table I), the total
→Eve Eve→ Bob’s result Detection probability
Z, 0 X, 1, μ0, t0 0 q0 = d0 + (1− d0)×
(1− exp (−μ0η0(t0)/2))
1 q1 = d1 + (1− d1)×
(1− exp (−μ0η1(t0)/2))
0 ∩ 1 q0q1
loss 1− (q0 + q1 − q0q1)
X, 0 Z, 1, μ0, t0 0 r0 = d0
1 r1 = d1 + (1− d1)×
(1− exp (−μ0η1(t0)))
0 ∩ 1 r0r1
loss 1− (r0 + r1 − r0r1)
X, 1 Z, 0, μ1, t1 0 s0 = d0 + (1− d0)×
(1− exp (−μ1η0(t1)))
1 s1 = d1
0 ∩ 1 s0s1
loss 1− (s0 + s1 − s0s1)
TABLE I. Faked-state attack, given that Alice prepared bit
0 in the Z basis and that Bob measured in the Z basis (only
matching basis at Alice and Bob remains after sifting). The
ﬁrst column contains the basis chosen by Eve and her mea-
surement result. The second column shows parameters of
the faked state resent by Eve: basis, bit, mean photon num-
ber, timing. The third column shows Bob’s measurement re-
sult; 0 ∩ 1 denotes a double click. The last column shows the
corresponding click probabilities (ignoring possible superlin-
earity eﬀect in gated detectors [18]). Note: The ﬁrst result
(→ Eve ≡ Z, 0) is twice as likely to occur as the other two.
detection probabilities in D0 and D1 when the attack is
launched at speciﬁc times t0 and t1 are
p0(μ0, μ1) = 0.75 + 0.25d− 0.25(1− d)×
(e−0.5μ0η00 + e−0.5μ1η01 + e−μ1η01) , (1)
p1(μ0, μ1) = 0.75 + 0.25d− 0.25(1− d)×
(e−0.5μ0η10 + e−0.5μ1η11 + e−μ0η10) . (2)
Here ηjk = ηj(tk) with j, k ∈ {0, 1} and d = mean (d0, d1)
are used to simplify the expressions. Similarly, one can
compute the expression for p0∩1, the total double-click
probability. Eve’s error probability, the arrival probabil-
ity of the optical signals in Bob, and the QBER are
perror(μ0, μ1) = 0.75 + 0.25d− 0.5p0∩1 − 0.125× (3)
(1 − d) (e−μ0η10 + 2e−0.5μ0η10 + e−μ1η01 + 2e−0.5μ1η01) ,
parrive(μ0, μ1) = p0 + p1 − p0∩1 , (4)
QBER(μ0, μ1) = perror(μ0, μ1)/parrive(μ0, μ1) . (5)
Here double clicks are assumed to be assigned a random
bit value by Bob [25], causing an error in half the cases.
If Alice and Bob are connected back-to-back (channel
transmission T ≈ 1), the click probabilities in Bob should
be slightly less than half of the peak values in Fig. 3. This
is owing to optical losses (>∼ 3 dB) in Bob’s apparatus.
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FIG. 4. Minimum QBER versus click probabilities in D0
and D1: Eve minimizes the error with a suitable choice of
the mean photon number of the faked states (for this plot,
1 < μ0 < 100 and 21 < μ1 < 120 at Bob’s detectors). The
thick shaded line indicates Bob’s detection probabilities. The
QBER introduced by Eve stays below 7% for T >∼ 0.25.
Eve’s constraints can now be formalized as: starting in
the vicinity of p0 = 0.038 and p1 = 0.032, not only does
she have to match Bob’s expected detection rate for any
given T < 1, but also keep the resultant QBER below the
threshold at which Clavis2 aborts the key exchange. We
assume Eve detects photons at Alice’s exit using a perfect
apparatus, and resends perfectly aligned faked states.
Substituting t1 = −1.32 ns, t0 = 1.90 ns (marked in
Fig. 3) and d = 2.4 × 10−4 in Eqns. 1–5, Eve collects
tuples [p0, p1, QBER] by varying μ0 and μ1 in a suitable
range. Out of all tuples that feature the same detection
probabilities (arising from diﬀerent combinations of μ0
and μ1), Eve chooses the one having the lowest QBER.
A contour plot in Fig. 4 displays this minimized error
minμ0,μ1 QBER((μ0, μ1)| (p0, p1)). The thick shaded line
shows that for T > 0.25, Eve not only maintains the
detection rates within 5% of Bob’s expected values, but
also keeps the QBER below 7% [? ]; thus breaking the
security of the system. Note that the simulation assumes
a lossless Eve, but in principle she can cover loss from
her realistic detection apparatus by increasing μ0 and μ1
further and/or including t0 and t1 in the minimization.
To counter this hack, Bob should randomly apply a
phase of 0 or π (instead of π/2 uniformly) while perform-
ing LLM. This modiﬁcation is implementable in software
and has already been proposed to ID Quantique. More
generally, a method to shield QKD systems from attacks
that exploit DEM is described in Ref. [23].
In conclusion, we report a proof-of-principle experi-
ment to induce a large detector eﬃciency mismatch in
a commercial QKD system by deceiving a vital calibra-
tion routine. An optimized faked-state attack on such a
compromised system would not alarm Alice and Bob as
it would introduce a QBER < 7% for a large range of
expected channel transmissions. Thus, the overall secu-
rity of the system is broken. With initiatives for stan-
dardizing QKD [24] underway, we believe this report is
timely and shall facilitate elevating the security of prac-
tical QKD systems.
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FIG. 5. Eve’s implementation (mAlice) by modifying Alice’s module: The onboard pulser driving the phase modulator (PM)
is disconnected, and the PM itself is positioned before the 23.5 km delay loops (DLs). The trigger conditioner circuit allows
(prevents) the pulse & delay generator to be triggered by the short arm (long arm) optical pulses. Newly added components
to the original Alice module are labeled in italic. VOA: variable optical attenuator, FM: Faraday mirror.
Implementation of the hack: Here, we explain our experimental implementation of the scheme outlined in the
Letter for deceiving Line Length Measurement (LLM), the calibration routine of the Clavis2 QKD system [15]. For
this purpose, we rig the module of Alice as shown in Fig. 5. From now on, we call this manipulated device mAlice. An
electronic tap placed on the classical detector (normally used by Alice for measuring the incoming optical power [5])
is conditioned appropriately with a homemade circuit. The output of this circuit provides the trigger for the pulse &
delay generator (PDG, Highland Technology P400), which essentially drives the phase modulator (PM) in mAlice.
For experimental convenience, we also change the settings in the Clavis2 ﬁrmware (Bob’s EEPROM speciﬁcally)
such that during the execution of LLM, ϕBob = 0 is applied instead of the usual π/2. This relaxes the requirement on
Eve’s modulation pattern: in comparison to the waveform in Fig. 2(b) in the Letter, the PDG needs to switch simply
from 0 to Vπ through the center of the optical pulse. This is in principle equivalent to the scheme in Fig. 2(b) in the
Letter, while easier to implement. In other words, it does not aﬀect a full implementation of Eve. Normally, Alice
applies the phase modulation in a double pass by making use of the Faraday mirror. However, the PM in mAlice is
shifted closer to Alice’s entrance (i.e. before the delay loops) to enable a precise synchronization of the PDG. To ensure
that the photons passing through the PM (in a single pass now) pick up the requisite ‘π’ modulation, a polarization
controller is deployed before the PM.
Finally, the synchronization of the rising edge of Eve’s modulation to the center of the optical pulse is performed by
scanning the delay in the PDG (in steps of 5 ps) while monitoring the interference visibility [15]. As Eve’s modulation
ﬂips the phase of the optical pulse through the center, the visibility reduces to zero. The corresponding delay setting
of the PDG can then be used to induce the temporal eﬃciency mismatch between Bob’s detectors D0 and D1, during
the execution of LLM.
We emphasize that the mAlice module serves as a proof-of-principle implementation only for inducing the detector
eﬃciency mismatch during the LLM. It should not be confused with Eve’s intercept or resend modules, needed in
the subsequent faked-state attack. Finally, note that Eve is free to modify Bob’s pulses or replace them by her
suitably-prepared pulses, and thus eﬀectively control the amount of detection eﬃciency mismatch that can be induced.
Measurement of eﬃciency curves: Detection eﬃciencies η0(t) and η1(t) are estimated at single-photon level by
scanning the detector gates in steps of 20 ps with an external laser (optical pulse-width ∼ 200 ps). We average the
click probability per gate and subtract d0/1 (the dark count rate in D0/1) from it. This gives a more accurate estimate
of the eﬃciencies, especially in the ﬂanks (see Fig. 3 in the Letter).
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We introduce the concept of a superlinear threshold detector, a detector that has a higher prob-
ability to detect multiple photons if it receives them simultaneously rather than at separate times.
Highly superlinear threshold detectors in quantum key distribution systems allow eavesdropping
the full secret key without being revealed. Here, we generalize the detector control attack, and
analyze how it performs against quantum key distribution systems with moderately superlinear de-
tectors. We quantify the superlinearity in superconducting single-photon detectors based on earlier
published data, and gated avalanche photodiode detectors based on our own measurements. The
analysis shows that quantum key distribution systems using detector(s) of either type can be vul-
nerable to eavesdropping. The avalanche photodiode detector becomes superlinear towards the end
of the gate. For systems expecting substantial loss, or for systems not monitoring loss, this would
allow eavesdropping using trigger pulses containing less than 120 photons per pulse. Such an attack
would be virtually impossible to catch with an optical power meter at the receiver entrance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Single photon detectors [1] can be regarded as essen-
tial parts of quantum information processing hardware,
and are certainly crucial components in quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) systems [2–7]. In QKD, the commu-
nicating parties Alice and Bob exploit the properties of
quantum mechanics to reveal any eavesdropping attempt
by the eavesdropper Eve. The security of QKD has been
proven for perfect devices [4, 5]. However, when the secu-
rity of QKD is to be proven for practical systems [8–16],
it is necessary to construct models based on assumptions
about the practical devices, and hence also about the
single photon detectors.
With a few exceptions [17, 18], most single photon de-
tectors suitable for QKD systems are threshold detectors
that cannot resolve the number of photons in a pulse.
They rather have a binary response distinguishing be-
tween zero, and ‘one or more’ photons, where a detection
event is often referred to as a “click”. Threshold detec-
tors are usually characterized by their quantum eﬃciency
η, which is the probability to detect a single photon.
For multiphoton pulses, a very common assumption is
that each photon within the pulse is detected individu-
ally with probability η. Then, the detection probability
of a n-photon Fock state can be expressed as
pdet(n) = 1− (1− η)n. (1)
We refer to threshold detectors with a multiphoton detec-
tion probability higher than the one given by Eq. (1) as
∗ lars.lydersen@iet.ntnu.no
superlinear threshold detectors. A superlinear threshold
detector has a larger probability to detect multiple pho-
tons if it receives them nearly simultaneously, than if it
receives each of the photons separately at diﬀerent times.
This eﬀect is well known in multiphoton absorption by
atoms [19], where the multiphoton absorption rate can
be much higher for chaotic light than for laser light with
the same mean intensity. Meanwhile for threshold detec-
tors, superlinear response may also originate from how
the entire device converts individual excitations into the
macroscopic detection event.
The photon number of a coherent state follows a Pois-
son distribution with probability pn = μ
ne−μ/n!, where
μ is the mean photon number. Therefore, if the detection
probability of a n-photon Fock state is given by Eq. (1),
a coherent state with mean photon number μ is detected
with probability
pdet =
∞∑
n=0
μne−μ
n!
pdet(n) = 1− e−μη. (2)
Note that for a coherent state with mean photon number
μ, a superlinear threshold detector with quantum eﬃ-
ciency η will have a higher detection probability than
the one given by Eq. (2).
Insuﬃcient models of single photon detectors have
caused numerous security loopholes [15, 20–30] in QKD.
For instance, the time-shift attack [21] based on detector
eﬃciency mismatch [20] has been shown to break the se-
curity of a commercial QKD system [24]. More recently,
the detector control attack [25–30] allows the eavesdrop-
per to capture the full key without revealing her presence
(via errors in the key). Speciﬁcally, the attack intro-
duces zero quantum bit error rate (QBER). Furthermore,
2this attack which is based on bright illumination is im-
plementable with current technology. Two commercial
QKD systems were shown to be vulnerable to the attack
[25–27], and a full eavesdropper has been implemented
to capture the full key of an experimental QKD system
under realistic conditions [29]. However, the power level
(more than 500μW) of the eavesdropper’s illumination
has led to discussions whether an optical power meter at
the entrance of Bob can be used to detect these attacks
[31–34].
In this paper we propose and analyze an attack against
QKD systems with superlinear detectors (Sec. II). Note
that the previously published detector control attack [25]
is based on an extreme superlinear behavior of the detec-
tors, and can therefore be considered a special case of
the “imperfect” detector control attack presented here.
Then we discuss how the attack would perform against
superconducting single photon detectors [35, 36], which
have been reported to exhibit superlinear behavior (Sec-
tion III). In Sec. IV we show that APD-based gated
detectors have a substantial superlinear response at the
end of the gate. The superlinear behavior at the end
of the gate allows eavesdropping with very faint trigger
pulses [25, 32]. This faint after-gate attack will be virtu-
ally impossible to catch with an optical power meter at
the entrance of Bob. At least one security proof covers
QKD systems with superlinear detectors [16]. In Sec. V
we show how the detector control attack relates to the
security proof, and discuss possible countermeasures. Fi-
nally, we conclude in Sec. VI.
II. THEORY OF SUPERLINEAR DETECTOR
CONTROL
The core of the previously proposed detector control
attacks is the following [25]: in the Bennett-Brassard
1984 (BB84) [2] family of protocols, Eve uses a random
basis to measure the quantum state from Alice. Then
she resends her measurement result, not as a single pho-
ton, but rather as a bright pulse, called a trigger pulse,
with a carefully selected optical power. Then, if Eve uses
Bob’s measurement basis, her trigger pulse is always de-
tected by Bob. On the contrary, if Eve uses a basis not
matching Bob’s to measure the quantum state from Alice,
her trigger pulse is never detected. This is possible be-
cause Bob’s detectors are very superlinear: for less than
a factor of two (3 dB) increase in trigger pulse power, the
detection probability shoots from 0 to 100%. Since Eve
uses the correct basis only half of the time, the total loss
between Alice and Bob is 3 dB. For the diﬀerential-phase-
shift protocol [37, 38] there is no basis choice, so the same
factor of two (3 dB) superlinearity allows eavesdropping
without extra loss [30]. The coherent one-way protocol
[39, 40] is also vulnerable to the detector control attacks
[30], but requires a more strict relationship between the
superlinearities of the detectors in the system.
The previously proposed detector control attacks allow
Eve to capture the full secret key without introducing any
QBER. However, Alice and Bob usually tolerate a non-
zero QBER (typically less than 11%). Therefore, Eve
might introduce a small QBER without getting caught.
What if the superlinearity of the detector is such that
when Eve selects the right basis, the trigger pulse is de-
tected with a high probability, while when Eve selects the
wrong basis, the trigger pulse is detected with a low prob-
ability? One can immediately identify two consequences
of this “imperfect” detector control attack: the non-unity
detection probability when Eve uses the right basis will
contribute extra to the loss. On the other hand, the non-
zero detection probability when Eve uses the wrong basis
will introduce a non-zero QBER.
We will here consider an active basis choice BB84 im-
plementation using two detectors. In a passive basis
choice BB84 implementation [41], Eve’s trigger pulse will
strike the detectors in both bases simultaneously for each
bit. For this case, the QBER introduced by the attack
depends on how Bob handles simultaneous clicks in both
bases. Assume that Bob assigns a random bit value to
these events. Then, if the probability for simultaneous
clicks in both bases is non-zero, the QBER introduced
by a “imperfect” detector control attack will be higher
in a passive basis choice implementation than in an ac-
tive basis choice implementation. In any case, for passive
basis choice implementations, the theoretical QBER de-
rived below can be used as a lower bound.
To calculate the QBER caused by this attack, let pf,i
be the detection probability in detector i for the trigger
pulse with full power. Likewise, let ph,i be the detection
probability at detector i with half the power. We assume
Eve resends the same power regardless of her detected
bit value, that double clicks are assigned to a random
bit value [42], and that Eve selects Bob’s measurement
basis with probability 1/2. When Eve resends in the
wrong basis and Bob has a detection, the bit value will
be erroneous with probability 1/2. Therefore, the QBER
caused by the “imperfect” detector control attack is given
by
QBER =
1
2
Bob detects and Eve used wrong basis
Bob has a detection
=
ph,0 + ph,1 − ph,0ph,1
pf,0 + pf,1 + 2(ph,0 + ph,1 − ph,0ph,1) ,
(3)
where dark counts have been omitted. Errors originating
from dark counts would add to the errors caused by the
attack. However, in a good detector design the amount
of errors from dark counts is minimized. Since we require
the eavesdropper to reproduce the detection probability
from normal operating conditions, the dark count prob-
ability would be minimized under attack as well. A high
dark count probability, and thus a high error rate with-
out the eavesdropper would leave the attack less room
for errors to be introduced. However, an equivalent re-
striction on the attack is easier obtained by lowering the
acceptance threshold for the QBER. Therefore, our anal-
yses is limited to the QBER introduced by the attack,
3and dark counts are omitted. Assuming that both de-
tectors have equal detection probabilities, pf,i = pf and
ph,i = ph, Eq. (3) simpliﬁes to
QBER =
2ph − p2h
2pf + 2(2ph − p2h)
. (4)
As discussed above, the perfect detector control attack
introduces 3 dB loss when applied against BB84 QKD
systems with active basis choice in Bob’s implementation,
because Eve only selects the correct basis half of the time.
If mini pf,i < 1, the attack will cause an even higher loss.
On the other hand, maxi ph,i > 0 will reduce the loss
introduced by the attack. Therefore, the transmittance
T when an “imperfect” detector control attack is applied
against a BB84 QKD system with active basis choice is
given by
T =
1
4
(pf,0 + pf,1) +
1
2
(ph,0 + ph,1 − ph,0ph,1) . (5)
Note that T refers to the transmittance between Eve and
Bob. If Eve uses imperfect detectors, this will add to the
total loss observed by Alice and Bob. For the remainder
of the paper, we simply consider Eve to use perfect de-
tectors. Since Eve can place her detectors close to Alice,
and she can use detectors with almost unity detection
eﬃciency [18], this is an acceptable assumption. If both
detectors have equal probabilities, Eq. (5) simpliﬁes to
T =
1
2
pf +
1
2
(
2ph − p2h
)
. (6)
Note that in passive implementations of Bob, such as pas-
sive basis choice in BB84 [41], or in distributed phase ref-
erence protocols [37–40], there is no 3 dB loss due to basis
choice. Therefore, the above expression for the transmit-
tance T can be considered a lower bound also for such
implementations.
In most cases, the eavesdropper can introduce sub-
stantial loss without getting noticed. With the notable
exception of transition-edge sensors [18], the quantum
eﬃciency of Bob’s detectors is typically about 10% at
telecom wavelengths [1]. Furthermore, an optical ﬁber
usually exhibits a loss of about 0.2 dB/km at 1550 nm
wavelength. Adding the loss owing to detector’s quan-
tum eﬃciency to the loss in the line at a typical distance
of 50 km, Alice and Bob normally observe a total loss of
20 dB, corresponding to T ∼ 0.01. In addition to this,
there is loss in the optical path inside Bob’s apparatus.
However, Eve can always adjust the power in her trig-
ger pulses to strike Bob’s detectors with a given optical
power. Therefore, by inserting her eavesdropping station
into the line close to Alice’s system, Eve has almost the
full 20 dB at her disposal. In one case, a QKD system op-
erating with loss up to 40 dB has been reported [43] (but
the actual, tolerable loss might be less because there is
no satisfactory security proof for the protocol used in
Ref. [43]). Therefore, it seems that for many QKD se-
tups, Eve can introduce loss of more than 20 dB without
being revealed from the reduction in the transmittance.
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FIG. 1. (Color online) The detection probability versus mean
photon number in the trigger pulse for the SSPD in Ref. [36],
at 1550 nm and Ib = 0.8Ic. Count rates were extracted from
Fig. 1 in Ref. [36], and divided by the pulse repetition fre-
quency of 82MHz to obtain the detection probability. The
red circled data points were used to calculate the QBER and
the transmittance from an attack.
III. SUPERLINEARITY OF
SUPERCONDUCTING SINGLE PHOTON
DETECTORS
Superconducting single photon detectors (SSPDs)
based on superconducting nanowires [35] have been used
for long-distance QKD experiments [43–47], due to their
ultra low dark count rate and timing jitter. However, the
need for cryogenic cooling to temperatures in the 2–4K
range has prevented them from being used in commercial
QKD systems.
In SSPDs, the nanowire is cooled to the superconduct-
ing state. Then, then the nanowire is biased with a cur-
rent Ib slightly lower than the critical current Ic. Be-
cause the wire is superconducing at Ib, there is no voltage
drop over the device. A photon incident on the nanowire
can create a normally-conducting hotspot, with the ef-
fect that the whole cross-section of the nanowire becomes
normally conducting. This increases the voltage over the
device. Afterwards, the cooling restores superconductiv-
ity in the nanowire, and the current increases back to the
bias current. This dead time is usually about 10 ns. The
biasing current Ib can be adjusted for a trade-oﬀ between
high detection eﬃciency and low dark count rate.
Already in the ﬁrst systematic investigation of the
detection eﬃciency of SSPDs [36], superlinear behavior
due to multiphoton absorption mechanisms was reported.
The superlinear behavior is wavelength dependent, and
is substantial at 1550 nm, which is the wavelength suit-
able for long-distance experiments. Figure 1 shows the
detection count data for 1550 nm extracted from Fig. 1
in Ref. [36], processed as detection probability (count
rate/trigger pulse rate), and plotted on a linear scale.
The SSPD was biased at Ib/Ic = 0.8. The superlinear
4behavior is suitable for eavesdropping in QKD: by in-
creasing the photon number, the detection probability
increases sharply. Using trigger pulses containing 106
photons per pulse, Eq. (4) predicts a QBER of less than
3%, and Eq. (6) predicts a transmittance T > 0.20 (as-
suming reasonable errors in extracting the numerical data
from the plot in Ref. [36]). Therefore, a QKD system us-
ing this SSPD would clearly be vulnerable to a detector
control attack.
Judging by the low detection probability at one pho-
ton per pulse for this SSPD, the QKD experiments would
use a higher bias current to get better sensitivity. Unfor-
tunately, few publications seems to report the detection
probabilities for pulses above the single photon level, es-
pecially for 1550 nm wavelength. The available literature
shows that SSPDs are less superlinear at shorter wave-
lengths [36], and also less superlinear at higher bias cur-
rents [48]. However, note that any superlinear detector
response must be handled in the security proof. There-
fore, the reported data on SSPDs [36, 48] clearly shows
that such a security proof is necessary for QKD systems
using SSPDs.
IV. SUPERLINEARITY OF GATED
APD-BASED DETECTORS
The gated APD-based detectors in the QKD system
Clavis2 by ID Quantique exhibit substantial superlinear
behavior far after the gate [27], or when blinded by bright
illumination [25, 26]. However, as pointed out before
[25, 31], the bright trigger pulses might be revealed by
an optical power meter at the entrance of Bob. Here, we
show that at the end of the gate, when the APD is biased
close to the breakdown voltage, the superlinear response
allows Eve to use very faint trigger pulses.
The detection probability during the gate was mea-
sured as follows: The gated InGaAs detectors in the
QKD system Clavis2 were run with factory settings, but
with the gating frequency reduced from 5MHz to 98 kHz.
The reduced frequency corresponds to the factory fre-
quency with a detection in every gate, and afterpulse
blocking (forced 10μs deadtime after detection events
to reduce dark counts) enabled. A short-pulsed laser
(see Appendix A for the pulse shape) was attenuated
to the appropriate mean photon number, and connected
directly to the ﬁber pigtail of each detector. Then, the
laser pulse was scanned through the gate in steps of 25 ps,
and the detection probability was recorded in each step.
The “quantum eﬃciency” η was measured by applying
a coherent state μ = 1, and solving η from Eq. (2). In
fact, the detector is slightly superlinear, but a coherent
state with μ = 1 [49] contains only a small fraction of
multiphoton pulses.
Once the quantum eﬃciency η is known, Eq. (2) can be
used to calculate the expected detection probability for a
coherent state with any mean photon number, assuming
that each photon is detected individually. Figure 2 shows
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FIG. 2. (Color online) The measured detection probability
for a coherent state with μ = 20, 40, 60 and 80, compared
to the expected detection probabilities predicted by Eq. (2).
Data points are 25 ps apart. Data for detector 0 is shown; de-
tector 1 behaved very similarly. When the mean photon num-
ber μ is increased, deviation between the expected detection
probabilities and the actual measured detection probabilities
increases, especially at the end of the gate. See also Fig. 3.
the detection probability of a coherent state for various
mean photon numbers predicted by Eq. (2), compared to
the actual detection probabilities measured in our exper-
iment.
The measurement data matches the expected detec-
tor response fairly well until the falling edge of the gate.
There, the measured detection probability becomes su-
perlinear. One possible explanation for this could be the
following: an avalanche, started by a photon in a local-
ized spot, laterally spreads over time to encompass the
entire junction area of the APD [50]. For detection events
before the falling edge of the gate, the avalanche has suf-
ﬁcient time to spread and therefore the current reaches
the same amplitude regardless of the number of pho-
tons absorbed in the APD [17]. At the end of the gate,
an avalanche from a single photon absorption does not
have suﬃcient time to spread to the entire junction area,
and therefore only causes a small current insuﬃcient of
crossing the comparator threshold. However, multiple
photon absorptions in diﬀerent spots across the junction
can start multiple small avalanches that together provide
enough current to cross the comparator threshold. This is
exactly the process exploited to make photon number re-
solving APD-based detectors [17]. Avalanche spreading
assisted by secondary photons re-emitted by the APD,
has already been used to explain avalanche development
[50, 51]. Similarly, multiple photon absorptions caused
by the multiphoton pulse could speed up the avalanche
development.
For the gated APD-based detectors, the superlinear
response can be exploited in a faint version of the after-
gate attack [27]. From Eve’s perspective, the original
after-gate attack has some drawbacks. The attack may
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Detection probability at the falling
edge of the gate (at the 4 ns point in Fig. 2). For μ < 40, the
shape of the actual detection probability is clearly superlinear,
in contrast to the nearly linear expected detection probability.
cause a substantial amount of errors in the key, because
the bright pulses cause afterpulses with a random bit
value. Furthermore, in principle, an optical power meter
can be used to catch Eve’s bright pulses. Also, remov-
ing gates randomly or as a part of afterpulse blocking
(to avoid excessive dark counts) would reveal the attack
because the trigger pulses would cause clicks regardless
of the presence of a gate. Then, detection events with-
out a gate applied would indicate the presence of the
eavesdropper. Similarly, it has been noted that in the
original after-gate attack could be countered by ignoring
detection events outside the gate [33], while for this faint
after-gate attack, the detections happen within the gate
[34].
As discussed in Sec. II, having a “high” detection prob-
ability for a given trigger pulse power, and a “low” detec-
tion probability for a 3 dB dimmer trigger pulse is suit-
able for Eve’s attack. Figure 3 shows the measured and
expected detection probability at a single point at the
falling edge of the gate. For less than 40 photons per
trigger pulse, the APDs clearly exhibit superlinear re-
sponse in favor of the eavesdropper.
The detection probability curve of the detector 0 (the
results are very similar for detector 1) was used when cal-
culating QBER and transmittance from Eqs. (4) and (6).
Figure 4 shows the resulting QBER and the correspond-
ing transmittance for various mean photon numbers in
the trigger pulse, when the trigger pulse timing was opti-
mized to minimize the QBER. The data indicates that a
faint after-gate attack could cause a QBER around 13%
with a transmittance of about 0.005, corresponding to
23 dB loss (for instance, for μ = 40, pf = 0.0054 and
ph = 0.00089 at the point 4.525 ns in Fig. 2). As dis-
cussed in Sec. II, this transmittance corresponds to Bob’s
detectors having 10% quantum eﬃciency, a line loss cor-
responding to about 50 km of ﬁber and another 3 dB loss
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FIG. 4. (Color online) The minimum QBER (solid curve)
caused by trigger pulses with various mean photon number
calculated from Eq. (4) and the corresponding transmittance
(dashed curve) calculated from Eq. (6). The data contains
some noise due to ﬂuctuations in applied power and/or ﬂuc-
tuations in the detection eﬃciency.
in Bob’s apparatus, which are reasonable values.
While most QKD systems do not accept QBER above
11% [5], there are post-processing protocols which ac-
cept QBER up to 20% [52]. Also note that the QBER
introduced by the attack may be signiﬁcantly lower with
yet shorter trigger pulses, since they would better resolve
the superlinear behavior at the falling edge of the gate.
A relatively wide pulse we’re using (Appendix A) arrives
at both linear and superlinear regions of the gate. There-
fore the superlinear response to it must be less than that
to a narrower pulse arriving only at the most superlinear
point in the gate.
The detectors in Clavis2 have been shown to exhibit
detection eﬃciency mismatch [20, 24, 53]. Therefore, in
the general case one would have to use diﬀerent timings
and/or diﬀerent powers depending on the bit value, to
avoid skewing the bit value distribution in the raw key.
Also, the superlinearity could be exploited in other at-
tacks, such as the faked-state attack [53, 54] and con-
ventional quantum attacks, to make them more eﬃcient
[15].
ID Quantique has been notiﬁed about this loophole
prior to the submission of the manuscript.
V. COUNTERMEASURES AND PROOF OF
SECURITY
The security of QKD systems with arbitrary non-
linearities in Bob’s system, and therefore superlinear
threshold detectors has already been proved [16]. With-
out source imperfections and with symmetry in the two
bases, the secret key rate is given by [16]
R ≥ −h(QBER) + η(1− h(QBER)), (7)
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Comparison of the detector control at-
tack and the bound from the security proof [16]. The region
to the left of the security bound curve (solid curve) allows
extraction a secure key. The region to the right of the de-
tector control attack curve (dashed curve) is clearly insecure,
because the attack presented in Sec. II can be applied. The
region between the curves should be assumed insecure.
where h( · ) is the binary entropy function, and η is the
smallest detection probability of a non-vacuum state. If
one further assumes that the probability to detect a mul-
tiphoton state is higher than a single photon, η is simply
the quantum eﬃciency (the probability to detect a single
photon).
As for the detector control attack, let us assume the
worst-case superlinearity, namely that a single photon is
detected with probability η, while a two-photon state is
detected with probability 1. Then, Eve can use trigger
pulses with two photons, and Eq. (4) simpliﬁes to
QBER =
2η − η2
2 + 2(2η − η2) . (8)
Figure 5 shows Eq. (7) for R = 0 and Eq. (8), com-
paring the “imperfect” detector control attack with the
bounds derived in the security proof [16]. It shows that a
suﬃciently high detection probability, and thus quantum
eﬃciency allows extraction of secret key regardless of any
superlinear detector response. For instance, if the QBER
is 5%, a quantum eﬃciency η > 0.4 allows the extraction
of secret key. Note that a high quantum eﬃciency does
not remove the superlinear eﬀect, but then the security
proof makes it possible to remove any knowledge Eve
could have obtained exploiting the superlinear response,
by (a large amount of) extra privacy ampliﬁcation [55].
For gated systems, one possible countermeasure might
be bit-mapped gating [56]. Then, the basis selector is
used to randomize all detection events outside the center
of the gate. Therefore, trigger pulses timed at the falling
edge of the gate would cause random detections and thus
a QBER of 50%. This would reveal Eve’s presence. How-
ever, the security analysis for bit-mapped gating requires
that each photon is detected individually during the tran-
sition of the basis selector. In practice, this means that
the detectors must have a detection probability given by
Eq. (2) in the center of the gate. Figure 2 shows that
this is nearly the case. It might be possible to detect
each photon completely individually in the middle of the
gate by expanding the gate, or by shaping the applied
electrical gate appropriately.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this paper we have analyzed the security of QKD
systems using superlinear threshold detectors. The de-
tector control attack previously reported [25] is based on
very superlinear detection probability: when the ampli-
tude of the trigger pulses is increased, the detection prob-
ability sharply increases from 0 to 100%. This allows
eavesdropping the full key without causing any errors,
the only side eﬀect is 3 dB total loss. Here, the detector
control attack is generalized to moderately superlinear
detectors by accepting a limited amount of errors in the
key, and/or accepting a higher loss. Note that in practice,
a total loss of about 20 dB may be tolerable, as discussed
in Sec. II.
Nanowire SSPDs [35] have been reported to have su-
perlinear detection probability [36]. We have shown
that by carefully selecting the trigger pulse amplitude,
an eavesdropper would introduce a QBER of less than
3% when attacking the SSPD in Ref. [36]. The total
loss caused by the eavesdropping would be less than
6 dB. Therefore, a QKD system using this detector would
clearly be insecure.
Figures 2 and 3 show that the response of the APD-
based gated detector is superlinear at the falling edge of
the gate. Therefore, it is possible to attack the gated
detectors with faint trigger pulses, with less than 120
photons per pulse. From the measurements, the attack
would cause a QBER of about 13% and about 23 dB loss.
Most QKD systems do not accept a QBER above 11%
[5], but there are post-processing protocols allowing a
QBER up to 20% [52]. Furthermore, we suspect that
both the QBER and the loss could be reduced by using
shorter trigger pulses [57]. Finally, even if the attack is
not directly applicable to some QKD systems due to the
QBER and/or loss threshold, the superlinear response
of the APD-based detector shows that ordinary security
proofs no longer apply to these systems. Therefore, these
systems must use advanced security proofs to bound and
remove Eve’s partial knowledge from the moderate su-
perlinear response.
The faint after-gate attack does not suﬀer from the lim-
itations of the original after-gate attack [27]. In the faint
after-gate attack, the afterpulsing is negligible. Further-
more, with less than 120 photons per pulse, the trigger
pulses should be nearly impossible to catch with an opti-
cal power meter at the entrance of Bob. Also, removing
gates randomly or due to after-pulse blocking will not
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Pulse shape of the id300 short-pulsed
laser, measured with a 45GHz optical probe on a 12.5GHz
sampling oscilloscope at a pulse repetition rate of 100 kHz.
expose the attack [27] since such trigger pulse will not
cause a click unless there is a gate present. Furthermore,
the timing of the trigger pulse detection will be very sim-
ilar to a normal detection inside the gate, and therefore
diﬃcult to discard based on timing [33].
If the detectors have an increasing detection proba-
bility for increasing photon number, a suﬃciently high
quantum eﬃciency makes it possible to remove Eve’s
knowledge using privacy ampliﬁcation [55]. For gated
APD-based detectors, bit-mapped gating [56] can be used
if each photon is detected individually in the center of the
gate.
Quantum key distribution has been proven secure for
all future, so currently the challenge is to make a secure
implementation. We believe that weeding out loopholes
caused by the implementation is a necessary step towards
achieving practical secure QKD, and that this work is
crucial because it fully exposes the nature of the detector
control attack.
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Appendix A: Pulse shape of id300
Figure 6 shows the pulse shape of the id300 short-
pulsed laser [58]. This is the particular laser sample used
in this experiment; other samples of this laser model may
have a diﬀerent pulse shape.
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We hack a commercial actively-quenched avalanche single-photon detector (PerkinElmer SPCM-
AQR) commonly used for quantum cryptography. This study complements the recent hacking of
passively-quenched and gated detectors by the same method, and thus demonstrates its generality.
Bright illumination is used to blind the detector, such that it exits single-photon detection mode
and instead operates as a mere classical photodiode. In this regime, the detector clicks controllably
if a bright pulse is applied above a classical sensitivity threshold, allowing for an attack on quantum
cryptography that eavesdrops the full secret key. The SPCM-AQR detector model exhibits three
redundant blinding mechanisms: (1) overload of an opamp in the bias control circuit, (2) thermal
blinding of the APD itself, and (3) overload of the DC/DC converter biasing the APD. This conﬁrms
that multiple loopholes may be left open if one does not examine closely non-idealities in components
used for quantum cryptography implementations. To reach the security envisioned by theoretical
proofs, this practice must change.
Over the past twenty years, quantum key distribution
(QKD) has progressed from a tabletop demonstration to
commercially available systems [1], with secure key ex-
change demonstrated up to 144 km in free-space [2] and
250 km in optical ﬁbers [3]. Security of these cryptosys-
tems is based on the impossibility, in principle, to reliably
copy an a priori unknown quantum state, as accounted
for by the no-cloning theorem [4]. However, security also
relies on the assumption that the optical and electro-
optical devices which are part of quantum cryptosystems
do not deviate from model assumptions made to establish
security proofs [5–11].
Recently, it has been demonstrated that both commer-
cial QKD systems on the market can be fully cracked
[12–14]. A tailored bright illumination was employed
to remote-control gated avalanche photodiodes (APDs)
used to detect single photons in these QKD systems.
In another work, a full eavesdropper has been imple-
mented on a research system using passively-quenched
APDs [15]. The overall purpose of the work reﬂected in
this paper is now to establish the generality of this attack,
by extending its validity to QKD systems employing the
most commonly used model of actively-quenched APD,
PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR detector module [16]. More-
over, we wish to illustrate here that the principle of our
attack can be exploited in numerous ways, leading in
practice to several control modes of the APDs (three in
the case of the detector tested in this paper). We now
explain brieﬂy the general scheme of attack, before em-
barking on particularities of this detector model.
From eavesdropper’s point of view, the intercept-resend
attack provides a general framework to exploit unac-
counted non-idealities or operating modes of components.
In this attack, we assume that the eavesdropper Eve
owns an exact replica of receiver Bob’s detection appara-
tus, with which she intercepts and measures the state of
each qubit sent by Alice. To successfully eavesdrop, Eve
must resend faked states [21] that will force her detec-
tion results onto Bob’s in a transparent way. Ideally, the
faked state should make the target detector click control-
lably (with unity probability and near zero time-jitter)
while keeping any other detector blind (no click). In the
Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) [22] and similar four-state
protocols, Bob must detect two bit values in two bases,
which can be implemented with two pairs of detectors.
One pair detects bit values “0” and “1”, and a second
pair (not necessary with active basis choice) detects in
the conjugate measurement basis, which is randomly se-
lected prior to detection of each qubit in order to guar-
antee security against eavesdropping. Thus in 50% of
the cases, the qubit resent by Eve will be measured by
Bob in the conjugate basis, resulting in a random out-
come. Similarly, if the photonic qubit is replaced by a
classical pulse of peak power Pth, an incompatible choice
of basis will result in arrival of pulses of power Pth/2
at both detectors. Let us now assume that under some
conditions, detectors remain blind at power Pth/2 and
click controllably at threshold power Pth. With the lat-
ter pulse, Eve can selectively address the target detector
without causing a click in the conjugate basis. This is il-
lustrated in Fig. 1 in the case of a QKD system running a
four-state protocol with polarization coding and passive
choice of basis at Bob’s side. After Bob reveals in which
bit slots he has registered detections, Eve will have the
same key bit sequence as Bob. Eve thus can extract the
ﬁnal secret key by listening to the classical public com-
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2Pth
Pth/2
Pth/2
Pth
0
HWP
PBS
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Bob′Alice Faked-state
generator
Blinding
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A
D
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V
FIG. 1. (Color online) Intercept-resend (faked-state) attack Eve could launch against a QKD system which runs a four-state
protocol with polarization coding and passive choice of basis [17–20]. In the example, Eve targets the detector recording
vertically polarized qubits in the horizontal/vertical (H/V) basis. We assume here that detectors click controllably when
illuminated by an optical pulse with peak power ≥ Pth, and that they are blind (or kept blind) at power ≤ Pth/2 (characteristics
of the ‘blinding generator’ potentially needed to bring detectors in this working mode will be described later). To address the
target detector, Eve sends a faked state with V polarization and power 2Pth, thus the V detector receives power Pth after
basis choice, and clicks. The detectors recording polarized qubits in the conjugate (45◦-rotated, D/A) basis each receive a
pulse of power Pth/2, and thus remain blinded. In the diagram: BS, 50:50% beamsplitter; PBS, polarizing beamsplitter; HWP,
half-wave plate rotated 22.5◦.
munication between Alice and Bob and doing the same
post-processing operations as Bob [12, 15]. Thus, provid-
ing that the above assumption of the detector threshold
behavior is satisﬁed, QKD systems using such detectors
are vulnerable.
Let us now explain how this assumption can be ful-
ﬁlled. Most QKD systems today use avalanche pho-
todiodes (APDs) to detect single photons [23]. (The
two notable exceptions are continuous-variable QKD sys-
tems [24–28] and those using superconducting detectors
[3, 29, 30].) For single-photon sensitivity, APDs are oper-
ated in so-called Geiger-mode, i.e., they are biased above
the breakdown voltage so that an absorbed photon trig-
gers an avalanche. (In case of gated-mode operation, the
APD is biased above breakdown only during the gate
time to limit noise [12, 23].) The avalanche current is
sensed by a comparator before the avalanche is quenched
to reset the diode. Quenching is achieved by lowering
(passively or actively) the bias voltage below breakdown.
In the latter condition, however, the APD no longer be-
haves as a single-photon detector but as a classical lin-
ear photodiode generating photocurrent proportional to
the optical illumination. It is thus insensitive to single
photons, but also to noise sources (dark counts, after-
pulses). However, it is still possible to make the APD
click controllably since in this linear mode, the com-
parator threshold translates to a classical optical power
threshold Pth. Providing the threshold is well-deﬁned, no
click will ever occur at power Pth/2, and Eve has at her
disposal a very general attack for breaking the security
of most APD-based QKD systems.
In the case of the two recently-hacked commercial
QKD systems operating at telecom wavelengths [12],
transition from Geiger to linear mode was achieved by
using continuous-wave (c.w.) bright illumination to re-
duce APD bias voltage below breakdown. Equivalently,
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Oscillogram at detector output (lower
trace) illuminated by bright optical pulses (upper trace) made
of control pulses (808 nm, 8mW, 50 ns wide, 800 kHz repeti-
tion rate) to blind the detector, and of weaker trigger pulses
(8 ns wide). The trigger pulses make the detector click with
unity probability and sub-nanosecond time jitter only above
a certain power threshold. In the example, detector always
clicks at Pth = 2.88mW peak power trigger pulses, never
clicks at ≤2.49mW.
raising the breakdown voltage above the ﬁxed bias volt-
age by heating the APDs also led to blinding and control
of the detectors [14].
In this paper, we illustrate further the generality of
the attack by taking full control of a commercial detec-
tor model commonly used for QKD in the visible/near
infrared range (PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR module [16]).
In this case, we achieved transition to linear mode by ap-
plying not c.w. but instead bright pulsed illumination at
the level of less than 10mW at ≥70 kHz repetition rate.
Between two pulses, the detector is blind to single pho-
tons, dark counts and afterpulses, and clicks controllably
if a classical pulse ≥Pth is applied, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
3Fig. 3(a) shows at which optical pulse frequencies
blinding of the detector is achieved, and the correspond-
ing bias voltage at the APD. We identiﬁed three distinct
mechanisms responsible for blinding. Each mechanism is
activated in a diﬀerent range of control pulse frequencies,
as discussed below.
The ﬁrst blinding mechanism corresponds to transition
from Geiger to linear mode by lowering the APD bias
voltage below breakdown. As the frequency of optical
pulses increases, control ﬁrst appears when the APD bias
voltage drops by 12–15V (Fig. 3(a)). To understand why
it drops, let’s consider the detector electrical circuit de-
picted in Fig. 4. When the APD is illuminated by a bright
optical pulse, the current through it is not interrupted by
the detection and quenching circuit (DQC) and is much
larger than during an ordinary single-photon avalanche.
A current limiting circuit (CLC) kicks in and limits the
current pulse to about 10mA. This current is drawn
from the capacitor C9, whose other end is connected to
the output of a low-power opamp U7.1. This opamp has
a speciﬁed maximum load current signiﬁcantly smaller
than 10mA. It gets overloaded by the current pulses,
and unexpectedly develops a large static voltage oﬀset
between its inputs (see Fig. 3(b), middle chart). This
negative oﬀset eﬀectively adds to the pre-set reference
voltage at the opamp non-inverting input, and the feed-
back loop lowers the APD bias voltage proportionally.
At higher control pulse frequencies ∼1MHz, however,
the disrupted opamp gets back into normal operation.
At these frequencies, the duty cycle of the current pulses
at the opamp output gets closer to 1/2, thus its sourc-
ing peak current decreases while its sinking peak current
grows; they become close in magnitude and now bet-
ter suit opamp load capability. As a result, the APD
bias is raised back to the nominal value. Yet, the de-
tector remains blind. This occurs because the APD pro-
duces more heat through electrical power dissipated in it,
as the frequency of control pulses increases. In normal
operation, the APD is cooled to −7 ◦C with a thermo-
electric cooler (TEC). The TEC heat removal capability
and maximum current are inherently limited. As can be
seen in the lower chart in Fig. 3(b), after a temperature
controller reaches the maximum TEC current, the APD
temperature quickly rises. The raised APD temperature
in turn raises its breakdown voltage (by about 1.2V/◦C)
above the bias voltage, which also leads to blinding. This
thermal blinding behavior is the same as previously re-
ported for gated detectors in the commercial QKD sys-
tem Clavis2 (Fig. 5).
At even higher pulse frequencies, the bias voltage drops
again below breakdown, while the detector is still under
control. This is due to load capacity exhaustion of the
high-voltage DC/DC converter U6 biasing the APD.
Above, we have demonstrated three distinct blinding
modes in the SPCM-AQR detector model [16]. Some
QKD experiments [20] use a four-channel version of this
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Detector blinding: (a) APD bias volt-
age vs. frequency and peak optical power Pcontrol of rectan-
gular 50 ns wide input optical pulses. Normal bias voltage at
low count rate for this detector sample is 410V (the other
detector sample we tested had bias voltage of 350V). Filled
symbols denote pulse parameters at which the detector got
completely blind between the control pulses. (b) Parameters
in the circuit vs. frequency of optical pulses with peak power
Pcontrol = 8mW. Behavior of these parameters reveals three
blinding mechanisms summarized over the top of the chart.
The middle chart shows static voltage diﬀerence between the
opamp inputs. The lower chart shows current of the ther-
moelectric cooler (TEC) and the temperature of the APD as
measured by a thermistor mounted nearby at the cold plate
of the TEC.
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FIG. 4. Simpliﬁed reverse-engineered circuit diagram of PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR module. In normal operation, the cathode
of the APD is biased at a constant high voltage, stabilized by a feedback loop containing an opamp U7.1 (Texas Instruments
TLC2262), ﬁeld-eﬀect transistor Q11 and high-voltage DC/DC converter module U6 (EMCO custom model no. 9546). The
anode of the APD is connected to a detection and quenching circuit (DQC). The DQC senses charge ﬂowing through the APD
during the avalanche, then brieﬂy connects the APD anode to +30V to lower the voltage across the APD below breakdown
and quench the avalanche. The APD anode voltage is subsequently reset to 0V, and the detector becomes ready for the next
avalanche. (Note: the circuit diagram has been greatly simpliﬁed for the paper; do not use this ﬁgure for attempting detector
repair or modiﬁcation.)
0 2 4 6 8
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
PerkinElmer SPCM−AQR
1mW blinding pulse frequency, MHz
I T
E
C
,
A
−10
0
10
20
30
40
T
h
e
rm
is
to
r
te
m
p
e
ra
tu
re
,
 C
TEC current
Thermistor/cold plate temperature
0 200 400 600 800
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Total heat dissipation in the APDs, mW
ID Quantique Clavis2
I T
E
C
,
A
−50
−45
−40
−35
−30
−25
C
o
ld
p
la
te
 t
e
m
p
e
ra
tu
re
,
C
(a) (b)
FIG. 5. (Color online) Comparison of thermal blinding char-
acteristics of the PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR detector to the
ones reported for ID Quantique’s Clavis2 commercial QKD
system [14]. Filled symbols denote regime in which the de-
tector got completely blind between the control pulses.
detector module, PerkinElmer SPCM-AQ4C [31]. Our
preliminary analysis indicates that it has a diﬀerent bias
control circuit that is not susceptible to the ﬁrst blinding
mechanism (opamp overload). However, it is likely sus-
ceptible to both thermal blinding and DC/DC converter
overload, because it uses the same APD package and the
same model of DC/DC converter.
The only side eﬀect that betrays our attack is the si-
multaneous arrival at all detectors of the blinding pulses
with a rate of at least 70 kHz. In some QKD systems,
these may be ignored by Bob as falling outside his post-
processing gating time window. In free-space systems
operating in daylight [18, 19], these pulses may be mis-
taken by Bob for normal background count rates. The
control pulses can be irregularly spaced to make them
look more like background counts. We remark that the
blinded state has some inertia (especially in the case of
thermal blinding [14]) that should in principle allow Eve
to apply the blinding pulses in bursts interleaved with
quiet periods when only the trigger pulses are applied.
We also note that both APDs used in the present study
died suddenly after prolonged extensive testing, which
may indicate that at least some of these control regimes
reduce their lifetime.
Countermeasures for all detectors considered may in-
clude monitoring the incoming optical power, as well as
monitoring the APD bias voltage, current and temper-
ature. Single-photon sensitivity of Bob’s APDs can be
tested at random times by a calibrated light source placed
inside Bob. Although development of countermeasures
has begun [12, 32], no deﬁnite countermeasure has been
ﬁnalized and tested by hacking at this time [33]. The
most frequently proposed countermeasure is an optical
power meter at Bob’s entrance. Currently this should
not be considered a suﬃcient countermeasure: it is un-
clear how to select the power meter threshold which must
be derived from a security proof with a suﬃciently gen-
eral detector model.
In view of this study, complemented by the ones made
on other APD models [12–15], we estimate that most of
the QKD systems existing today are potentially vulner-
5able to our attack, the only ‘detector-dependent’ aspect
here being the type of bright illumination (none, c.w., or
pulsed) required to bring a particular APD into the lin-
ear regime. Our work emphasizes the need to investigate
thoroughly vulnerabilities originating from unaccounted
physical non-idealities of QKD components.
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We experimentally demonstrate that a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector is deter-
ministically controllable by bright illumination. We found that bright light can temporarily make
a large fraction of the nanowire length normally-conductive, can extend deadtime after a normal
photon detection, and can cause a hotspot formation during the deadtime with a highly nonlinear
sensitivity. In result, although based on diﬀerent physics, the superconducting detector turns out
to be controllable by virtually the same techniques as avalanche photodiode detectors. As demon-
strated earlier, when such detectors are used in a quantum key distribution system, this allows
an eavesdropper to launch a detector control attack to capture the full secret key without being
revealed by errors in the key.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties,
Alice and Bob, to generate a secret random key at a dis-
tance [1–4]. The key is protected by quantum mechanics:
an eavesdropper Eve must disturb the signals between
Alice and Bob, and therefore reveal her presence. QKD
using perfect devices has been proven secure [5, 6].
Implementations of QKD have to use components
available with current technology, which are usually im-
perfect. While there are numerous security proofs con-
sidering more realistic devices [7–15], these proofs assume
that the imperfections are quantiﬁed in terms of certain
source and detector parameters. Due to the diﬃculty of
characterizing or upper bounding these parameters owing
to limitations of these security proofs, it is common to use
the more established security proofs for ideal systems also
in practical implementations. With actual devices devi-
ating from the ideal models, numerous security loopholes
have therefore been identiﬁed [16–24], and in some cases
exploited in eavesdropping experiments without [25, 26]
and with [27, 28] secret key extraction by Eve. Finding
and eliminating loopholes in implementations is crucial
to obtain provable practical security.
As an example, several recent attacks have been based
on bright-light control of avalanche photodiodes (APDs)
[22, 23, 27–33]. Superconducting nanowire single-photon
detectors (SSPDs) studied in this paper are based on dif-
ferent physics. However, as we will see, the principles of
attacks on QKD systems using SSPDs are broadly simi-
lar to attacks on QKD systems using APDs: Eve uses a
faked-state attack [34], can blind the detectors [22, 23],
make them click with a classical threshold using a bright
∗ lars.lydersen@iet.ntnu.no
† makarov@vad1.com
pulse [23] or let one detector temporarily recover from
blinding [22]; also, detector’s response to multiphoton
pulses can be superlinear [33]. We refer to these princi-
ples through the paper.
Although SSPDs have been used in several QKD ex-
periments [35–39], this detector technology is still in its
infancy. No automated unattended operation of sys-
tems containing SSPDs has been reported. Technical as-
pects of SSPD operation, such as handling the latching
behavior and converting the nanowire analog response
into a digital detection signal, have only been studied
in the normal single-photon counting regime. So far,
no attempt has been reported to consider SSPD’s non-
idealities in order to attack a QKD system. This study
thus serves as an early warning. Although we have done
our experiments on only one detector sample, we show
that control by bright light can be achieved through two
separate mechanisms, and may thus be applicable to dif-
ferent detector electronics designs [40].
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we de-
scribe the SSPD under test. Sections III and IV deal with
the SSPD in the latched and non-latched states; in each
section we present the physics behind detector’s reaction
to bright-light illumination, then how it can be exploited
to attack QKD. We discuss our ﬁndings and conclude in
Sec. V.
II. DETECTOR DESIGN AND OPERATION
We performed our tests on an SSPD of a fairly stan-
dard conﬁguration, which has been characterized in pre-
vious publications [41–43]. The SSPD chip was manu-
factured at the State Pedagogical University, Moscow,
and consists of a 4 nm thick, 120 nm wide NbN nanowire
on sapphire substrate, laid out in a 10 × 10μm mean-
der pattern with 60% ﬁlling ratio. The chip is pack-
aged and installed in a ∼ 1m long dipstick assembly (see
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Detector circuit. The SSPD is biased from a battery-powered direct current (DC) source, an equivalent
circuit diagram of which is shown. Pulses produced by the SSPD travel through ∼ 1m coaxial cable, bias tee (0.1–6000MHz,
Mini-Circuits ZFBT-6GW+), radio-frequency (RF) ampliﬁer (voltage gain 100, 0.1–1500MHz, Phillips Scientiﬁc 6954-S-100),
∼ 1.5m coaxial cable, and RF splitter (Mini-Circuits ZN2PD-9G-S+), to the counter and oscilloscope. Inside the oscilloscope
box: normal single-photon response after the RF ampliﬁer and splitter, shown as a single-shot trace with 2GHz bandwidth
(solid line) and averaged over many pulses (dashed line). Features appearing 12 ns after the leading edge are attributed to
reﬂections due to impedance mismatch in the RF circuits.
Ref. [42] for details), lowered into a Dewar ﬂask. During
detector operation, the chip is immersed into liquid he-
lium at 4.2K. It is optically accessible through a single-
mode ﬁbre. The chip is connected to a room-temperature
bias tee and wideband radio-frequency (RF) ampliﬁer via
a 50Ω coaxial cable (Fig. 1). A battery-powered cur-
rent source biases the superconducting nanowire with
Ib = 22.5μA which is ≈ 0.85 of its critical current Ic
(this Ib value provides the highest ratio of photon de-
tection probability at 1550 nm to dark count rate, for
this particular SSPD sample). The signal from the out-
put of the RF ampliﬁer is split to a 16GHz single-shot
oscilloscope (Tektronix DSA 71604) and a counter (Stan-
ford Research Systems SR400). Detection eﬃciency for
single photons at 1550 nm was 2.2 × 10−5 and the dark
count rate was < 1Hz. The detector sensitivity was
polarization-dependent; in all experiments in this paper
polarization was aligned to maximize the detection eﬃ-
ciency, using a ﬁber polarization controller.
One aspect of detector operation is how the analog
pulse produced by a transient hotspot (see inset in Fig. 1)
is converted into a detection event and assigned a partic-
ular timing. The analog pulse is well-deﬁned, its magni-
tude and shape being nearly constant from one photon
detection to another. Therefore almost any discrimina-
tor design would work for single-photon detection, and its
implementation details (bandwidth, hysteresis, whether
it is a threshold discriminator or a constant-fraction dis-
criminator, etc.) are often omitted in the literature on
SSPDs. However these details become more important
for demonstration of detector control by bright light. We
assume in this study that the analog pulse is sensed by a
high-speed voltage comparator, and the detection event
timing is registered by pulse’s leading edge crossing a pre-
set comparator threshold. Indeed this is how our SR400
counter operates: it has an adjustable threshold set with
0.2mV resolution. In our setup, the counter works cor-
rectly (registering one count per one single-photon ana-
log pulse) in a wide range of threshold settings, +4.4 to
+37mV. A detail not mentioned in the literature is what
threshold level the comparator should be set at, within
this working range. While the setting may not aﬀect nor-
mal detector operation, only a part of this voltage range
is reachable under bright-light control described in the
following section.
Another interesting aspect of detector operation is
latching. In single-photon detection regime, the hotspot
after formation shrinks quickly and the nanowire returns
to the superconducting state [44]. However the detec-
tor also has a stable latched state, when a larger self-
heating hotspot persists indeﬁnitely, at a steady current
Ilatched which is a fraction of Ib, and a large voltage
across the SSPD. The detector is blind to single pho-
tons and does not produce dark counts in this regime. A
properly designed SSPD does not enter the latched state
after a single-photon detection [44, 45]. However it can
still latch after an electromagnetic interference (which in
our experiment was easily caused by switching on and
oﬀ lights and other mains-powered electrical equipment
in the same building). Latching also occurs after a brief
bright illumination: as little as 50 nW, 5ms long single
light pulse at 1550 nm reliably latches the device. In-
creasing the bias current Ib very close to Ic also leads to
latching. The only way to return the detector from the
latched state into the normal regime is to temporarily
reduce Ib below Ilatched. In our experiment, and suppos-
3edly in most other experiments reported in the literature,
this was performed manually.
III. DETECTOR CONTROL IN LATCHED
STATE
A. Physics
In the latched state, the Joule heat generated in the
normally-conductive fraction of the nanowire exactly bal-
ances the cooling. The length of the normally-conductive
fraction changes with the voltage applied across the
SSPD. We investigated this by replacing the battery-
powered bias source with an external voltage source. In
our experiment, Ilatched was roughly 7μA regardless of
the voltage across the device, up to 10V (we did not
apply higher voltages to reduce a chance of electrical
breakdown). At 10V, the nanowire resistance was thus
∼ 1.4MΩ. Above the superconducting transition tem-
perature the resistance of the entire device is approxi-
mately constant, and is ≈ 2.3MΩ [43]. Therefore we
concluded that slightly over half its length was normally-
conductive at 10V. During the experiment, Ilatched
would randomly assume a value in the 6 to 8μA range,
which could correspond to the normally-conductive re-
gion shifting and “locking” to the local variations of
nanowire thermal characteristics along its length.
Next, we investigated what happened when bright
continuous-wave (CW) light was applied in the latched
state. Under illumination, current I through the de-
vice dropped, with a diﬀerent sensitivity at diﬀerent
voltages (Fig. 2(a)). When recalculated into device re-
sistance (Fig. 2(b)), we see that at low source volt-
ages the resistance increased by about the same amount
(350–400 kΩ per 20mW), while at 10V the increase was
smaller (∼110 kΩ). Note that depending on optical cou-
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Response to continuous-wave (CW)
light in the latched state. (a) Current I through the SSPD
vs. optical power at 1550 nm, at diﬀerent voltages V applied
across the SSPD. (b) SSPD resistance R = V/I .
pling, illumination may be unevenly distributed along the
nanowire.
Implementation and maximum voltage of the bias
source is yet another detail that varies between setups
and is rarely speciﬁed in the literature. In our detector
it is implemented as a ≈ 0.1V voltage source in series
with ≈ 4.5 kΩ resistor (see Fig. 1), with both voltage
and resistance being trimmable in a small range to set
precise Ib in the normal (non-latched) regime. When the
SSPD resistance is zero, this bias circuit acts as a current
source. However, in the latched state the SSPD resis-
tance becomes larger than the circuit output impedance,
thus it acts as a voltage source. Measurements done with
this battery-powered bias circuit closely match the 0.1V
curve in Fig. 2.
B. Exploit
The eavesdropper Eve can latch the device by applying
a single 5ms long light pulse at 1550 nm. Latching occurs
at any pulse power > 50 nW.
In the latched state, the SSPD is insensitive to single
photons and produces no dark counts (similarly to blind-
ing of APDs [22, 23]). However, the nanowire’s response
to bright illumination detailed in Sec. III A also holds on a
nanosecond scale, and can be used to produce an electri-
cal pulse after the RF ampliﬁer and splitter (Fig. 3) [46].
The response is caused by a larger piece of the nanowire
becoming normally conductive during the bright illumi-
nation, therefore causing an abrupt change in the resis-
tance, just as a single photon causes an abrupt change in
the resistance in the normal operating regime. Note that
the electrical response to a bright trigger pulse saturates
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Electrical response in the latched state
to the 10 ns, 1550 nm optical trigger pulse. All traces are
averaged over 500 samples. The trigger pulse saturates at an
electrical response of about 20mV (see inset), compared to
the normal detection event which reaches peak amplitude of
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Detection probability of the 10 ns trig-
ger pulse, depending on the comparator threshold. The prob-
abilities were obtained by simulating a bandwidth-limited
ideal comparator, requiring that the wideband signal recorded
by the oscilloscope spent at least 3 ns above the threshold level
to register a click. With SR400, jitter of comparator click in
response to the bright pulse was ∼ 0.5 ns full width at half
maximum (FWHM).
at ∼ 20mV when optical power > 15mW is applied, be-
cause at this power the current through the nanowire is
reduced to almost zero.
Since this analog electrical pulse is sensed by a com-
parator, the detector has a highly superlinear detection
probability of bright pulses [33]. The actual detection
probability depends strongly on the comparator thresh-
old (Fig. 4). With the comparator threshold in the 5–
20mV range, the detection probability is highly superlin-
ear and increases quickly from negligible to a substantial
value for a 3 dB increase in the optical power. A suf-
ﬁcient condition for a detector control attack is a large
ratio of detection probabilities over a 3 dB change in the
trigger pulse power [23, 33] (or 6 dB change in the trig-
ger pulse power for distributed-phase-reference protocols
[29]). Then Eve can intercept the quantum states from
Alice, and resend bright trigger pulses corresponding to
her detection to Bob [23, 33]. If Eve used a measurement
basis not matching Bob’s, she wants her pulse to remain
undetected. Indeed when the pulse is measured by Bob
in a diﬀerent basis, it will be split to both detectors, cor-
responding to 3 dB reduction in its power, and almost
never cause a click. Due to the large diﬀerence in detec-
tion probability for 3 dB change in the trigger pulse am-
plitude, a detector control attack would cause negligible
errors and not expose eavesdropping, for the comparator
threshold settings  20mV. Above ∼ 20mV the trigger
pulses stop causing clicks at all, and this attack method
no longer works. However, it may be possible to reach
higher threshold settings using a diﬀerent attack method
described in the next section.
IV. DETECTOR CONTROL VIA DEADTIME
EXTENSION
A. Physics
In this section we consider a non-latched, single-photon
sensitive normally operating detector. The attack is
based on detector’s ability to form a hotspot in response
to bright light when the current I through the SSPD
is low. In addition, the hotspot formation probabil-
ity at a low current is strongly superlinear. It is well-
known that at relatively low values of the bias current
Ib, multiphoton processes dominate the detector sensi-
tivity [33, 47, 48]. Here we demonstrate that this eﬀect
becomes extreme during the normal recovery time after
a photon detection.
In normal detector operation, after the hotspot for-
mation, I drops to a fraction of Ib [44]. Then, I expo-
nentially recovers to Ib at a slow rate, owing to a rel-
atively large kinetic inductance of the superconducting
nanowire (see dashed trace in Fig. 5). During the initial
part of this recovery, the SSPD remains insensitive to
single photons, but it can react to a bright illumination
by forming another hotspot, with a higher illumination
power being able to form a hotspot earlier in the recov-
ery. This is illustrated in Fig. 5, which shows electrical
response to a 48 ns long bright pulse. At 0.25mW pulse
power, the single-shot trace clearly shows that the SSPD
forms a hotspot on average every 6 ns. At 0.5mW, the
period reduces to ∼ 2.7 ns. At higher optical powers sep-
arate hotspot formations are no longer distinguishable,
but the whole electrical pulse gets higher, indicating a
lower average current through the nanowire during the
optical pulse. Thus, during a suﬃciently bright optical
pulse, the electrical signal will stay above the comparator
threshold. This allows Eve to extend the detector dead-
time after the ﬁrst photon detection, up to 500 ns with
this detector setup, without causing latching.
We further quantify the hotspot formation probability
during the recovery, by applying a 53 ps FWHM trigger
pulse after the closing edge of the 48 ns, 2.5mW pulse.
(The recovery after the bright pulse should be similar to
the recovery after a single-photon detection, however we
focus on the former for reasons that will become apparent
in the next subsection.) As far as we can see, response to
this trigger pulse is probabilistic and binary: the hotspot
either forms, or it does not (Fig. 6). In the former case
the recovery resets and starts anew from a certain cur-
rent value, in the latter case the recovery continues undis-
turbed. The probability that the trigger pulse causes a
hotspot is plotted in Fig. 7. The measurement shows that
the detection probability is reduced for at least 40 ns. It
also shows that the detector is highly superlinear in at
least the ﬁrst 10 ns. During this time, a hotspot can be
formed with unity probability using a suﬃciently high-
energy trigger pulse (∼ 150 fJ), while the same trigger
pulse attenuated by 20 dB (i.e., 100 times lower pulse
energy) is very unlikely to cause a hotspot formation.
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Electrical response in the non-latched state to the 48 ns, 1550 nm optical pulse. Single-shot traces with
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Accumulated 30,000 oscilloscope traces
of the electrical response to the trigger pulse during the re-
covery from a 48 ns, 2.5mW rectangular optical pulse. The
trigger is (a) 8 ns into the recovery, 25 fJ energy, (b) 3 ns into
the recovery, 78 fJ energy. In both cases the trigger pulse
causes hotspot formation with roughly 50% probability, and
resets the voltage to the same level. All oscillograms at trigger
pulse delays ≥ 2 ns show the same behavior.
B. Exploit
Extendability of SSPD’s deadtime can be exploited in
the earlier described attack [22] on the Bennett-Brassard
1984 (BB84) and similar protocols. We remark that the
superlinearity is not required for this attack, but is help-
ful and makes it easier. Here we propose a version of
this attack for diﬀerential-phase-shift QKD (DPS-QKD)
systems [36, 49]. We explain the key component of the at-
tack: how Eve can control Bob’s SSPDs in the DPS-QKD
system. Bob consists of an unbalanced Mach-Zehnder in-
terferometer, and two detectors D0 and D1 (Fig. 8(a)).
10−17 10−16 10−15 10−14 10−13
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Trigger pulse energy, J
H
ot
sp
ot
 fo
rm
at
io
n 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
 
 
3 ns
4 ns
5 ns
6 ns
8 ns
10 ns
13 ns
18 ns
25 ns
40 ns
70 ns
500 ns
FIG. 7. (Color online) Hotspot formation probability vs. en-
ergy of a 53 ps wide trigger pulse, for diﬀerent trigger pulse
delays after the closing edge of a 48 ns, 2.5mW rectangular
optical pulse (both pulses at 1550 nm). The probabilities were
extracted from recorded oscillograms similar to those shown
in Fig. 6. 10−13 J corresponds to 780,000 photons contained
in the trigger pulse.
We assume that a properly implemented Bob will not ac-
cept clicks from both detectors for the duration of recov-
ery after a click in one of the detectors, in order to avoid
the detector deadtime and eﬃciency mismatch loopholes
[18, 28]. As illustrated above, the expected recovery is
∼ 40 ns long. Eve begins by applying to both detectors
a laser pulse longer than the recovery time (Fig. 8(b)),
with phase ϕ changing in steps along the pulse such that
its power splits equally to the two detectors. This pulse
produces a double click at the beginning, which however
can be timed to fall in between the bit slots and be dis-
carded by Bob. Immediately after this long pulse, Eve
applies a sequence of short pulses. Their phases are cho-
sen to steer them primarily to one of the two detectors
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FIG. 8. (Color online) Proposed faked-state attack on the DPS-QKD system. (a) Bob’s optical scheme. Δt is the time delay
between the two interferometer arms. (b) Diagram showing Eve’s optical output, how her light splits between the two Bob’s
detectors, and how the electrical signals in each detector react to it.
(similarly to [29, 50]) and form hotspots in that detec-
tor only, keeping the comparator input voltage above the
threshold. In the other detector, the voltage is allowed
to fall below the comparator threshold. Then a pulse is
applied and causes a click only in the detector that has
recovered. Eve can end her control diagram here, or re-
peat the long pulse (as shown in Fig. 8(b)) and then make
another controlled click. The total length of such chained
control diagram producing several controlled clicks is lim-
ited by low-frequency cutoﬀ of the RF components, and
in the case of our setup can be up to 500 ns. We re-
mark that the short-pulsed parts of the diagram could in
principle be replaced by a single phase-modulated long
pulse, however short pulses may be easier to steer be-
tween Bob’s detectors in case of sub-nanosecond Δt used
in the modern DPS-QKD systems [36].
Interferometers used for DPS-QKD are of a suﬃciently
good quality to allow Eve an extinction ratio of at least
20 dB when routing her short pulses between the two
Bob’s detectors [36]. Examination of the recovery traces
in Fig. 6 and hotspot formation probabilities in Fig. 7
suggests that the above control diagram will work. It
should allow Eve to make clicks in Bob deterministically,
or close to deterministically, in a wide range of compara-
tor threshold voltages and Δt, even for Δt = 100 ps [36]
or/and a threshold voltage above 20mV. Eve should be
able to vary the number of short pulses during the re-
covery to suit these system parameters, and still induce
clicks in the correct detector most of the time.
Our present experimental setup did not allow us to
verify this control diagram experimentally for all combi-
nations of threshold voltages and Δt. However, we have
veriﬁed that the detector is controllable as expected for
a simulated Δt = 5ns and threshold setting of 11.6mV.
We used a 2mW peak power, 53 ns long pulse (with
1mW, 5 ns steps at the sides as per diagram in Fig. 8(b)).
We added 5 or 10 ns behind it a single 53 ps FWHM short
pulse, and measured the click probability by the SR400
counter while varying the short pulse energy. With an en-
ergy diﬀerence that simulated interferometer extinction
ratio of 20 dB, control over the detector was nearly per-
fect: probability of a click induced at 10 ns in the wrong
detector was < 0.005%, in the right detector > 99.7%.
At simulated 10 dB extinction ratio, the wrong detector
7click probability was < 1%. Jitter of the clicks caused by
the short pulse was 250 ps FWHM, while that of clicks
caused by the long pulse leading edge was 170 ps FWHM.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The experimental results show that the control of this
SSPD is nearly perfect. Therefore, if this SSPD were
used in a QKD system, an eavesdropper could use bright
illumination to capture the full raw and secret key, while
introducing negligible errors.
While the SSPD is based on diﬀerent physics than the
APD single-photon detector, the similarity in how they
can be controlled is startling. Latching the SSPD us-
ing bright illumination can be considered as permanently
blinding it, without the need for additional illumination
to keep it blind. In the latched/blind state, the SSPD
exhibits the same superlinear response to bright trigger
pulses as a blind APD. Likewise, controlling the SSPD
using deadtime extension is nearly identical to controlling
the APD using deadtime extension: the only diﬀerence
is that for this SSPD the low-frequency cut-oﬀ of the RF
components (and on a longer time scale the latching phe-
nomenon) limits how long the deadtime can be extended.
Countermeasures against bright illumination attacks
have been discussed extensively [22, 23, 27, 32, 51–53],
and most of the countermeasures are equally applicable
to SSPD-based detectors. To summarize the discussion,
detectors should be designed in a provably secure way.
For instance, in an installed QKD system, latching can
be avoided either by an automated reset, or by includ-
ing a shunt resistor in parallel with the nanowire [54].
However, this does not guarantee that latching is pre-
cluded for all types of external input, and more impor-
tantly this countermeasure does not ﬁt into a security
proof. Therefore, detector control based on both latching
and deadtime extension should be avoided by including
a calibrated light source inside Bob, randomly testing,
and thereby guaranteeing the single photon sensitivity
at random times as modelled in the security proof [53].
As mentioned in the introduction, SSPDs are still in
their infancy, and therefore our ﬁndings might not apply
to other detector designs. However, our ﬁndings clearly
demonstrate that unless detector control is specially con-
sidered during design, SSPDs may be controllable us-
ing bright illumination, just as their APD-based cousins.
The early stage of SSPD technology is an excellent oppor-
tunity to avoid detector control vulnerability for future
generations of SSPDs. Designing hack-proof detectors
will be crucial for the success of QKD.
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Quantum key distribution (QKD) has initially been
proven secure using ideal devices. However, implementa-
tions use imperfect devices available with current technol-
ogy. Therefore, there are security proofs for QKD which
model the devices to allow these imperfection, though
at the expense of a lower secure key rate. To achieve
provable security, it is crucial that the devices and im-
plementations are veriﬁed to be within the models in the
security proofs.
Security loopholes have been found originating from
discrepancies between the actual implementations and
the models in the security proofs. For instance, one such
discrepancy allows the tailored bright illumination at-
tacks [1–3], recently shown also to be applicable against
superconducting single-photon detectors [4, 5]. In this
case the loophole is caused by the response of qubit mea-
surement devices (detectors) to swarms of qubits (bright
illumination). The question is how to counter such loop-
holes.
In their paper, Yuan et al. propose to counter these
bright illumination attacks by monitoring the avalanche
photodiode (APD) current for “anomalously high values”
[6]. The robustness of this countermeasure is shown by
arguing that previously proposed attacks do not work
anymore. First of all, this leaves the challenge of deter-
mining what is “anomalously high”. In order to achieve
provable security, this threshold must originate from a
security proof. Secondly, the fundamental issue, namely
that the detector response deviates from the models in
the security proofs [7], is not solved by this countermea-
sure.
As discussed previously [8, 9], practical QKD can-
not become provably secure by intuitive countermeasures
against known attacks. This approach also requires man-
ufacturers to make frequent, possibly costly upgrades to
their systems. Loopholes should instead be countered by
modifying the implementation and/or the security proofs
such that the devices are within the models of the security
proofs. This is the only way practical QKD can obtain
the provable security that makes it superior to classi-
cal key distribution schemes. This is also how loopholes
have been handled previously: for example, the photon-
number splitting attack [10] led to more general secu-
rity proofs [11] and eventually more eﬃcient protocols
to negate the decrease in the key rate [12]. In another
example, detector eﬃciency mismatch [13], enabling for
instance the time-shift attack [14, 15], is now included in
security proofs [16, 17]. For the bright illumination at-
tacks, we have proposed a secure detection scheme which
integrates with security proofs [18]. In this scheme, a
calibrated light source is used to verify the quantum ef-
ﬁciency in the center of the detector gate. Randomizing
detection events outside the center of the gate provides
a lower bound on the fraction of detections in the center
of the gate.
In this particular case, we have already shown that
an eavesdropper using temporally tailored light of short
pulses containing less than 120 photons can threaten the
security of QKD [4]. This faint after-gate attack would
not be detectable with the countermeasure proposed by
Yuan et al., since the pulses would not cause an “anoma-
lously high” current, but rather a current similar to the
current caused by a single photon. Therefore, this serves
as an example of the risk associated with closing loop-
holes in an intuitive way.
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